Attack Surface: Log Injection
- Description: Exploiting vulnerabilities in GoAccess's log parsing logic by injecting malicious data within log entries. This can occur due to insufficient input validation in GoAccess's parsing routines.
- GoAccess Contribution: GoAccess's core functionality is parsing various log formats. Flaws in its parsing implementation directly create this attack surface.
- Example: A crafted log entry with an overly long URI is processed by GoAccess. Due to a buffer overflow vulnerability in GoAccess's URI parsing code, this leads to memory corruption and potential code execution.
- Impact: Code execution on the server running GoAccess, Denial of Service (DoS) due to crashes or resource exhaustion, information disclosure if memory contents are leaked.
- Risk Severity: High to Critical
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Input Sanitization (GoAccess Developers): Developers must implement rigorous input sanitization and validation within GoAccess's parsing code to handle malformed or malicious log entries safely. Focus on preventing buffer overflows, format string bugs, and other injection-related vulnerabilities during parsing.
- Secure Parsing Logic (GoAccess Developers): Employ secure coding practices in GoAccess's parsing logic. Use safe string handling functions, bounds checking, and robust error handling.
- Fuzzing and Security Testing (GoAccess Developers): GoAccess developers should use fuzzing and extensive security testing with a wide range of malformed and malicious log inputs to identify and fix parsing vulnerabilities before release.
- Regular Updates (Users): Users should keep GoAccess updated to the latest version to benefit from security patches released by the developers that address parsing vulnerabilities.
Attack Surface: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) in HTML Reports
- Description: Injecting malicious JavaScript code into HTML reports generated by GoAccess. This occurs when GoAccess fails to properly sanitize log data before embedding it in the HTML output.
- GoAccess Contribution: GoAccess's HTML report generation feature directly creates this attack surface if output encoding is insufficient.
- Example: A log entry contains user-controlled data like a referrer URL that includes
<script>alert("XSS")</script>
. GoAccess processes this log and includes the unsanitized referrer URL in the generated HTML report. When a user views the report, the JavaScript code executes in their browser. - Impact: If HTML reports are accessible to other users, XSS can lead to account compromise of report viewers, data theft, website defacement within the report context, or redirection to malicious sites.
- Risk Severity: High (if reports are accessible to untrusted users)
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Output Encoding (GoAccess Developers): GoAccess developers must implement robust output encoding for all user-controlled data originating from log files before including it in HTML reports. Use context-aware HTML entity encoding to sanitize data and prevent JavaScript injection.
- Content Security Policy (CSP) (Users/Deployment): While primarily a deployment mitigation, users can configure their web server serving GoAccess reports to use Content Security Policy (CSP) headers. This can provide an additional layer of defense against XSS by restricting the sources from which the browser can load resources, even if GoAccess's output encoding has a flaw.
- Regular Security Audits (GoAccess Developers): Developers should conduct regular security audits specifically focused on the HTML report generation code to ensure proper and consistent output encoding is implemented and maintained.
- Restrict Report Access (Users): Limit access to GoAccess HTML reports to only trusted users, especially if there's a concern about potentially malicious data in logs or if complete confidence in output encoding is lacking.