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Attack Tree Analysis for allinurl/goaccess

Objective: Compromise application using GoAccess by exploiting GoAccess vulnerabilities to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) or Denial of Service (DoS) on the server running GoAccess.

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Application via GoAccess
├─── **[HIGH RISK PATH]** Gain Remote Code Execution (RCE) on Server
│   ├─── **[HIGH RISK PATH]** Exploit Input Handling Vulnerabilities
│   │   ├─── **[HIGH RISK PATH]** Malicious Log File Injection
│   │   │   ├─── **[CRITICAL NODE]** Format String Vulnerability
│   │   │   └─── **[CRITICAL NODE]** Buffer Overflow Vulnerability
└─── **[HIGH RISK PATH]** Cause Denial of Service (DoS)
    ├─── **[HIGH RISK PATH]** Resource Exhaustion via Malicious Log Files
    │   ├─── **[HIGH RISK PATH]** CPU Exhaustion
    │   │   └── Craft complex or excessively large log files that require significant CPU processing to parse and analyze, overwhelming the server.
    │   ├─── **[HIGH RISK PATH]** Memory Exhaustion
    │   │   └── Craft log files that cause GoAccess to allocate excessive memory during parsing or report generation, leading to memory exhaustion and application crash.
    │   ├─── **[HIGH RISK PATH]** Disk Exhaustion (If GoAccess writes extensive logs or reports to disk)
    │   │   └── If GoAccess is configured to write detailed logs or reports, flood the application with requests to generate massive log files and reports, filling up disk space.

Attack Tree Path: Gain Remote Code Execution (RCE) on Server

  • Attack Vector: Exploiting Input Handling Vulnerabilities via Malicious Log File Injection.

  • Description: An attacker crafts malicious log entries and injects them into log files that are processed by GoAccess. By exploiting vulnerabilities in how GoAccess handles this input, the attacker aims to execute arbitrary code on the server running GoAccess.

    • Critical Node: Format String Vulnerability

      • Attack Description: If GoAccess uses printf-family functions in C to process log data without proper sanitization, an attacker can inject format string specifiers (e.g., %s, %x, %n) within log entries. When GoAccess processes these entries, the format string specifiers are interpreted, allowing the attacker to read from or write to arbitrary memory locations, potentially leading to code execution.
      • Mitigation:
        • Thorough code review focusing on printf-family function usage.
        • Static analysis tools to detect format string vulnerabilities.
        • Compiler flags like -Wformat, -Wformat-security.
        • Strict input sanitization of log entries before processing with format string functions.
        • Prefer using fixed format strings and passing user data as arguments.

    • Critical Node: Buffer Overflow Vulnerability

      • Attack Description: If GoAccess does not properly validate the length of log entries when copying or processing them, an attacker can craft overly long log entries. This can cause a buffer overflow, where data is written beyond the allocated buffer, potentially overwriting adjacent memory regions. By carefully crafting the overflow, an attacker can overwrite return addresses or function pointers to redirect program execution to attacker-controlled code.
      • Mitigation:
        • Fuzzing GoAccess with long and varied log entries.
        • Code review focusing on string manipulation functions (strcpy, strcat, sprintf, memcpy).
        • Use safe string functions like strncpy, strncat, snprintf.
        • Implement robust bounds checking in all string and memory operations.
        • Enable Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) and Data Execution Prevention (DEP/NX) on the server OS.

Attack Tree Path: Cause Denial of Service (DoS)

  • Attack Vector: Resource Exhaustion via Malicious Log Files.

  • Description: An attacker crafts malicious log files designed to consume excessive server resources (CPU, memory, disk) when processed by GoAccess. This can lead to performance degradation, service disruption, or application crashes, effectively denying service to legitimate users.

    • High-Risk Path: CPU Exhaustion

      • Attack Description: Attackers create complex or excessively large log files that require significant CPU processing time for GoAccess to parse and analyze. This can overwhelm the server's CPU, making GoAccess and potentially other services unresponsive.
      • Mitigation:
        • Resource monitoring of CPU usage during log processing.
        • Input validation to reject excessively large or complex log entries.
        • Resource limits (CPU) for the GoAccess process using OS mechanisms.
        • Rate limiting on log file processing.

    • High-Risk Path: Memory Exhaustion

      • Attack Description: Attackers craft log files that trigger inefficient memory allocation patterns in GoAccess during parsing or report generation. This can lead to GoAccess consuming all available memory, causing memory exhaustion, application crashes, and potentially system instability.
      • Mitigation:
        • Memory monitoring of the GoAccess process.
        • Resource limits (memory) for the GoAccess process.
        • Code review for memory leaks and inefficient memory allocation.

    • High-Risk Path: Disk Exhaustion (If GoAccess writes extensive logs or reports to disk)

      • Attack Description: If GoAccess is configured to write detailed logs or reports to disk, attackers can flood the application with requests that generate massive log files and reports. This can rapidly fill up disk space, leading to service disruption, storage issues, and potential data loss.
      • Mitigation:
        • Disk space monitoring.
        • Disk quotas to limit disk space usage by GoAccess.
        • Log rotation and retention policies.
        • Limit or control the generation of detailed reports.