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Attack Tree Analysis for arut/nginx-rtmp-module

Objective: To compromise application using nginx-rtmp-module by disrupting service availability, gaining unauthorized access, or injecting malicious content, focusing on high-likelihood and high-impact attack vectors.

Attack Tree Visualization

1.0 [CRITICAL NODE] Compromise Application Using nginx-rtmp-module
    ├── 1.1 [HIGH RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE] Disrupt Service Availability (Denial of Service - DoS)
    │   ├── 1.1.1 [HIGH RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE] Resource Exhaustion
    │   │   ├── 1.1.1.1 [HIGH RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE] High Connection Count Attack
    │   ├── 1.1.2 [HIGH RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE] Protocol-Level DoS
    │   │   ├── 1.1.2.1 [HIGH RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE] RTMP Handshake Exploits
    │   │   ├── 1.1.2.2 [HIGH RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE] Malformed RTMP Messages
    ├── 1.2 [HIGH RISK PATH] Gain Unauthorized Access or Control
    │   ├── 1.2.1 [HIGH RISK PATH] Authentication/Authorization Bypass (If Implemented by Application)
    │   │   ├── 1.2.1.1 [HIGH RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE] Weak or Default Credentials
    ├── 1.3 [HIGH RISK PATH] Inject Malicious Content into Streams
    │   ├── 1.3.1 [HIGH RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE] Stream Data Injection
    │   │   ├── 1.3.1.1 [HIGH RISK PATH] Malicious Media Stream Injection

Attack Tree Path: 1.0 [CRITICAL NODE] Compromise Application Using nginx-rtmp-module

  • Description: This is the root goal of the attacker. Success at any of the child nodes contributes to achieving this overall objective.
  • Attack Vectors (Summarized by Child Nodes):
    • Denial of Service attacks to disrupt availability.
    • Authentication and Authorization bypass to gain unauthorized control.
    • Malicious content injection to harm users or reputation.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1 [HIGH RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE] Disrupt Service Availability (Denial of Service - DoS)

  • Description: This path focuses on making the streaming service unavailable to legitimate users. DoS attacks are generally easier to execute and can have immediate impact.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • Resource Exhaustion (1.1.1): Overwhelming the server with requests or data to consume resources (CPU, memory, bandwidth) and cause service degradation or failure.
    • Protocol-Level Exploits (1.1.2): Exploiting weaknesses in the RTMP protocol handling to cause server errors, crashes, or hangs.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1 [HIGH RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE] Resource Exhaustion

  • Description: This is a common DoS technique targeting server resources.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • 1.1.1.1 [HIGH RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE] High Connection Count Attack:
      • Attack Vector: Flooding the RTMP server with a massive number of connection requests.
      • Mechanism: Attackers use botnets or distributed tools to initiate numerous RTMP connections simultaneously.
      • Impact: Exhausts server connection limits, memory, and CPU, preventing legitimate users from connecting and potentially crashing the server.
    • 1.1.1.2 Large Stream Data Attack (Not in High-Risk Subtree, but related): While not marked as High-Risk Path in the focused tree based on previous estimations, it's worth noting as a resource exhaustion vector.
      • Attack Vector: Sending extremely large or malformed data streams to the RTMP server.
      • Mechanism: Attackers publish streams with unusually large data chunks or crafted data that consumes excessive processing power or memory during handling.
      • Impact: Overwhelms server processing capabilities, potentially leading to hangs, crashes, or service degradation.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.2 [HIGH RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE] Protocol-Level DoS

  • Description: Exploiting vulnerabilities or weaknesses in the RTMP protocol implementation within nginx-rtmp-module.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • 1.1.2.1 [HIGH RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE] RTMP Handshake Exploits:
      • Attack Vector: Sending malformed or incomplete RTMP handshake messages.
      • Mechanism: Attackers craft RTMP handshake packets that deviate from the protocol specification in ways that cause the nginx-rtmp-module to get stuck in handshake processing, consume excessive resources, or crash.
      • Impact: Prevents legitimate connections, exhausts server resources during handshake processing, or causes service crashes.
    • 1.1.2.2 [HIGH RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE] Malformed RTMP Messages:
      • Attack Vector: Sending crafted RTMP messages with invalid headers, data types, or commands.
      • Mechanism: Attackers create RTMP messages that violate the protocol structure or contain unexpected data. When nginx-rtmp-module attempts to parse these malformed messages, it can lead to parsing errors, unexpected behavior, crashes, or resource exhaustion.
      • Impact: Service disruption, potential crashes due to parsing errors, or unexpected behavior in the streaming service.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2 [HIGH RISK PATH] Gain Unauthorized Access or Control

  • Description: This path focuses on bypassing security controls to gain unauthorized access to publishing streams or managing the streaming service.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • 1.2.1 [HIGH RISK PATH] Authentication/Authorization Bypass (If Implemented by Application): Exploiting weaknesses in the application's authentication and authorization mechanisms that are intended to control access to RTMP publishing.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2.1 [HIGH RISK PATH] Authentication/Authorization Bypass (If Implemented by Application)

  • Description: Targeting weaknesses in how the application verifies user identity and permissions for publishing streams.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • 1.2.1.1 [HIGH RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE] Weak or Default Credentials:
      • Attack Vector: Using easily guessable passwords or default credentials for accounts that are supposed to be protected.
      • Mechanism: Attackers attempt common usernames and passwords, or exploit default credentials that were not changed during setup.
      • Impact: Gains unauthorized access to publishing streams, allowing attackers to inject malicious content, disrupt legitimate streams, or gain control over the streaming service's content.

Attack Tree Path: 1.3 [HIGH RISK PATH] Inject Malicious Content into Streams

  • Description: This path focuses on injecting harmful or unwanted content into the media streams served by the application.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • 1.3.1 [HIGH RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE] Stream Data Injection: Injecting malicious data directly into the media stream itself.

Attack Tree Path: 1.3.1 [HIGH RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE] Stream Data Injection

  • Description: Directly manipulating the content of the media stream.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • 1.3.1.1 [HIGH RISK PATH] Malicious Media Stream Injection:
      • Attack Vector: Publishing a stream that contains malicious media content.
      • Mechanism: Attackers, having gained unauthorized publishing access (e.g., through authentication bypass), publish a stream that contains video or audio with embedded exploits, phishing content, propaganda, or other harmful material.
      • Impact: Reputational damage to the service, potential client-side exploits if viewers' media players are vulnerable to the injected content, serving harmful or unwanted content to users.