Objective: Gain Unauthorized Control over Skynet Application
Goal: Gain Unauthorized Control over Skynet Application
├── 1.2. Exploit C Service Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│ ├── 1.2.1. Buffer Overflow in C service. [CRITICAL NODE]
│ └── 1.2.3. Memory Corruption in C service (use-after-free, double-free). [CRITICAL NODE]
├── 1.3. Exploit Lua Service Vulnerabilities
│ └── 1.3.1. Inject malicious Lua code. [HIGH-RISK PATH]
├── 2.3. Exploit Weaknesses in Gate Service (if used) [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│ └── 2.3.1. Bypass authentication/authorization in the gate service. [CRITICAL NODE]
└── 3. Compromise the Global Name Server [HIGH-RISK PATH]
└── 3.1. Exploit vulnerabilities in the snlua nameserver service. [CRITICAL NODE]
Attack Tree Path: 1.2. Exploit C Service Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH]
Description: This path focuses on exploiting vulnerabilities in services written in C, which are often lower-level and more prone to memory-related issues. Successful exploitation can lead to arbitrary code execution, giving the attacker full control over the compromised service and potentially the entire Skynet node.
Critical Nodes:
1.2.1. Buffer Overflow in C service. [CRITICAL NODE]
Exploit: The attacker sends a crafted message to a C service that contains data exceeding the allocated buffer size. This overwrites adjacent memory, potentially altering program control flow and executing malicious code.
Mitigation:
Rigorous code review to identify potential buffer overflow vulnerabilities.
Use of safe string handling functions (e.g., snprintf instead of sprintf).
Employ memory safety tools like AddressSanitizer (ASan) and Valgrind during development and testing.
Implement stack canaries (if supported by the compiler/platform) to detect buffer overflows.
Likelihood: Low-Medium (if code is not well-audited), Impact: Very High, Effort: Medium-High, Skill Level: Advanced, Detection Difficulty: Hard-Very Hard (without specific tools)
1.2.3. Memory Corruption in C service (use-after-free, double-free). [CRITICAL NODE]
Exploit: The attacker crafts messages or sequences of messages that trigger memory management errors within the C service. This can involve using memory after it has been freed (use-after-free) or freeing the same memory region multiple times (double-free). These errors can lead to crashes, data corruption, or arbitrary code execution.
Mitigation:
Rigorous code review, paying close attention to memory allocation and deallocation.
Use of memory safety tools (ASan, Valgrind) to detect memory errors during development and testing.
Careful management of dynamically allocated memory, ensuring proper initialization, usage, and deallocation. Consider using smart pointers or other memory management techniques to reduce the risk of manual errors.
Likelihood: Low-Medium, Impact: Very High, Effort: High, Skill Level: Advanced-Expert, Detection Difficulty: Very Hard
Attack Tree Path: 1.3. Exploit Lua Service Vulnerabilities
1.3.1. Inject malicious Lua code. [HIGH-RISK PATH] Description: This attack targets services written in Lua, specifically focusing on scenarios where the application might dynamically load or execute Lua code based on untrusted input. Exploit: If the application takes user input (e.g., from a message, configuration file, or external source) and uses it to construct or execute Lua code without proper sanitization or validation, an attacker can inject malicious Lua code. This code could then perform unauthorized actions, access sensitive data, or disrupt the service. Mitigation: Avoid dynamic Lua code loading from untrusted sources whenever possible. This is the most effective mitigation. If dynamic loading is absolutely necessary, rigorously sanitize and validate any input used to construct Lua code. Use whitelisting approaches to allow only known-safe code patterns. Employ a sandboxed Lua environment. This restricts the capabilities of the executed Lua code, limiting its access to system resources and other services. Skynet provides some sandboxing features, but careful configuration is required. Consider using a Lua linter to identify potentially dangerous code patterns. Likelihood: Low (if input is properly sanitized), Impact: Very High, Effort: Low-Medium, Skill Level: Intermediate, Detection Difficulty: Medium
Attack Tree Path: 2.3. Exploit Weaknesses in Gate Service (if used) [HIGH-RISK PATH]
Description: The gate service acts as a front-end, handling external connections and routing them to internal Skynet services. Compromising the gate service provides a direct path to attack internal services. Critical Nodes: 2.3.1. Bypass authentication/authorization in the gate service. [CRITICAL NODE] Exploit: If the gate service has vulnerabilities in its authentication or authorization mechanisms, an attacker can bypass these checks and gain unauthorized access to internal services. This could involve exploiting flaws in the authentication logic, finding default credentials, or discovering vulnerabilities that allow privilege escalation. Mitigation: Implement robust authentication and authorization mechanisms. Use strong, well-vetted authentication protocols. Follow the principle of least privilege: the gate service should only have the minimum necessary permissions to perform its function. Thoroughly test the gate service's security mechanisms, including penetration testing and fuzzing. Regularly review and update the gate service's code and configuration. Implement rate limiting and other defenses against brute-force attacks. Likelihood: Low-Medium (depending on gate implementation), Impact: Very High, Effort: Medium-High, Skill Level: Advanced, Detection Difficulty: Medium-Hard
Attack Tree Path: 3. Compromise the Global Name Server [HIGH-RISK PATH]
Description: The global name server (snlua nameserver) is a critical component of Skynet, responsible for mapping service names to their addresses. Compromising the name server allows an attacker to control service discovery, redirecting traffic to malicious services.
Critical Nodes:
3.1. Exploit vulnerabilities in the snlua nameserver service. [CRITICAL NODE]
Exploit: The attacker exploits vulnerabilities in the snlua nameserver service itself (e.g., buffer overflows, code injection, logic errors) to gain control over its operation. This could allow them to modify service registrations, add new malicious registrations, or disrupt the name server's functionality.
Mitigation:
Treat the snlua nameserver as a high-security component and apply the same rigorous security practices as for other C services (code review, memory safety tools, fuzzing).
Implement strong input validation and sanitization for any data received by the name server.
Regularly update the name server to the latest version to patch any known vulnerabilities.
Monitor the name server's logs and resource usage for signs of suspicious activity.
Consider running the name server in a restricted environment with limited privileges.
Likelihood: Low (if well-audited), Impact: Very High, Effort: High, Skill Level: Advanced-Expert, Detection Difficulty: Very Hard