attack-surface.md

Attack Surface Analysis for davatorium/rofi

Attack Surface: 1. Configuration Parsing Vulnerabilities

• Description: Flaws in rofi's parsing of config.rasi files can lead to security breaches.
• Rofi Contribution: rofi's functionality relies on parsing config.rasi for customization. A vulnerable parser makes rofi susceptible to malicious configurations.
• Example: A buffer overflow in rofi's config.rasi parser. A crafted config.rasi with an excessively long string for a theme setting could trigger a buffer overflow during parsing by rofi, potentially leading to denial of service or code execution within the rofi process.
• Impact: Denial of Service, potentially Code Execution within rofi process.
• Risk Severity: High to Critical.
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Developers & Users:
    • Ensure rofi is updated to the latest version to benefit from parser security fixes.
    • Report any suspected parsing issues to the rofi developers.
  • Users:
    • Be cautious when using config.rasi files from untrusted sources. Stick to well-vetted themes and configurations.

Attack Surface: 2. Command Injection via User Input in dmenu Mode and Custom Commands

• Description: Improper handling of user input when rofi executes commands, especially in dmenu mode or through custom commands, can enable command injection.
• Rofi Contribution: rofi's core purpose includes executing commands based on user selections. If rofi or its configuration allows user input to be directly incorporated into shell commands without proper sanitization, it becomes a direct vector for command injection.
• Example: Using rofi -dmenu to select an action, where the selected text is directly used in a command. If a user can control the input to rofi -dmenu (e.g., via a script generating the menu items), they could inject malicious commands. For instance, if the menu items are generated from an external, untrusted source and one item is crafted as ; rm -rf / #, selecting this item in rofi -dmenu could lead to the execution of rm -rf / with the privileges of the user running rofi.
• Impact: Code Execution, Privilege Escalation, System Compromise.
• Risk Severity: Critical.
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Developers & Users (Configuration/Scripts):
    • Never directly use unsanitized user input in shell commands executed by rofi.
    • When defining custom commands or actions in rofi configurations or scripts, ensure user input is properly escaped or validated before being used in shell commands. Use safer alternatives to shell commands when possible.
    • If generating menu items for rofi -dmenu from external sources, sanitize the input to prevent injection attacks.
  • Users (General):
    • Be extremely cautious when using rofi in scenarios where the menu items or actions are derived from untrusted sources.
    • Understand the commands that rofi is configured to execute based on your selections.

Attack Surface: 3. Unsafe Execution of External Scripts Triggered by Rofi

• Description: If rofi is configured to execute external scripts based on user actions, vulnerabilities in how rofi triggers these scripts or in the scripts themselves can be exploited.
• Rofi Contribution: rofi's ability to trigger external scripts (e.g., through custom commands or actions associated with menu items) introduces an attack surface if this script execution is not handled securely by rofi or if the scripts are vulnerable.
• Example: A rofi configuration defines a custom command that executes a shell script. If rofi does not properly handle the execution environment or if the script itself is vulnerable to command injection (even if the input to rofi is safe, the script might have its own vulnerabilities), this can be exploited. For example, if rofi executes a script with elevated privileges based on a user action, and that script has a vulnerability, it can be exploited to gain those elevated privileges.
• Impact: Code Execution, Privilege Escalation, System Compromise (depending on the script's capabilities and vulnerabilities).
• Risk Severity: High to Critical.
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Developers & Users (Configuration/Scripts):
    • Ensure that any scripts executed by rofi are written securely and follow secure coding practices, especially regarding input handling and command execution.
    • Minimize the privileges required for scripts executed by rofi. Run scripts with the least necessary privileges.
    • Carefully review and audit any scripts that rofi is configured to execute, especially if they are from untrusted sources.
  • Users (General):
    • Be cautious about using rofi configurations that execute external scripts, especially if you are unsure of the script's origin and security.
    • Understand what scripts rofi is configured to execute and what those scripts do.

Attack Surface: 4. Path Traversal in Loading Configuration Files and Resources

• Description: Improper handling of file paths when rofi loads configuration files, themes, icons, or scripts can lead to path traversal vulnerabilities.
• Rofi Contribution: rofi needs to load various resources from the file system. If rofi does not properly sanitize or validate paths used for loading these resources, it can be vulnerable to path traversal attacks.
• Example: If rofi allows specifying a theme path via a command-line argument or environment variable, and it doesn't properly sanitize this path, an attacker could potentially provide a path like /../../../../etc/passwd to attempt to load a file outside of the intended theme directory. While rofi might not directly display /etc/passwd as a theme, a path traversal vulnerability in resource loading could potentially be leveraged in more complex exploits or in custom extensions/scripts that rely on rofi's resource loading mechanisms. More realistically, a malicious theme file loaded via path traversal could overwrite legitimate configuration files if rofi or related scripts have write access to those locations due to misconfigurations.
• Impact: Information Disclosure (potentially, depending on what files can be accessed), Configuration Tampering, potentially Code Execution in more complex scenarios.
• Risk Severity: High.
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Developers & Users (Configuration):
    • Ensure rofi is updated to versions with path traversal vulnerability fixes.
    • If modifying rofi's code, use secure path handling functions and avoid manual string manipulation for path construction.
  • Users:
    • Be cautious when specifying custom paths for themes, configurations, or other resources, especially if the source of these paths is untrusted.
    • Only use themes and configurations from trusted sources.