mitigations.md

Mitigation Strategies Analysis for davatorium/rofi

Mitigation Strategy: Strict Input Sanitization and Validation (Rofi Context)

• Mitigation Strategy: Strict Input Sanitization and Validation (Rofi Context)
• Description:
  1. Identify Rofi Input Points: Developers must pinpoint all instances where user input, intended for use within rofi commands, originates in the application. This includes input that populates rofi menus, search queries passed to rofi, or any text fields presented by rofi that the application processes.
  2. Define Rofi-Specific Whitelist: Create a whitelist of allowed characters and patterns specifically for input that will be used in rofi commands. This whitelist should be tailored to the expected input types within rofi and should be as restrictive as possible. For example, if rofi is used to select application names, the whitelist should allow only alphanumeric characters, hyphens, and underscores.
  3. Validate Input Before Rofi Interaction: Implement input validation routines in the application code before passing any user input to rofi or constructing commands that rofi will execute. This validation must check if the input conforms to the defined rofi-specific whitelist. Input that fails validation should be rejected before it reaches rofi, and an informative error message should be displayed to the user via the application (not necessarily via rofi itself).
  4. Escape Special Characters for Rofi Commands (Limited Use): If dynamic input beyond a strict whitelist is absolutely necessary for rofi commands (which should be minimized), use proper escaping mechanisms when constructing the command string that is passed to rofi. For example, when using shell commands with rofi -dmenu -p ..., ensure user input is properly quoted using shell quoting mechanisms (like printf '%q') before being embedded in the command string. However, emphasize that escaping should be a last resort for rofi command construction, and whitelisting input before it even reaches rofi is the preferred approach.
• List of Threats Mitigated:
  • Command Injection via Rofi (High Severity): Malicious users could inject arbitrary shell commands by providing crafted input that bypasses sanitization and is then used in commands executed by rofi. This leads to unauthorized code execution initiated through rofi.
• Impact: Significantly reduces the risk of Command Injection via rofi. By validating input before it interacts with rofi and carefully constructing commands passed to rofi, the likelihood of successful injection is drastically reduced.
• Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. Input sanitization is currently implemented in the Python backend for application name selection in the main menu (main_menu.py), using a basic alphanumeric whitelist before application names are presented in rofi.
• Missing Implementation: Input sanitization is missing in:
  • The custom command execution feature in the advanced_menu.sh script. User-provided commands are not sanitized before being passed to rofi for execution.
  • Any input fields in potential future features that might involve user-provided text used in commands executed by rofi. Validation needs to be implemented before this input is used with rofi.

Mitigation Strategy: Parameterization and Command Construction Best Practices (Rofi Commands)

• Mitigation Strategy: Parameterization and Command Construction Best Practices (Rofi Commands)
• Description:
  1. Prefer Direct Binary Execution for Rofi Actions: When designing actions triggered by rofi selections, prioritize directly executing binaries with arguments instead of relying on shell interpretation of complex command strings passed to rofi. This minimizes the shell's role and reduces the attack surface for injection vulnerabilities within the commands that rofi executes. For example, instead of using rofi to trigger a shell command like rofi -dmenu -p "Action: " -input <(echo "script.sh arg1 arg2"), if possible, have rofi directly trigger the execution of script.sh with arguments passed separately by the application.
  2. Minimize Shell Usage in Rofi Commands: Reduce reliance on shell features like command substitution, pipes, and redirection within the commands that rofi is instructed to execute. If shell features are necessary in rofi-triggered actions, carefully construct the command strings and ensure user input is never directly embedded without strict sanitization and escaping (as described in strategy 1, applied before constructing the rofi command).
  3. Use Array-Based Command Construction for Rofi (Shell Scripts): In shell scripts that construct commands for rofi to execute, use arrays to build commands instead of string concatenation. This helps prevent accidental misinterpretation of spaces and special characters when constructing the command string for rofi. For example, instead of rofi_command="rofi -dmenu -p '$prompt' -input <(echo '$menu_items')", use rofi_command_array=("rofi" "-dmenu" "-p" "$prompt" "-input" "<(echo '$menu_items')"); "${rofi_command_array[@]}".
  4. Avoid eval and similar dangerous constructs in Rofi-Triggered Actions: Never use eval or similar functions that execute arbitrary strings as code within the actions triggered by rofi selections, especially when user input is involved. This is a major command injection vulnerability that can be easily exploited through rofi if not carefully avoided.
• List of Threats Mitigated:
  • Command Injection via Rofi (High Severity): Reduces the likelihood of command injection by limiting the shell's ability to interpret user input as commands or shell metacharacters within the commands executed by rofi.
• Impact: Moderately reduces the risk of Command Injection via rofi. While not a complete solution on its own, it significantly reduces the attack surface and makes exploitation harder, especially when combined with input sanitization applied before interacting with rofi.
• Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. For simple application launches in main_menu.py, direct binary execution is used where possible when rofi triggers application starts.
• Missing Implementation:
  • The advanced_menu.sh script relies heavily on shell command construction and string manipulation for actions triggered by rofi, increasing the risk of injection. This script needs to be refactored to minimize shell usage in rofi-triggered actions and adopt safer command construction methods for rofi.
  • Future features involving more complex actions triggered by rofi should prioritize direct binary execution and minimize shell interaction in the commands that rofi executes.

Mitigation Strategy: Clear and Explicit Rofi Menu Design & Confirmation Prompts

• Mitigation Strategy: Clear and Explicit Rofi Menu Design & Confirmation Prompts
• Description:
  1. Descriptive Rofi Menu Items: Use clear, concise, and unambiguous labels for all menu items presented in rofi. Labels should accurately reflect the action that will be performed when the item is selected via rofi. Avoid vague or misleading labels in rofi menus.
  2. Contextual Information in Rofi Prompts: Provide sufficient contextual information in rofi menu prompts and item descriptions to help users understand the consequences of their choices within the rofi interface.
  3. Confirmation Prompts in Rofi for Destructive Actions: For actions triggered by rofi that are potentially destructive, irreversible, or have significant consequences (e.g., deleting files, executing system commands), implement confirmation prompts within the rofi workflow. These prompts should be displayed by rofi (or immediately after a rofi selection) and clearly state the action to be performed, requiring explicit user confirmation (e.g., "Are you sure you want to delete file X? [Yes/No]" presented in a subsequent rofi prompt or a similar mechanism triggered by rofi).
  4. Visual Cues in Rofi Menus: Use visual cues (e.g., different colors, icons) in rofi menus to differentiate between actions with varying levels of risk or impact within the rofi interface. This can help users quickly identify potentially sensitive or destructive options in rofi.
• List of Threats Mitigated:
  • Unintended Command Execution via Rofi (Medium Severity): Reduces the risk of users accidentally triggering unintended actions through rofi due to unclear menu items or lack of confirmation in the rofi interface.
  • User Error leading to Data Loss or System Damage via Rofi (Medium Severity): Confirmation prompts and clear descriptions in rofi help prevent accidental data loss or system damage caused by user mistakes made while interacting with rofi.
• Impact: Moderately reduces the risk of Unintended Command Execution and User Error when using rofi. Confirmation prompts within the rofi workflow are particularly effective in preventing accidental destructive actions triggered through rofi.
• Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. Main menu items in main_menu.py are generally descriptive when presented in rofi.
• Missing Implementation:
  • Confirmation prompts are not implemented for any actions triggered by rofi, including potentially destructive actions in advanced_menu.sh or future features that use rofi to initiate actions. Confirmation prompts need to be integrated into the rofi interaction flow.
  • Menu item descriptions could be improved in some areas to provide more context and clarity within rofi, especially in advanced_menu.sh.

Mitigation Strategy: Control Sensitive Information Displayed in Rofi Interface

• Mitigation Strategy: Control Sensitive Information Displayed in Rofi Interface
• Description:
  1. Minimize Information Displayed in Rofi: Carefully review all information displayed in rofi menus and prompts. Avoid displaying sensitive data (passwords, API keys, personal information, internal system details) directly within the rofi interface unless absolutely necessary for the user to perform the intended task using rofi.
  2. Redact or Mask Sensitive Data in Rofi: If sensitive information must be displayed in rofi, redact or mask portions of it to minimize exposure within the rofi display. For example, display only the last few digits of an ID or mask characters in a password field presented in rofi.
  3. Temporary Display and Clearing in Rofi (If Applicable): If sensitive information is displayed temporarily in rofi, ensure it is cleared from the rofi display and application memory as soon as it is no longer needed. Consider how rofi handles display history and ensure sensitive information is not persistently stored or easily accessible in rofi's history.
  4. Access Control for Sensitive Information in Rofi Context: Implement access control mechanisms in the application to ensure that only authorized users can interact with rofi interfaces that might display sensitive information or trigger privileged actions via rofi. This control should be applied before information is presented in rofi.
• List of Threats Mitigated:
  • Information Disclosure via Rofi (Medium Severity): Prevents accidental or intentional disclosure of sensitive information through the rofi display.
  • Data Breach via Rofi Interface (Medium Severity): Reduces the risk of data breaches by limiting the exposure of sensitive data in the user interface presented by rofi.
• Impact: Moderately reduces the risk of Information Disclosure and Data Breach related to information presented in rofi. The impact depends on the sensitivity of the information being controlled and displayed in rofi.
• Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. Currently, no highly sensitive information is directly displayed in rofi menus in the main application.
• Missing Implementation:
  • This strategy needs to be considered proactively for all future features and updates that involve displaying information via rofi. Developers must be mindful of information disclosure risks when designing new rofi interfaces.
  • A formal review process should be implemented to assess information disclosure risks before adding new features that display data in rofi menus or prompts. This review should specifically consider what information is presented in rofi.