attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for davatorium/rofi

Objective: Execute Arbitrary Code OR Exfiltrate Sensitive Data via Rofi

Attack Tree Visualization

                                     +-------------------------------------------------+
                                     |  Attacker Goal: Execute Arbitrary Code OR       |
                                     |  Exfiltrate Sensitive Data via Rofi             |
                                     +-------------------------------------------------+
                                                      |
          +================================================================================================+
          || [HIGH-RISK]                                                                                    ||
+-------------------------+
|  Exploit Rofi's Input   |
|       Handling          |
+-------------------------+
          ||
+=========[HIGH-RISK]=====+
| Command |  Script   |
|Injection|[CRITICAL] | (Dmenu   |
|         |  Mode)   |
|         |           |
+---------+---------+
          ||
+=========[HIGH-RISK]=====+
| Bypass  |  Escape  |
| Input   |  Chars   |
|Filtering|[CRITICAL] |          |
+---------+---------+

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Rofi's Input Handling (High-Risk)

• Description: This is the primary attack vector, focusing on how rofi processes user-provided or application-provided input. The lack of proper sanitization or filtering of this input can lead to severe vulnerabilities.

• Sub-Vectors:

Attack Tree Path: Command Injection (Critical)

• Description: The attacker injects malicious commands into the input that rofi receives. If the application using rofi then executes this input as a command (e.g., using system(), exec(), or similar functions), the attacker's code runs with the privileges of the application.
• Example: If rofi is used to select a file to open, and the application uses a command like xdg-open <user_input>, the attacker could input ; rm -rf /; to attempt a destructive command.
• Mitigation:
  • Strict Whitelisting: Allow only a predefined set of safe characters and commands.
  • Robust Escaping: If whitelisting isn't feasible, use a well-tested escaping function to neutralize special characters.
  • Avoid Shell Execution: If possible, use safer alternatives to executing shell commands directly. For example, use library functions to open files instead of xdg-open.
  • Input Length Limits: Restrict the maximum length of the input.

Attack Tree Path: Script Injection (Dmenu Mode) (High-Risk)

• Description: When rofi emulates dmenu, it reads options from standard input. If the application feeds unsanitized data to rofi in this mode, an attacker might be able to inject script code that rofi or the calling application will interpret and execute. This depends heavily on how the application processes rofi's output.
• Example: If the application feeds a list of usernames to rofi in dmenu mode, and an attacker can control one of the usernames, they might inject a username like "; malicious_command; #.`
• Mitigation:
  • Sanitize Input to Dmenu: Treat all data fed to rofi in dmenu mode as potentially malicious. Sanitize it as rigorously as you would sanitize direct user input.
  • Context-Aware Processing: Understand how the application uses rofi's output in dmenu mode and ensure that it's not vulnerable to script injection.

Attack Tree Path: Bypass Input Filtering (Critical)

• Description: If the application attempts to filter or sanitize input, the attacker will try to find ways to bypass these filters. This often involves using obscure character encodings, Unicode normalization tricks, or other techniques to sneak malicious characters or commands past the filter.
• Example: If the application filters out semicolons (;), the attacker might try using a Unicode fullwidth semicolon (\uff1b) or other visually similar characters.
• Mitigation:
  • Test Filters Thoroughly: Use fuzzing and penetration testing techniques to try to bypass the input filters.
  • Use Well-Vetted Libraries: Don't write your own filtering logic from scratch. Use established and well-tested input validation libraries.
  • Defense in Depth: Combine multiple layers of input validation and sanitization.

Attack Tree Path: Escape Chars (High-Risk)

• Description: If rofi uses escape characters, attacker can try to inject them to manipulate the output or behavior of rofi.
• Example: If rofi uses \n as newline, attacker can inject it to create multiline output, potentially bypassing some checks.
• Mitigation:
  • Properly escape or filter escape characters: Ensure that escape characters are handled correctly and cannot be used to inject malicious code or manipulate the output.
  • Use a well-tested escaping library: Avoid writing custom escaping logic.