mitigations.md

Mitigation Strategies Analysis for davatorium/rofi

Mitigation Strategy: Input Sanitization and Whitelisting (within Rofi and its Scripts)

Description:

1. Identify Rofi Input Points: Pinpoint all locations where rofi receives user input. This includes the main input field, arguments passed to custom scripts via rofi, and any data read from files/pipes that are directly influenced by rofi's user interaction.
2. Define Strict Whitelists: For each rofi input point, create a rigorous whitelist of allowed characters or regular expression patterns. Prioritize the most restrictive whitelist possible.
3. Implement Validation in Rofi Configuration and Scripts:
   • Within rofi's configuration (e.g., config.rasi), if using features that process input (like -dmenu), ensure the commands receiving the input perform thorough validation.
   • Within every custom script called by rofi, implement robust input validation before using the input in any shell command, file operation, or other potentially dangerous action. Use a dedicated parsing library if feasible.
4. Escape/Quote (Last Resort): If shell metacharacters must be used after validation within a rofi-launched script, ensure they are meticulously escaped or quoted. This is a fallback to whitelisting, not a replacement.
5. Rofi Input Length Limits: Utilize rofi's built-in features (if available) or script-level checks to enforce reasonable maximum lengths on input fields to prevent excessively long inputs.
6. Consistent Encoding: Ensure that rofi and all associated scripts use a consistent character encoding (preferably UTF-8) to avoid encoding-related vulnerabilities.

• Threats Mitigated:

  • Command Injection (Severity: Critical): Prevents attackers from injecting arbitrary shell commands through rofi's input mechanisms.
  • Script Injection (Severity: Critical): Prevents malicious code injection into scripts executed by rofi.
  • Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) (Severity: High): Relevant if rofi's output is displayed in a web context (uncommon, but possible with custom scripts).
  • Denial of Service (DoS) (Severity: Medium): Length limits and input validation mitigate some DoS attacks.
  • Path Traversal (Severity: High): If rofi is used for file/directory selection, input validation prevents access outside intended directories.

• Impact:

  • Command Injection: Risk reduced from Critical to Very Low.
  • Script Injection: Risk reduced from Critical to Very Low.
  • XSS: Risk reduced from High to Low (context-dependent).
  • DoS: Risk reduced from Medium to Low.
  • Path Traversal: Risk reduced from High to Low.

• Currently Implemented:

  • Hypothetical Example: Partially implemented. Basic length limits might exist in rofi's configuration. Some custom scripts have basic validation, but it's inconsistent and not always whitelist-based.

• Missing Implementation:

  • Hypothetical Example: Comprehensive whitelisting needs to be implemented across all rofi input points and within every custom script. A dedicated input validation library should be considered for scripts. A thorough audit of all rofi-related scripts is required.

Mitigation Strategy: Secure Script Execution (Rofi-Launched Scripts)

Description:

1. Principle of Least Privilege (within Scripts): Ensure that every script executed by rofi operates with the minimum necessary privileges. Avoid running scripts as root.
2. Wrapper Scripts (for Rofi): Create wrapper scripts that rofi calls instead of directly executing the target script. These wrappers can perform:
   • Additional Input Validation: Reinforce input validation before passing data to the main script.
   • Integrity Checks: Verify the target script's integrity (e.g., checksum) before execution.
   • Security Policy Enforcement: Implement custom security checks.
   • Logging: Log script execution details for auditing.
3. Secure Scripting Practices (within Rofi Scripts):
   • Always quote variables to prevent word splitting and globbing.
   • Use set -euo pipefail in shell scripts for robustness.
   • Avoid unsafe functions/commands.
   • Handle errors meticulously.
   • Never store sensitive data directly in scripts. Use environment variables or secure alternatives, and ensure rofi passes these securely (if needed).
4. -no-exec Consideration: Evaluate using rofi's -no-exec option in specific scenarios. This forces rofi to use a shell, which, combined with rigorous shell script validation, can provide an extra (though not primary) layer of control.

• Threats Mitigated:

  • Privilege Escalation (Severity: Critical): Limits the potential for a compromised script to gain elevated privileges.
  • System Compromise (Severity: Critical): Reduces the damage a compromised script can inflict.
  • Data Exfiltration (Severity: High): Makes it harder for a script to access and exfiltrate sensitive data.
  • Malware Propagation (Severity: High): Restricts a script's ability to spread malware.

• Impact:

  • Privilege Escalation: Risk reduced from Critical to Medium.
  • System Compromise: Risk reduced from Critical to Medium.
  • Data Exfiltration: Risk reduced from High to Medium.
  • Malware Propagation: Risk reduced from High to Medium.

• Currently Implemented:

  • Hypothetical Example: Partially implemented. Some scripts might avoid unnecessary root privileges, but there's no consistent use of wrapper scripts or comprehensive secure scripting practices.

• Missing Implementation:

  • Hypothetical Example: Implement wrapper scripts for all rofi-launched scripts that handle user input or perform sensitive operations. Conduct a thorough security review of all existing scripts, enforcing secure coding practices.

Mitigation Strategy: Secure Rofi Configuration

Description:

1. Restrict File Permissions (Rofi Config): Ensure strict file permissions on rofi's configuration file (e.g., ~/.config/rofi/config.rasi) and any directories containing rofi-launched scripts. Only the user running rofi should have read-write access.
2. Avoid Sensitive Data in Rofi Config: Never store passwords, API keys, or other sensitive information directly in rofi's configuration file. Use environment variables or other secure mechanisms, and ensure rofi is configured to access them securely (if necessary).
3. Review Rofi Configuration: Regularly audit rofi's configuration file for any potentially unsafe settings or commands.

• Threats Mitigated:

  • Unauthorized Configuration Modification (Severity: Medium): Prevents unauthorized changes to rofi's behavior.
  • Information Disclosure (Severity: High): Protects sensitive data that might be (incorrectly) stored in the configuration.

• Impact:

  • Unauthorized Configuration Modification: Risk reduced from Medium to Low.
  • Information Disclosure: Risk reduced from High to Low (if sensitive data is removed).

• Currently Implemented:

  • Hypothetical Example: Partially implemented. File permissions are likely set correctly, but a review for sensitive data in the configuration is needed.

• Missing Implementation:

  • Hypothetical Example: Thoroughly review rofi's configuration file to ensure no sensitive data is stored directly within it. Implement a secure method for managing any secrets that rofi needs to access.

Mitigation Strategy: Wayland Preference for Rofi

Description:

1. Prioritize Wayland: If the system supports both X11 and Wayland, configure the system and rofi to use Wayland. Wayland's architecture provides better isolation between applications, reducing the risk of rofi being affected by or affecting other applications. This is a direct choice impacting rofi's security posture.
2. Verify Rofi is using Wayland: Use system tools to confirm that rofi is actually running under Wayland and not falling back to X11.

• Threats Mitigated:

  • Input Sniffing (Severity: High): Reduces the risk of other applications eavesdropping on rofi's input (a significant risk on X11).
  • Window Manipulation (Severity: Medium): Reduces the risk of other applications interfering with rofi's windows (also more prevalent on X11).

• Impact:

  • Input Sniffing: Risk reduced from High (X11) to Low (Wayland).
  • Window Manipulation: Risk reduced from Medium (X11) to Low (Wayland).

• Currently Implemented:

  • Hypothetical Example: Potentially not implemented or inconsistently implemented. The system might default to X11, or rofi might not be explicitly configured to prefer Wayland.

• Missing Implementation:

  • Hypothetical Example: Configure the system and rofi to explicitly prefer Wayland. Verify that rofi is running under Wayland.