attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for eclipse-mosquitto/mosquitto

Objective: Compromise Application via Mosquitto Exploitation

Attack Tree Visualization

Root Goal: Compromise Application via Mosquitto Exploitation [CRITICAL NODE]
├───(OR)─ 1. Exploit Mosquitto Broker Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]
│   └───(OR)─ 1.1. Exploit Known Mosquitto Vulnerabilities (CVEs) [CRITICAL NODE]
│       └───(AND)─ 1.1.3. Execute Exploit ***HIGH-RISK PATH***
├───(OR)─ 2. Exploit Mosquitto Configuration Weaknesses [CRITICAL NODE]
│   ├───(OR)─ 2.1. Leverage Default/Weak Credentials ***HIGH-RISK PATH*** [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   ├───(AND)─ 2.1.2. Attempt Default Credentials ***HIGH-RISK PATH***
│   │   └───(AND)─ 2.1.3. Brute-Force Weak Credentials ***HIGH-RISK PATH***
│   └───(OR)─ 2.3. Abuse Anonymous Access ***HIGH-RISK PATH*** [CRITICAL NODE]
│       └───(AND)─ 2.3.2. Exploit Anonymous Access Permissions ***HIGH-RISK PATH***
│           ├───(OR)─ 2.3.2.1. Subscribe to Sensitive Topics ***HIGH-RISK PATH***
│           ├───(OR)─ 2.3.2.2. Publish Malicious Messages ***HIGH-RISK PATH***
│           └───(OR)─ 2.3.2.3. Cause Denial of Service (DoS) ***HIGH-RISK PATH***
└───(OR)─ 4. Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attacks (Network Level) [CRITICAL NODE]
    └───(OR)─ 4.2. Message Eavesdropping (Without TLS) ***HIGH-RISK PATH*** [CRITICAL NODE]
    │   └───(AND)─ 4.2.2. MQTT Communication is Unencrypted (No TLS) ***HIGH-RISK PATH*** [CRITICAL NODE]
    │       └───(AND)─ 4.2.3. Read Sensitive Data from Intercepted Messages ***HIGH-RISK PATH***
    └───(OR)─ 4.3. Message Tampering (Without TLS) ***HIGH-RISK PATH*** [CRITICAL NODE]
        └───(AND)─ 4.3.2. MQTT Communication is Unencrypted (No TLS) ***HIGH-RISK PATH*** [CRITICAL NODE]
            └───(AND)─ 4.3.3. Modify MQTT Messages in Transit ***HIGH-RISK PATH***
            └───(AND)─ 4.3.4. Forward Modified Messages to Broker/Clients ***HIGH-RISK PATH***

Attack Tree Path: Root Goal: Compromise Application via Mosquitto Exploitation [CRITICAL NODE]

• This is the ultimate objective. Success in any of the sub-paths leads to achieving this goal. It's critical because it represents the overall security posture of the application in relation to Mosquitto.

Attack Tree Path: 1. Exploit Mosquitto Broker Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]

• Directly targeting the Mosquitto broker is a critical path because compromising the broker can have widespread impact, affecting all applications and clients connected to it.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1. Exploit Known Mosquitto Vulnerabilities (CVEs) [CRITICAL NODE]

• Known vulnerabilities are critical because they are publicly documented and often have readily available exploits. Outdated Mosquitto instances are prime targets.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.3. Execute Exploit HIGH-RISK PATH

• Attack Vector: Leveraging publicly available exploits (e.g., from exploit databases, Metasploit) for known CVEs in Mosquitto. * Impact: Full compromise of the Mosquitto broker, potentially leading to control over all MQTT communications, data breaches, and further system compromise if the broker host is also vulnerable. * Mitigation: Maintain up-to-date Mosquitto versions, implement vulnerability scanning, and have a patch management process.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit Mosquitto Configuration Weaknesses [CRITICAL NODE]

• Misconfigurations are a common source of vulnerabilities and are often easier to exploit than code-level vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1. Leverage Default/Weak Credentials HIGH-RISK PATH [CRITICAL NODE]

• Attack Vector: Exploiting default usernames and passwords that are sometimes left unchanged after installation, or using easily guessable/brute-forceable weak passwords. * Impact: Unauthorized access to the Mosquitto broker with administrative or privileged user rights, allowing full control over broker settings, topics, and client management. * Mitigation: Disable default accounts, enforce strong password policies, use password complexity requirements, and consider multi-factor authentication if supported or via plugin.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1.2. Attempt Default Credentials HIGH-RISK PATH

• Attack Vector: Trying common default username/password combinations against the Mosquitto broker's authentication mechanism. * Impact: Gain unauthorized access if default credentials are still active. * Mitigation: Change or disable default credentials immediately upon deployment.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1.3. Brute-Force Weak Credentials HIGH-RISK PATH

• Attack Vector: Using automated tools to try a large number of password combinations (dictionary attack, brute-force) to guess weak passwords. * Impact: Gain unauthorized access if weak passwords are in use. * Mitigation: Enforce strong password policies, implement account lockout mechanisms after failed login attempts, and use rate limiting on login attempts.

Attack Tree Path: 2.3. Abuse Anonymous Access HIGH-RISK PATH [CRITICAL NODE]

• Attack Vector: If anonymous access is enabled in Mosquitto configuration, attackers can connect without any authentication. * Impact: Unauthorized access to the broker, potentially allowing subscription to sensitive topics, publishing malicious messages, and causing denial of service. * Mitigation: Disable anonymous access and enforce authentication for all clients.

Attack Tree Path: 2.3.2. Exploit Anonymous Access Permissions HIGH-RISK PATH

• Attack Vector: Once anonymous access is gained, exploiting the permissions granted to anonymous users.

Attack Tree Path: 2.3.2.1. Subscribe to Sensitive Topics HIGH-RISK PATH

• Attack Vector: Subscribing to MQTT topics that contain sensitive data (e.g., personal information, sensor readings, control commands) if anonymous users are allowed to subscribe to these topics. * Impact: Confidentiality breach, data leakage, unauthorized information access. * Mitigation: Implement Access Control Lists (ACLs) to restrict topic access even for authenticated users, and especially for anonymous users if it cannot be disabled.

Attack Tree Path: 2.3.2.2. Publish Malicious Messages HIGH-RISK PATH

• Attack Vector: Publishing crafted MQTT messages to topics that control application functionality, inject malicious data, or cause disruption if anonymous users are allowed to publish. * Impact: Data integrity compromise, application malfunction, unauthorized control of devices, potential for command injection vulnerabilities in the application. * Mitigation: Implement ACLs to restrict publish access, validate and sanitize all MQTT messages received by the application, and design application logic to be resilient to malicious inputs.

Attack Tree Path: 2.3.2.3. Cause Denial of Service (DoS) HIGH-RISK PATH

• Attack Vector: Flooding the broker with messages or connection requests from anonymous connections to overwhelm resources and cause service disruption. * Impact: Broker unavailability, application disruption, impacting legitimate users. * Mitigation: Implement rate limiting, connection limits, resource monitoring, and consider using a firewall to filter malicious traffic.

Attack Tree Path: 4. Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attacks (Network Level) [CRITICAL NODE]

• MITM attacks are critical because they can compromise confidentiality and integrity of communication if encryption is not properly implemented.

Attack Tree Path: 4.2. Message Eavesdropping (Without TLS) HIGH-RISK PATH [CRITICAL NODE]

• Attack Vector: Intercepting unencrypted MQTT traffic on the network to eavesdrop on sensitive data transmitted in MQTT messages. * Impact: Confidentiality breach, exposure of sensitive data, loss of privacy. * Mitigation: Enforce TLS/SSL encryption for all MQTT communication.

Attack Tree Path: 4.2.2. MQTT Communication is Unencrypted (No TLS) HIGH-RISK PATH [CRITICAL NODE]

• Attack Vector: The fundamental vulnerability is the lack of TLS/SSL encryption for MQTT communication, making it vulnerable to eavesdropping. * Impact: Enables eavesdropping and message tampering. * Mitigation: Configure Mosquitto to require TLS/SSL for all client connections and broker-to-broker connections.

Attack Tree Path: 4.2.3. Read Sensitive Data from Intercepted Messages HIGH-RISK PATH

• Attack Vector: Analyzing captured network packets to extract sensitive information from unencrypted MQTT messages. * Impact: Data breach, confidentiality compromise. * Mitigation: Enforce TLS/SSL encryption to protect data in transit.

Attack Tree Path: 4.3. Message Tampering (Without TLS) HIGH-RISK PATH [CRITICAL NODE]

• Attack Vector: Intercepting unencrypted MQTT traffic and modifying messages in transit before forwarding them to the broker or clients. * Impact: Data integrity compromise, application malfunction, unauthorized control of devices by injecting malicious commands or data. * Mitigation: Enforce TLS/SSL encryption for all MQTT communication.

Attack Tree Path: 4.3.2. MQTT Communication is Unencrypted (No TLS) HIGH-RISK PATH [CRITICAL NODE]

• Attack Vector: Same as 4.2.2, the lack of encryption is the root cause. * Impact: Enables message tampering. * Mitigation: Enforce TLS/SSL encryption.

Attack Tree Path: 4.3.3. Modify MQTT Messages in Transit HIGH-RISK PATH

• Attack Vector: Using network tools to alter MQTT packets while they are being transmitted. * Impact: Data manipulation, application malfunction, unauthorized control. * Mitigation: Enforce TLS/SSL encryption to ensure message integrity.

Attack Tree Path: 4.3.4. Forward Modified Messages to Broker/Clients HIGH-RISK PATH

• Attack Vector: Injecting the tampered MQTT packets back into the network stream to be processed by the broker or clients. * Impact: Application receives and processes malicious or altered data. * Mitigation: Enforce TLS/SSL encryption and implement message authentication/integrity checks at the application level if necessary for critical data.