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Attack Tree Analysis for ffmpeg/ffmpeg

Objective: Compromise application using FFmpeg by exploiting FFmpeg vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Application via FFmpeg Exploitation [CRITICAL NODE] ├───[AND] Gain Code Execution on Server [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├───[OR] Exploit Memory Corruption Vulnerability in FFmpeg [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├───[AND] Trigger Buffer Overflow [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ ├───[OR] Malformed Media File Input [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ │ ├─── Crafted Container Format (e.g., MKV, MP4, AVI) [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ │ │ └─── Exceed Buffer Limits in Demuxer/Parser [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ │ ├─── Crafted Codec Data (e.g., H.264, VP9, AAC) [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ │ │ └─── Exceed Buffer Limits in Decoder [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├───[OR] Use-After-Free Vulnerability [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ ├─── Crafted Media File Input │ │ │ │ └─── Trigger Specific Code Path Leading to UAF [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ └─── Specific FFmpeg Function Vulnerability │ │ │ └─── Exploit UAF in Internal Object Management [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├───[AND] Exploit Known CVE in FFmpeg [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ ├─── Identify Vulnerable FFmpeg Version [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ │ └─── Application Inventory/Version Detection [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ ├─── Find Publicly Available Exploit (PoC or Exploit Code) [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ │ └─── Exploit Databases (e.g., Exploit-DB, NVD) [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ └─── Execute Exploit against Application [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ └─── Trigger Vulnerable Code Path via Input or API Call [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├───[OR] Exploit Command Injection via FFmpeg Usage [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├───[AND] Application Constructs FFmpeg Command from User Input [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ └─── Analyze Application Code for Command Construction [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├─── Inject Malicious Commands into User Input [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ ├─── Control Filenames/Paths Passed to FFmpeg [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ │ └─── Inject Shell Commands in Filename Parameters [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ └─── FFmpeg Executes Injected Commands [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ └─── Lack of Input Sanitization/Escaping in Application [HIGH-RISK PATH]

Attack Vector: The attacker's primary goal is to execute arbitrary code on the server hosting the application. This grants them full control over the application and potentially the underlying system. * Why High-Risk: Code execution is the most severe type of compromise, leading to complete loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability.

Attack Vector: FFmpeg, being written in C/C++, is susceptible to memory corruption vulnerabilities like buffer overflows and use-after-free errors. Attackers can exploit these flaws by providing crafted media files that trigger these vulnerabilities during processing. * Why High-Risk: Memory corruption vulnerabilities can directly lead to code execution. They are often difficult to detect and mitigate due to the complexity of memory management in C/C++.

* 2.1. Trigger Buffer Overflow [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
    * Attack Vector: A buffer overflow occurs when data written to a buffer exceeds its allocated size, potentially overwriting adjacent memory regions. Attackers can control the overflowed data to overwrite critical program data or inject and execute malicious code.
    * Why High-Risk: Buffer overflows are a classic and still prevalent vulnerability type that directly leads to code execution.

    * 2.1.1. Malformed Media File Input [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
        * Attack Vector: Attackers provide intentionally malformed media files to the application. These files are designed to exploit weaknesses in FFmpeg's parsing and decoding logic.
        * Why High-Risk: Malformed input is a common and easily achievable attack vector.

        * 2.1.1.1. Crafted Container Format (e.g., MKV, MP4, AVI) [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
            * Attack Vector: Attackers craft media files with manipulated container formats (like MKV, MP4, AVI headers and structures). These crafted containers can trigger vulnerabilities in FFmpeg's demuxers and parsers responsible for handling these formats.
            * Why High-Risk: Container formats are complex, and vulnerabilities in their parsers are common.

            * 2.1.1.1.1. Exceed Buffer Limits in Demuxer/Parser [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
                * Attack Vector: By crafting container formats with oversized headers, metadata, or other elements, attackers can cause FFmpeg's demuxers/parsers to write beyond allocated buffer boundaries, leading to buffer overflows.
                * Why High-Risk: Demuxers and parsers are critical components that process untrusted input directly, making them prime targets for buffer overflow attacks.

        * 2.1.1.2. Crafted Codec Data (e.g., H.264, VP9, AAC) [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
            * Attack Vector: Attackers craft media files with manipulated codec data (like H.264, VP9, AAC streams). These crafted codec streams can trigger vulnerabilities in FFmpeg's decoders responsible for processing these codecs.
            * Why High-Risk: Codecs are extremely complex, and vulnerabilities in decoders are frequently discovered.

            * 2.1.1.2.1. Exceed Buffer Limits in Decoder [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
                * Attack Vector: By crafting codec data with oversized frames, packets, or other elements, attackers can cause FFmpeg's decoders to write beyond allocated buffer boundaries during decoding, leading to buffer overflows.
                * Why High-Risk: Decoders are performance-critical and handle complex data structures, making them susceptible to buffer overflow vulnerabilities.

* 2.2. Use-After-Free Vulnerability [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
    * Attack Vector: A use-after-free vulnerability occurs when a program attempts to access memory that has already been freed. Attackers can trigger this by crafting specific media files that cause FFmpeg to free memory prematurely and then access it again later. By controlling the memory allocation after the free, attackers can potentially hijack program execution.
    * Why High-Risk: Use-after-free vulnerabilities are complex to exploit but can reliably lead to code execution. They are notoriously difficult to debug and prevent.

    * 2.2.1. Trigger Specific Code Path Leading to UAF [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
        * Attack Vector: Attackers need to carefully craft media input that forces FFmpeg to execute a specific code path containing the use-after-free vulnerability. This often requires reverse engineering and deep understanding of FFmpeg's internal workings.
        * Why High-Risk: While requiring precise input, successful exploitation of UAF is highly impactful.

    * 2.2.2. Exploit UAF in Internal Object Management [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
        * Attack Vector: Use-after-free vulnerabilities often occur in object management within complex software like FFmpeg. Attackers target vulnerabilities related to how FFmpeg allocates, frees, and manages internal data structures and objects.
        * Why High-Risk: Object management is a critical and complex part of software, and vulnerabilities in this area can have widespread consequences.

Attack Vector: If the application uses an outdated version of FFmpeg with known Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs), attackers can exploit these publicly disclosed vulnerabilities. Exploit code or Proof-of-Concepts (PoCs) are often available for known CVEs, making exploitation easier. * Why High-Risk: Exploiting known CVEs is a highly effective attack vector, especially if applications fail to keep their dependencies updated.

* 3.1. Identify Vulnerable FFmpeg Version [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
    * Attack Vector: Attackers first need to determine the version of FFmpeg used by the application. This can be done through various techniques like examining HTTP headers, error messages, or probing application behavior.
    * Why High-Risk: Version detection is a crucial first step for exploiting known vulnerabilities.

    * 3.1.1. Application Inventory/Version Detection [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
        * Attack Vector: Attackers use techniques to perform application inventory and version detection. This might involve automated tools or manual reconnaissance.
        * Why High-Risk: Successful version detection enables targeted attacks against known vulnerabilities.

* 3.2. Find Publicly Available Exploit (PoC or Exploit Code) [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
    * Attack Vector: Once a vulnerable FFmpeg version is identified, attackers search exploit databases like Exploit-DB and the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) for publicly available exploits or PoCs related to known CVEs affecting that version.
    * Why High-Risk: Publicly available exploits significantly lower the barrier to entry for attackers.

    * 3.2.1. Exploit Databases (e.g., Exploit-DB, NVD) [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
        * Attack Vector: Exploit databases are primary resources for attackers seeking exploit information.
        * Why High-Risk: These databases provide readily accessible information that facilitates exploitation.

* 3.3. Execute Exploit against Application [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
    * Attack Vector: Attackers use the found exploit code or PoC to target the application. This typically involves sending crafted requests or inputs to trigger the vulnerable code path in FFmpeg.
    * Why High-Risk: Executing a working exploit directly leads to code execution.

    * 3.3.1. Trigger Vulnerable Code Path via Input or API Call [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
        * Attack Vector: Exploits often specify how to trigger the vulnerability, usually by providing specific input or making certain API calls to the application that then interacts with FFmpeg.
        * Why High-Risk: Following exploit instructions to trigger the vulnerability is often straightforward.

Attack Vector: If the application constructs FFmpeg commands from user-controlled input without proper sanitization or escaping, attackers can inject malicious shell commands into these inputs. When the application executes the constructed command, the injected commands are also executed by the system shell. * Why High-Risk: Command injection is a common and easily exploitable web application vulnerability that directly leads to code execution.

* 4.1. Application Constructs FFmpeg Command from User Input [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
    * Attack Vector: The application code dynamically builds FFmpeg commands using user-provided data, such as filenames, paths, or processing options.
    * Why High-Risk: Dynamic command construction from user input is a common source of command injection vulnerabilities.

* 4.1.1. Analyze Application Code for Command Construction [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
    * Attack Vector: Attackers analyze the application's source code or behavior to understand how FFmpeg commands are constructed and identify potential injection points.
    * Why High-Risk: Code analysis is a standard step in vulnerability assessment and exploit development.

* 4.2. Inject Malicious Commands into User Input [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
    * Attack Vector: Attackers inject shell metacharacters and commands into user-controlled input fields that are used to construct FFmpeg commands.
    * Why High-Risk: Command injection is often achieved with simple injection techniques.

* 4.2.1. Control Filenames/Paths Passed to FFmpeg [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
    * Attack Vector: Attackers manipulate filenames or file paths that are passed as arguments to FFmpeg commands.
    * Why High-Risk: Filenames and paths are frequently user-controlled in web applications.

        * 4.2.1.1. Inject Shell Commands in Filename Parameters [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
            * Attack Vector: Attackers embed shell commands within filenames or paths. If the application doesn't properly sanitize these filenames before passing them to FFmpeg, the shell will interpret and execute the injected commands. For example, a filename like `; rm -rf / ;` could be injected.
            * Why High-Risk: Filename injection is a common and effective command injection technique.

* 4.3. FFmpeg Executes Injected Commands [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
    * Attack Vector: When the application executes the constructed FFmpeg command (containing injected malicious commands), the system shell interprets and executes both the intended FFmpeg command and the attacker's injected commands.
    * Why High-Risk: Successful command injection directly leads to code execution with the privileges of the application process.

    * 4.3.1. Lack of Input Sanitization/Escaping in Application [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
        * Attack Vector: The root cause of command injection is the application's failure to properly sanitize or escape user input before using it to construct shell commands. This allows shell metacharacters to be interpreted by the shell instead of being treated as literal characters.
        * Why High-Risk: Lack of input sanitization is a fundamental security flaw that is easily exploited.