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Attack Tree Analysis for ffmpegwasm/ffmpeg.wasm

Objective: Compromise application using ffmpeg.wasm by exploiting vulnerabilities within ffmpeg.wasm or its integration.

Attack Tree Visualization

Attack Goal: Compromise Application via ffmpeg.wasm [CRITICAL NODE] ├───[AND]─ Exploit ffmpeg.wasm Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├───[OR]─ Input Manipulation Attacks [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ ├─── Malformed Media File Injection [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├───[OR]─ Supply Chain Attacks [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ ├─── Compromised npm Package (ffmpeg.wasm Dependency) [HIGH-RISK PATH] ├───[AND]─ Application Integration Weaknesses (Amplifying ffmpeg.wasm Risks) [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├───[OR]─ Insecure Input Handling (Application Side) [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├───[OR]─ Insecure Output Handling (Application Side) [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Attack Goal: Compromise Application via ffmpeg.wasm [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Description: The ultimate objective of the attacker. Success means gaining unauthorized control or access through vulnerabilities related to ffmpeg.wasm.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit ffmpeg.wasm Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Description: Focuses on directly exploiting weaknesses within the ffmpeg.wasm library itself. This is a primary avenue for attack.
  • Sub-Paths: Includes Input Manipulation Attacks and Supply Chain Attacks (both High-Risk Paths).

Attack Tree Path: 3. Input Manipulation Attacks [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Description: Exploiting vulnerabilities by providing malicious or unexpected input to ffmpeg.wasm.
  • High-Risk Attack Vector:
    • Malformed Media File Injection [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Mechanism: Providing crafted media files (images, videos, audio) as input to ffmpeg.wasm.
      • Vulnerability: Exploiting parsing vulnerabilities in ffmpeg decoders (buffer overflows, integer overflows, format string bugs) triggered by these malformed inputs.
      • Impact:
        • Client-Side Code Execution: Arbitrary code execution within the browser.
        • Denial of Service (DoS): Crashing or hanging ffmpeg.wasm or the browser tab.
        • Information Disclosure: Leaking sensitive data from browser memory.
      • Likelihood: Medium-High
      • Effort: Medium-High
      • Skill Level: Medium-Expert
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium-Hard
      • Mitigation:
        • Input Validation & Sanitization: Strict validation of media file formats, codecs, and metadata.
        • Content Security Policy (CSP): Restrict script execution and resource loading.
        • Regular Updates: Keep ffmpeg.wasm updated.
        • Sandboxing & Isolation: Leverage browser's WASM sandboxing.

Attack Tree Path: 4. Supply Chain Attacks [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Description: Compromising the supply chain of ffmpeg.wasm to inject malicious code.
  • High-Risk Attack Vector:
    • Compromised npm Package (ffmpeg.wasm Dependency) [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
      • Mechanism: Attacker compromises the npm package repository or the ffmpeg.wasm package itself.
      • Vulnerability: Malicious code injected into the ffmpeg.wasm package or its dependencies during build or release.
      • Impact:
        • Backdoor Installation: Injecting malicious code into the application.
        • Data Theft: Stealing application data, user credentials.
        • Application Takeover: Gaining full control over the application.
      • Likelihood: Low-Medium
      • Effort: Medium-High
      • Skill Level: Medium-High
      • Detection Difficulty: Hard
      • Mitigation:
        • Dependency Verification: Use package integrity checks (npm audit, yarn audit, --integrity).
        • Secure Dependency Management: Use dependency lock files (package-lock.json, yarn.lock).
        • Source Code Review: Review source code (if feasible).
        • Monitor Security Advisories: Subscribe to security advisories.

Attack Tree Path: 5. Application Integration Weaknesses (Amplifying ffmpeg.wasm Risks) [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Description: Weaknesses in how the application integrates with ffmpeg.wasm, which can amplify the risks from ffmpeg.wasm vulnerabilities.
  • Sub-Paths: Includes Insecure Input Handling and Insecure Output Handling (both High-Risk Paths).

Attack Tree Path: 6. Insecure Input Handling (Application Side) [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Description: Application failing to properly validate or sanitize user input before passing it to ffmpeg.wasm.
  • Mechanism: Lack of input validation on the application side.
  • Vulnerability: Allows injection of malformed media files or malicious options that can exploit ffmpeg.wasm vulnerabilities.
  • Impact: Amplifies the impact of Input Manipulation Attacks on ffmpeg.wasm (Code Execution, DoS, Information Disclosure).
  • Likelihood: High
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Low
  • Detection Difficulty: Easy-Medium
  • Mitigation:
    • Input Validation & Sanitization (Application): Robust input validation before interacting with ffmpeg.wasm.
    • Principle of Least Privilege: Only pass necessary and validated data to ffmpeg.wasm.

Attack Tree Path: 7. Insecure Output Handling (Application Side) [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Description: Application improperly handling the output from ffmpeg.wasm (e.g., displaying raw output without sanitization).
  • Mechanism: Displaying raw ffmpeg.wasm output without sanitization.
  • Vulnerability: If ffmpeg.wasm output contains malicious content, it can lead to Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).
  • Impact:
    • Cross-Site Scripting (XSS): Injecting malicious scripts into the application's frontend.
    • Content Spoofing: Displaying misleading or malicious content.
  • Likelihood: Medium-High
  • Effort: Low-Medium
  • Skill Level: Low-Medium
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Mitigation:
    • Output Sanitization: Sanitize and encode ffmpeg.wasm output before displaying it.
    • Content Security Policy (CSP): Mitigate XSS impact.
    • Context-Aware Output Handling: Handle different output types securely.