attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for krallin/tini

Objective: Execute Arbitrary Code within Container via Tini Vulnerabilities

Attack Tree Visualization

Attack Goal: Execute Arbitrary Code within Container via Tini Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE - HIGH IMPACT GOAL] └── AND: Exploit Tini Weaknesses [CRITICAL NODE - ENTRY POINT] ├── OR: 1. Exploit Tini Code Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE - VULNERABILITY TYPE] │ ├── 1.1.1 Trigger Overflow via Malicious Signal Handling [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ └── 1.4 Use-After-Free or Double-Free Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH] ├── OR: 1.2 Logic Errors in Signal Handling [CRITICAL NODE - HIGH LIKELIHOOD & IMPACT POTENTIAL] │ ├── 1.2.1 Signal Not Forwarded Correctly/Dropped [HIGH-RISK PATH - DoS/Instability] │ └── 1.2.4 Race Conditions in Signal Handling [HIGH-RISK PATH - Instability/Unpredictability] ├── OR: 2. Exploit Tini's Process Management Weaknesses [CRITICAL NODE - PROCESS MANAGEMENT FOCUS] │ ├── 2.1.1 Tini Misconfiguration Leading to Privilege Escalation [HIGH-RISK PATH - Misconfiguration] │ ├── OR: 2.2 Process Reaping Issues Leading to Resource Exhaustion [CRITICAL NODE - DoS VECTOR] │ │ ├── 2.2.1 Tini Failing to Reap Zombie Processes [HIGH-RISK PATH - DoS via Zombies] │ │ └── 2.2.2 Attacker Flooding System with Zombie Processes to Degrade Performance [HIGH-RISK PATH - Intentional DoS] │ └── 2.3.2 Unexpected Application Behavior due to Tini's Signal Handling Logic [HIGH-RISK PATH - Application Instability] │ └── 2.3.3 Race Conditions in Process Termination Handling [HIGH-RISK PATH - Instability/Unpredictability] └── OR: 3. Supply Chain Vulnerabilities Related to Tini Distribution [CRITICAL NODE - SUPPLY CHAIN RISK] ├── 3.1 Compromised Tini Binary in Official Repositories/Distributions [HIGH-RISK PATH - Supply Chain Compromise] └── 3.2 Malicious Modifications During Build Process [HIGH-RISK PATH - Build Process Compromise]

Attack Tree Path: Attack Goal: Execute Arbitrary Code within Container via Tini Vulnerabilities

• Description: The ultimate objective of the attacker is to gain the ability to run arbitrary code within the containerized application. This represents a complete compromise of the application's security within the container environment.
  • Impact: Very High - Full control over the application and potentially sensitive data within the container. Could lead to data breaches, service disruption, and further attacks.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Tini Weaknesses

• Description: This is the starting point for all attacks focused on Tini. The attacker aims to find and exploit vulnerabilities or weaknesses specifically within the Tini project to achieve their goal.
  • Impact: Varies depending on the specific weakness exploited, but can range from Medium (DoS) to Very High (Code Execution, Container Escape).

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Tini Code Vulnerabilities

• Description: This category focuses on vulnerabilities present in the source code of Tini itself. These could be memory corruption bugs, logic errors, or other coding flaws that can be exploited.
  • Impact: Can be High (Code Execution) if memory corruption vulnerabilities are exploited.

Attack Tree Path: Logic Errors in Signal Handling

• Description: This critical node highlights the risks associated with flaws in Tini's signal handling logic. Incorrect or incomplete signal handling can lead to application instability, denial of service, or even security vulnerabilities.
  • Impact: Medium (DoS, Application Instability) to potentially High if logic errors can be chained with other vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Tini's Process Management Weaknesses

• Description: This category focuses on vulnerabilities related to how Tini manages processes within the container. Issues in process reaping, signal forwarding to child processes, or resource management can be exploited.
  • Impact: Medium (DoS, Resource Exhaustion) to Very High (Privilege Escalation, Container Escape in extreme cases).

Attack Tree Path: Process Reaping Issues Leading to Resource Exhaustion

• Description: This critical node specifically highlights the risk of Denial of Service attacks caused by Tini's potential failure to properly reap zombie processes, or by attackers intentionally flooding the system with zombie processes.
  • Impact: Medium (Denial of Service, Application Degradation).

Attack Tree Path: Supply Chain Vulnerabilities Related to Tini Distribution

• Description: This critical node addresses the risks associated with the supply chain of Tini. If the Tini binaries or build process are compromised, applications using Tini could be vulnerable from the outset.
  • Impact: Very High (Widespread compromise of applications using the compromised Tini).

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1 Trigger Overflow via Malicious Signal Handling

• Attack Vector: Attacker crafts malicious signals with payloads designed to exploit buffer overflows in Tini's signal handling routines.
  • Likelihood: Low to Medium
  • Impact: High (Code Execution within Container)
  • Effort: Medium to High
  • Skill Level: High
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Actionable Insight: Fuzz test signal handling logic in Tini with various signal types and payloads.

Attack Tree Path: 1.4 Use-After-Free or Double-Free Vulnerabilities

• Attack Vector: Attacker triggers memory management errors (use-after-free or double-free) in Tini, potentially leading to code execution.
  • Likelihood: Low to Medium
  • Impact: High (Code Execution within Container)
  • Effort: Medium to High
  • Skill Level: High
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Actionable Insight: Perform static analysis and dynamic analysis (e.g., Valgrind, ASan) to detect memory management errors in Tini.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2.1 Signal Not Forwarded Correctly/Dropped

• Attack Vector: Logic errors in Tini cause signals intended for the application to be dropped or not forwarded correctly, leading to application malfunction or denial of service.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: Medium (Denial of Service, Application Instability)
  • Effort: Low to Medium
  • Skill Level: Medium
  • Detection Difficulty: Easy to Medium
  • Actionable Insight: Test Tini's signal forwarding behavior with different signal combinations and application responses. Monitor signal delivery.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2.4 Race Conditions in Signal Handling

• Attack Vector: Race conditions in Tini's signal handling logic, especially during startup or shutdown, lead to unpredictable behavior and potential instability.
  • Likelihood: Low to Medium
  • Impact: Medium (Application Instability, Unpredictable Behavior)
  • Effort: Medium
  • Skill Level: Medium
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard
  • Actionable Insight: Conduct race condition testing around signal handling, especially during process startup/shutdown.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1.1 Tini Misconfiguration Leading to Privilege Escalation

• Attack Vector: Incorrect container configuration or permissions related to Tini's execution allow an attacker to escalate privileges within the container or potentially escape the container.
  • Likelihood: Low
  • Impact: Very High (Container Escape, Host System Compromise)
  • Effort: Low to Medium
  • Skill Level: Medium
  • Detection Difficulty: Easy to Medium
  • Actionable Insight: Ensure proper container image hardening and least privilege principles are applied. Verify Tini's execution context.

Attack Tree Path: 2.2.1 Tini Failing to Reap Zombie Processes

• Attack Vector: Bugs in Tini's process reaping logic cause zombie processes to accumulate, leading to resource exhaustion and denial of service.
  • Likelihood: Low to Medium
  • Impact: Medium (Denial of Service, Application Degradation)
  • Effort: Low to Medium
  • Skill Level: Low to Medium
  • Detection Difficulty: Easy
  • Actionable Insight: Monitor container resource usage (PID count). Test Tini's zombie process reaping under heavy load and error conditions.

Attack Tree Path: 2.2.2 Attacker Flooding System with Zombie Processes to Degrade Performance

• Attack Vector: Attacker intentionally creates a large number of child processes that become zombies to exhaust container resources and cause denial of service.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: Medium (Denial of Service, Application Degradation)
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Low
  • Detection Difficulty: Easy
  • Actionable Insight: Implement resource limits and monitoring to detect and mitigate resource exhaustion attacks.

Attack Tree Path: 2.3.2 Unexpected Application Behavior due to Tini's Signal Handling Logic

• Attack Vector: Differences in Tini's signal handling compared to standard init systems lead to unexpected application behavior, potentially causing instability or data corruption.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: Medium (Application Instability, Potential Data Corruption)
  • Effort: Low to Medium
  • Skill Level: Medium
  • Detection Difficulty: Easy to Medium
  • Actionable Insight: Thoroughly test application's behavior under various signal conditions when running with Tini.

Attack Tree Path: 2.3.3 Race Conditions in Process Termination Handling

• Attack Vector: Race conditions during process termination, especially in rapid restart scenarios, lead to unpredictable behavior and potential instability.
  • Likelihood: Low to Medium
  • Impact: Medium (Application Instability, Unpredictable Behavior)
  • Effort: Medium
  • Skill Level: Medium
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard
  • Actionable Insight: Test process termination scenarios, especially rapid restarts and signal-based shutdowns, for race conditions in Tini.

Attack Tree Path: 3.1 Compromised Tini Binary in Official Repositories/Distributions

• Attack Vector: Attacker compromises official repositories or distribution channels to replace legitimate Tini binaries with malicious ones.
  • Likelihood: Very Low
  • Impact: Very High (Widespread compromise)
  • Effort: Very High
  • Skill Level: Very High
  • Detection Difficulty: Very Hard
  • Actionable Insight: Verify checksums of Tini binaries downloaded from official sources. Use trusted and reputable sources.

Attack Tree Path: 3.2 Malicious Modifications During Build Process

• Attack Vector: Attacker compromises the build process used to create Tini binaries, injecting malicious code during compilation.
  • Likelihood: Low
  • Impact: High (Compromise of applications using the malicious binary)
  • Effort: Medium to High
  • Skill Level: Medium to High
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard
  • Actionable Insight: Implement secure build pipelines and verify source code integrity.