attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for madler/zlib

Objective: Compromise Application Using zlib

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Application Using zlib [CRITICAL NODE]
├── Exploit Memory Corruption Vulnerabilities in zlib [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   ├── Buffer Overflow in Decompression [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   ├── Heap Buffer Overflow [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   │   └── Trigger Heap Overflow via Malicious Compressed Data [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   ├── Integer Overflow in Size Calculations [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   │   └── Cause Integer Overflow Leading to Buffer Underrun/Overflow [HIGH-RISK PATH]
├── Denial of Service (DoS) via zlib [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   ├── Decompression Bomb (Zip Bomb) [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   └── Exhaust Resources (CPU, Memory) by Decompressing Highly Compressed Data [HIGH-RISK PATH]
├── Logic/Implementation Flaws in zlib Usage (Application-Specific, but Zlib-Related) [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   ├── Insecure Handling of Decompressed Data [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   └── Exploit Vulnerabilities in Application Logic Post-Decompression [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   ├── Incorrect Size Checks/Limits on Decompressed Data [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   └── Bypass Application Size Limits via Crafted Compressed Data [HIGH-RISK PATH]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Exploit Memory Corruption Vulnerabilities in zlib [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]

• Attack Vectors:
  • Buffer Overflow in Decompression [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
    • Heap Buffer Overflow [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
      • Trigger Heap Overflow via Malicious Compressed Data [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
        • Description: Attacker crafts malicious compressed data that, when decompressed, writes beyond the bounds of a heap-allocated buffer used by zlib.
        • Mechanism: Exploits vulnerabilities in zlib's decompression routines to cause out-of-bounds writes on the heap.
        • Impact: Arbitrary code execution, system compromise.
        • Mitigation: Use latest zlib version, robust input validation, memory-safe language wrappers.
    • Integer Overflow in Size Calculations [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
      • Cause Integer Overflow Leading to Buffer Underrun/Overflow [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
        • Craft Compressed Data to Trigger Integer Overflow in Length/Size Checks [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
          • Description: Attacker crafts compressed data that causes integer overflows in zlib's size calculations, leading to incorrect buffer allocations and memory corruption.
          • Mechanism: Exploits integer overflow vulnerabilities in zlib's length or size checks during decompression.
          • Impact: Memory corruption, potentially code execution.
          • Mitigation: Use latest zlib version, careful size limit implementations, safer integer arithmetic.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Denial of Service (DoS) via zlib [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]

• Attack Vectors:
  • Decompression Bomb (Zip Bomb) [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
    • Exhaust Resources (CPU, Memory) by Decompressing Highly Compressed Data [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
      • Provide Extremely High Compression Ratio Data to Consume Excessive Resources [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
        • Description: Attacker provides maliciously crafted compressed data (zip bomb) that decompresses to an extremely large size, overwhelming system resources.
        • Mechanism: Exploits the nature of compression algorithms to create small compressed files that expand dramatically upon decompression.
        • Impact: Service disruption, resource exhaustion, application crash.
        • Mitigation: Implement strict decompressed size limits, decompression timeouts, resource limits.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Logic/Implementation Flaws in zlib Usage (Application-Specific, but Zlib-Related) [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]

• Attack Vectors:
  • Insecure Handling of Decompressed Data [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
    • Exploit Vulnerabilities in Application Logic Post-Decompression [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
      • Decompress Data Containing Malicious Payloads (e.g., Path Traversal, Command Injection) [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
        • Description: Attacker embeds malicious payloads within compressed data. After decompression, the application processes this data insecurely, leading to vulnerabilities.
        • Mechanism: Exploits application logic flaws in handling decompressed data, such as lack of sanitization or validation.
        • Impact: Path traversal, command injection, SQL injection, XSS, data breaches, remote code execution (depending on the vulnerability).
        • Mitigation: Strict input validation and sanitization of decompressed data, secure coding practices.
  • Incorrect Size Checks/Limits on Decompressed Data [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
    • Bypass Application Size Limits via Crafted Compressed Data [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
      • Provide Compressed Data that Decompresses to Exceed Expected/Allowed Size [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
        • Description: Attacker crafts compressed data to bypass application's size limit checks, still resulting in a large decompressed size and resource exhaustion.
        • Mechanism: Exploits flaws in the application's size limit implementation, such as checking compressed size instead of decompressed size.
        • Impact: DoS, resource exhaustion.
        • Mitigation: Implement size limits based on decompressed size, thorough testing of size limit implementations.