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Attack Tree Analysis for memcached/memcached

Objective: Compromise application using Memcached by exploiting Memcached weaknesses.

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Application via Memcached Exploitation ├─── [CRITICAL NODE] Access Memcached Server │ ├─── [CRITICAL NODE] Exploit Lack of Authentication [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├─── [CRITICAL NODE] Publicly Accessible Memcached Instance [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ └─── [HIGH-RISK PATH] Direct Access from Internet [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ └─── Mitigation: [CRITICAL NODE] Bind Memcached to localhost or private network interface, use firewall rules to restrict access. ├─── [CRITICAL NODE] Manipulate Cached Data │ ├─── [CRITICAL NODE] Data Injection/Poisoning [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├─── [HIGH-RISK PATH] Inject Malicious Data [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ └─── [HIGH-RISK PATH] Set commands to overwrite legitimate cached data with attacker-controlled content. [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ └─── Mitigation: [CRITICAL NODE] Input validation on data stored in Memcached (at application level), data integrity checks, use appropriate data serialization/deserialization, consider data signing/HMAC for critical cached data. ├─── [CRITICAL NODE] Buffer Overflow/Memory Corruption │ │ └─── Mitigation: [CRITICAL NODE] Keep Memcached updated to latest stable version, monitor security advisories, use memory-safe programming practices in Memcached development (if contributing).

Attack Tree Path: [CRITICAL NODE] Access Memcached Server

  • Description: The attacker's initial goal is to gain access to the Memcached server. This is a critical node because without access, most other attacks are not possible.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • Exploiting lack of authentication (see below).
    • Compromising a machine on the same network and using it to access Memcached.
    • Network sniffing (less likely if binary protocol or encryption is used).
  • Impact: Successful access allows the attacker to read, modify, and delete cached data, and potentially perform DoS attacks.
  • Mitigations:
    • Implement strong access controls (network restrictions, authentication if feasible).
    • Network segmentation to limit access from untrusted networks.
    • Regular security audits to ensure access controls are in place and effective.

Attack Tree Path: [CRITICAL NODE] Exploit Lack of Authentication [HIGH-RISK PATH]

  • Description: Memcached, by default, does not have built-in authentication. This is a major vulnerability if not properly mitigated. This path is high-risk because it's a common misconfiguration and easy to exploit.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • [CRITICAL NODE] Publicly Accessible Memcached Instance [HIGH-RISK PATH]: If Memcached is exposed to the internet or an untrusted network without access controls, anyone can connect.
      • [HIGH-RISK PATH] Direct Access from Internet [HIGH-RISK PATH]: The most direct and dangerous scenario. An attacker can directly connect to the publicly accessible Memcached instance.
        • Attack Vector: Simply connecting to the Memcached port (default 11211) from the internet using telnet, nc, or Memcached client libraries.
        • Impact: Full, unauthenticated access to Memcached. Complete control over cached data, potential for data manipulation, information disclosure, and DoS.
        • Mitigation: [CRITICAL NODE] Bind Memcached to localhost or private network interface, use firewall rules to restrict access. This is the most critical mitigation. Ensure Memcached only listens on localhost (127.0.0.1) or a private network interface and use firewalls to restrict access to only authorized machines.

Attack Tree Path: [CRITICAL NODE] Manipulate Cached Data

  • Description: Once access to Memcached is gained, manipulating the cached data is a primary attack goal. This is a critical node because it directly impacts the application's functionality and data integrity.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • [CRITICAL NODE] Data Injection/Poisoning [HIGH-RISK PATH]: Overwriting legitimate cached data with malicious content. This path is high-risk because it can directly lead to application compromise.
      • [HIGH-RISK PATH] Inject Malicious Data [HIGH-RISK PATH]: Using Memcached set commands to inject attacker-controlled data.
        • [HIGH-RISK PATH] Set commands to overwrite legitimate cached data with attacker-controlled content. [HIGH-RISK PATH]: The attacker uses set commands with known or guessed keys to replace valid cached data.
          • Attack Vector: Using Memcached client libraries or command-line tools to send set commands with crafted keys and malicious values.
          • Impact:
            • Application logic manipulation: If the application relies on cached data for logic or decisions, poisoning the cache can alter application behavior.
            • Potential XSS: If cached data is rendered in web pages without proper output encoding, injected malicious scripts can lead to Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).
            • Session hijacking: If session IDs or session data are cached, poisoning can lead to session hijacking.
            • Bypass security checks: If cached data is used for authorization or security checks, poisoning can bypass these checks.
          • Mitigation: [CRITICAL NODE] Input validation on data stored in Memcached (at application level), data integrity checks, use appropriate data serialization/deserialization, consider data signing/HMAC for critical cached data. Application-level input validation and data integrity checks are crucial to prevent data poisoning.

Attack Tree Path: [CRITICAL NODE] Buffer Overflow/Memory Corruption

  • Description: Exploiting vulnerabilities in Memcached's code itself, such as buffer overflows or memory corruption bugs. While less common in mature software, these are critical due to their potential severity.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • Exploiting known or zero-day vulnerabilities in Memcached parsing or processing logic.
    • Crafting specific Memcached commands or data payloads to trigger vulnerabilities.
  • Impact:
    • Denial of Service (DoS): Crashing the Memcached server.
    • Potential Code Execution: In some cases, memory corruption vulnerabilities can be exploited to achieve arbitrary code execution on the Memcached server.
  • Mitigation: [CRITICAL NODE] Keep Memcached updated to latest stable version, monitor security advisories, use memory-safe programming practices in Memcached development (if contributing). Regularly updating Memcached is essential to patch known vulnerabilities.