Objective: Compromise Application via OSSEC-HIDS Exploitation
Root Goal: Compromise Application via OSSEC-HIDS Exploitation [CRITICAL NODE]
├───[OR]─ Compromise OSSEC Agent [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│ └───[OR]─ Compromise Agent Host System [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│ └───[AND]─ Exploit Host OS Vulnerabilities (e.g., Unpatched System) [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│ └───[AND]─ Gain Root/Administrator Access on Agent Host [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
├───[OR]─ Compromise OSSEC Agent [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│ └───[OR]─ Agent Configuration Manipulation [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│ └───[AND]─ Gain Access to Agent Configuration Files (e.g., weak permissions) [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│ ├───[OR]─ Disable Agent Monitoring [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│ └───[OR]─ Modify Agent Rules to Bypass Detection [HIGH-RISK PATH]
├───[OR]─ Compromise OSSEC Server [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│ └───[OR]─ Compromise Server Host System [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│ └───[AND]─ Exploit Host OS Vulnerabilities (e.g., Unpatched System, Weak Services) [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│ └───[AND]─ Gain Root/Administrator Access on Server Host [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
├───[OR]─ Compromise OSSEC Server [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│ └───[OR]─ Server Configuration Manipulation [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│ └───[AND]─ Gain Access to Server Configuration Files (e.g., weak permissions, web interface vulnerability) [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│ ├───[OR]─ Disable Server Monitoring/Alerting [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│ └───[OR]─ Modify Server Rules to Bypass Detection Globally [HIGH-RISK PATH]
├───[OR]─ Compromise OSSEC Server [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│ └───[OR]─ Database Compromise (OSSEC Backend) [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│ └───[AND]─ Exploit Database Vulnerabilities (e.g., SQL Injection in OSSEC Web UI if used) [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│ └───[AND]─ Gain Access to OSSEC Event Data and Configurations [HIGH-RISK PATH]
└───[OR]─ Abuse OSSEC Functionality/Misconfiguration [HIGH-RISK PATH]
├───[OR]─ Bypass Detection Rules [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│ └───[AND]─ Analyze OSSEC Ruleset [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│ └───[AND]─ Craft Attacks that Evade Existing Rules (e.g., Obfuscation, Novel Attack Vectors) [HIGH-RISK PATH]
└───[OR]─ Exploit Misconfiguration [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
└───[AND]─ Identify Weak Configurations (e.g., Default Credentials, Weak Passwords, Overly Permissive Rules) [HIGH-RISK PATH]
└───[AND]─ Exploit Weak Configurations for Privilege Escalation or Bypass [HIGH-RISK PATH]
Attack Tree Path: 1. Compromise Agent Host System via OS Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH, Critical Nodes: Root Goal, Compromise OSSEC Agent, Compromise Agent Host System, Gain Root/Administrator Access on Agent Host]
Attack Vector: Exploiting known vulnerabilities in the operating system running on the OSSEC agent host. * Details: Attackers scan for unpatched systems or known vulnerabilities in services running on the agent host. Publicly available exploits can be used to gain initial access. * Impact: Full compromise of the agent host, allowing attackers to control the OSSEC agent, potentially pivot to other systems, and disrupt monitoring. * Mitigation: * Implement a robust patch management process for all agent hosts. * Harden the operating system by disabling unnecessary services and applying security best practices. * Use vulnerability scanning tools to proactively identify and remediate OS vulnerabilities.
Attack Tree Path: 2. Agent Configuration Manipulation via Access to Configuration Files [HIGH-RISK PATH, Critical Nodes: Root Goal, Compromise OSSEC Agent, Agent Configuration Manipulation]
Attack Vector: Gaining unauthorized access to OSSEC agent configuration files and modifying them.
* Details: Attackers may exploit weak file permissions, host compromise, or misconfigurations to read and write agent configuration files (e.g., ossec.conf).
* Impact:
* Disable Agent Monitoring: Attackers can disable the agent entirely or specific monitoring functionalities, creating a blind spot for security monitoring on that host.
* Modify Agent Rules to Bypass Detection: Attackers can alter agent rules to exclude their malicious activities from being logged and alerted, effectively making their attacks invisible to OSSEC.
* Mitigation:
* Ensure strict file permissions on agent configuration files, limiting access to only the root/administrator user.
* Implement file integrity monitoring (FIM) on agent configuration files to detect unauthorized changes.
* Use configuration management tools to enforce consistent and secure agent configurations.
Attack Tree Path: 3. Compromise Server Host System via OS Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH, Critical Nodes: Root Goal, Compromise OSSEC Server, Compromise Server Host System, Gain Root/Administrator Access on Server Host]
Attack Vector: Exploiting known vulnerabilities in the operating system running on the OSSEC server host. * Details: Similar to agent host compromise, attackers target unpatched systems or vulnerable services on the OSSEC server host. Successful exploitation grants them control over the server host. * Impact: Full compromise of the OSSEC server host, leading to complete control over the OSSEC server, access to all monitored data, and the ability to disable or manipulate global security monitoring. This is a critical breach. * Mitigation: * Implement a rigorous patch management process for the OSSEC server host. * Harden the server operating system following security best practices, minimizing the attack surface. * Segment the OSSEC server network to limit exposure and lateral movement in case of compromise.
Attack Tree Path: 4. Server Configuration Manipulation via Access to Configuration Files/Web Interface [HIGH-RISK PATH, Critical Nodes: Root Goal, Compromise OSSEC Server, Server Configuration Manipulation]
Attack Vector: Gaining unauthorized access to OSSEC server configuration files or the web interface (if enabled) and modifying server settings. * Details: Attackers may exploit weak file permissions, web interface vulnerabilities (e.g., authentication bypass, misconfigurations), or server host compromise to access and modify server configurations. * Impact: * Disable Server Monitoring/Alerting: Attackers can disable global monitoring and alerting, effectively turning off security monitoring for the entire application environment protected by OSSEC. * Modify Server Rules to Bypass Detection Globally: Attackers can alter global OSSEC rules to bypass detection for specific attack types across all agents, rendering OSSEC ineffective against those attacks. * Mitigation: * Secure the OSSEC web interface (if used) with strong authentication, regular updates, and vulnerability patching. Restrict access to authorized administrators only. * Ensure strict file permissions on server configuration files, limiting access to the root/administrator user. * Implement file integrity monitoring (FIM) on server configuration files. * Regularly review and audit server configurations for security weaknesses.
Attack Tree Path: 5. Database Compromise via Database Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH, Critical Nodes: Root Goal, Compromise OSSEC Server, Database Compromise]
Attack Vector: Exploiting vulnerabilities in the database system used by OSSEC (e.g., SQL injection in the web UI, direct database vulnerabilities). * Details: Attackers may target SQL injection flaws in the OSSEC web interface (if used) or directly exploit vulnerabilities in the database server itself (e.g., unpatched database, weak authentication). * Impact: * Gain Access to OSSEC Event Data and Configurations: Attackers can access sensitive security logs, alerts, and potentially configuration data stored in the database. This information can be used to understand security posture, identify vulnerabilities, and plan further attacks. Data exfiltration is also a risk. * Mitigation: * Secure the OSSEC database server by following database security best practices (strong passwords, access control, regular patching). * If using the OSSEC web UI, ensure it is regularly updated and hardened against web application vulnerabilities, especially SQL injection. * Implement database access controls to restrict access to the OSSEC database to only necessary processes and users.
Attack Tree Path: 6. Bypass Detection Rules via Rule Analysis and Evasion [HIGH-RISK PATH, Critical Nodes: Root Goal, Abuse OSSEC Functionality/Misconfiguration, Bypass Detection Rules]
Attack Vector: Analyzing the OSSEC ruleset and crafting attacks specifically designed to evade detection by those rules. * Details: Attackers study publicly available OSSEC rules or rulesets they can access. They then develop attack techniques that are not covered by existing rules, using methods like obfuscation, encoding, or novel attack vectors. * Impact: Successful attacks on the application may go undetected by OSSEC, leading to delayed incident response and potential compromise. * Mitigation: * Implement a layered security approach, combining OSSEC with other security tools (WAF, IPS, etc.) for defense in depth. * Regularly review and update OSSEC rulesets to cover new attack techniques and vulnerabilities. * Implement custom rules tailored to the specific application and its environment. * Conduct regular penetration testing and red team exercises to identify gaps in OSSEC detection capabilities and rule effectiveness.
Attack Tree Path: 7. Exploit Misconfiguration for Privilege Escalation or Bypass [HIGH-RISK PATH, Critical Nodes: Root Goal, Abuse OSSEC Functionality/Misconfiguration, Exploit Misconfiguration, Critical Node: Exploit Misconfiguration]
Attack Vector: Identifying and exploiting weak configurations in OSSEC components (agents or server). * Details: Attackers look for common misconfigurations such as default credentials, weak passwords, overly permissive rules, insecure logging settings, or incorrect file permissions. * Impact: * Privilege Escalation: Weak configurations can allow attackers to gain higher privileges within the OSSEC system or on the host systems. * Bypass Security Controls: Misconfigurations can weaken or disable security controls, allowing attackers to bypass intended security measures. * Mitigation: * Follow OSSEC security hardening guidelines and best practices during installation and configuration. * Change default credentials for all OSSEC components. * Implement strong password policies for OSSEC administrators and users. * Regularly audit OSSEC configurations to identify and remediate any misconfigurations. * Implement the principle of least privilege for OSSEC user accounts and access controls.