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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for raysan5/raylib

Attack Surface: Image Loading Vulnerabilities

  • Description: Exploiting vulnerabilities in image parsing libraries used by raylib to load textures. Maliciously crafted image files can trigger buffer overflows, memory corruption, or arbitrary code execution.
  • Raylib Contribution: Raylib provides functions like LoadTexture, LoadImage, and LoadTextureFromImage which rely on underlying image loading libraries (like stb_image) to process various image formats (PNG, JPG, BMP, etc.). If these libraries have vulnerabilities, raylib applications become susceptible.
  • Example: A specially crafted PNG file, when loaded using LoadTexture, triggers a buffer overflow in the stb_image library. This overflow can be exploited to overwrite memory and potentially execute arbitrary code on the user's machine.
  • Impact:
    • Arbitrary Code Execution: Attacker gains full control of the application and potentially the system.
    • Denial of Service: Application crashes due to memory corruption or unexpected behavior.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Keep Raylib Updated: Raylib updates often include patches for vulnerabilities in its dependencies, including image loading libraries.
    • Use Latest stb_image (or alternative): If possible, ensure raylib is using the latest version of stb_image or consider using alternative, more robust image loading libraries if raylib allows for customization or extensions.
    • Input Validation (File Type and Size): While not a direct mitigation for format vulnerabilities, validate file types and sizes before loading to prevent processing of unexpected or excessively large files.
    • Sandboxing/Isolation: Run the application in a sandboxed environment to limit the impact of a successful exploit.

Attack Surface: Audio Loading Vulnerabilities

  • Description: Similar to image loading, vulnerabilities in audio decoding libraries used by raylib to load sounds and music. Malicious audio files can lead to buffer overflows, memory corruption, or arbitrary code execution.
  • Raylib Contribution: Raylib uses functions like LoadSound, LoadMusicStream which rely on audio decoding libraries (like dr_libs for WAV, OGG, MP3 if extensions are used). Vulnerabilities in these libraries are inherited by raylib applications.
  • Example: A crafted OGG file, when loaded with LoadMusicStream, exploits a buffer overflow in the OGG decoding library. This can cause the application to crash or potentially allow for code execution.
  • Impact:
    • Arbitrary Code Execution: Potentially, attacker gains control of the application and potentially the system.
    • Denial of Service: Application crashes or becomes unresponsive.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Keep Raylib Updated: Ensure raylib and its audio decoding dependencies are up-to-date.
    • Use Latest dr_libs (or alternative): Similar to image loading, using the latest versions of dr_libs or considering more secure alternatives if possible.
    • Input Validation (File Type and Size): Validate audio file types and sizes before loading.
    • Resource Limits: Limit the number and size of audio files loaded simultaneously to mitigate resource exhaustion.
    • Sandboxing/Isolation: Run the application in a sandboxed environment.

Attack Surface: Model Loading Vulnerabilities

  • Description: Exploiting vulnerabilities in 3D model parsing libraries when loading models (OBJ, GLTF, etc.) using raylib. Malicious model files can trigger parsing errors, buffer overflows, or potentially code execution.
  • Raylib Contribution: Raylib provides functions like LoadModel and LoadModelFromMesh to load 3D models. These functions rely on model loading libraries which can be complex and potentially vulnerable.
  • Example: A crafted OBJ file, when loaded with LoadModel, exploits a vulnerability in the OBJ parser, leading to a buffer overflow and application crash, or potentially code execution.
  • Impact:
    • Arbitrary Code Execution: Potentially, attacker gains control of the application and potentially the system.
    • Denial of Service: Application crashes or becomes unresponsive due to resource exhaustion or parsing errors.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Keep Raylib Updated: Update raylib to benefit from any patches in model loading.
    • Use Reputable Model Sources: Load models from trusted sources.
    • Input Validation (File Type and Complexity): Validate file types and potentially limit the complexity (vertex/triangle count) of loaded models.
    • Resource Limits: Implement limits on model complexity and memory usage.
    • Sandboxing/Isolation: Run the application in a sandboxed environment.

Attack Surface: Text Input Buffer Overflow

  • Description: If the application uses raylib's text input functions (e.g., GuiTextBox, GetInputText) without proper buffer size management and input validation, it can be vulnerable to buffer overflows, potentially leading to code execution.
  • Raylib Contribution: Raylib provides functions for text input, but it's the application's responsibility to handle the input buffer correctly. If the application doesn't allocate sufficient buffer space or doesn't prevent excessively long input, overflows can occur.
  • Example: An application uses GuiTextBox with a fixed-size buffer of 64 characters. If a user inputs more than 64 characters, and the application doesn't handle this correctly, a buffer overflow can occur, potentially overwriting adjacent memory and leading to code execution.
  • Impact:
    • Arbitrary Code Execution: If the overflow is carefully crafted, it could be exploited for code execution, allowing attacker to control the application.
    • Denial of Service: Application crash due to memory corruption.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Proper Buffer Allocation: Allocate sufficient buffer space for text input, considering maximum expected input length.
    • Input Length Validation: Limit the length of user input to prevent exceeding buffer boundaries.
    • Safe String Handling Functions: Use safe string handling functions (e.g., strncpy in C) to prevent buffer overflows when copying or manipulating input strings.
    • Code Reviews: Carefully review code that handles text input to ensure proper buffer management.

Attack Surface: Path Traversal via File Loading

  • Description: If the application allows users to specify file paths for loading resources (images, audio, models, fonts) without proper sanitization, attackers can use path traversal techniques to access sensitive files outside the intended resource directory, leading to information disclosure.
  • Raylib Contribution: Raylib's file loading functions (LoadTexture, LoadSound, etc.) take file paths as input. If the application directly passes user-provided paths to these functions without validation, it becomes vulnerable.
  • Example: An application allows users to load custom textures by entering a file path. An attacker enters a path like "../../../../etc/shadow" intending to read the system's password hash file (on Linux-like systems). If the application doesn't sanitize the path, raylib might attempt to load this file, potentially exposing sensitive information.
  • Impact:
    • Information Disclosure: Access to sensitive files outside the intended application directory, potentially including system files or user data.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Path Sanitization: Sanitize user-provided file paths to remove or neutralize path traversal sequences like "../" and "..".
    • Restrict File Access: Limit file loading to a predefined resource directory. Do not allow users to specify arbitrary paths.
    • Input Validation (Path Format): Validate the format of user-provided paths to ensure they conform to expected patterns.
    • Principle of Least Privilege: Run the application with minimal file system permissions.