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Attack Tree Analysis for raysan5/raylib

Objective: Compromise Application Using Raylib by Exploiting Raylib-Specific Weaknesses

Attack Tree Visualization

Root: Compromise Application Using Raylib
    ├───(OR)─ Exploit Raylib Library Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH]
    │   ├───(OR)─ Memory Corruption Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH]
    │   │   ├───(AND)─ Buffer Overflow in Image/Texture Loading **[CRITICAL NODE]** [HIGH RISK PATH]
    │   │   │   ├─── Provide Maliciously Crafted Image File (PNG, JPG, etc.) [HIGH RISK PATH]
    │   │   │   │   └─── Exploit vulnerabilities in image decoding libraries used by Raylib (stb_image) **[CRITICAL NODE]** [HIGH RISK PATH]
    │   │   ├───(AND)─ Buffer Overflow in Audio Loading/Processing **[CRITICAL NODE]** [HIGH RISK PATH]
    │   │   │   ├─── Provide Maliciously Crafted Audio File (WAV, OGG, etc.) [HIGH RISK PATH]
    │   │   │   │   └─── Exploit vulnerabilities in audio decoding libraries used by Raylib (stb_vorbis, etc.) **[CRITICAL NODE]** [HIGH RISK PATH]
    │   │   ├───(AND)─ Use-After-Free Vulnerabilities **[CRITICAL NODE]**
    │   ├───(OR)─ Vulnerabilities in Shaders (if used and custom shaders are allowed) [HIGH RISK PATH]
    │   │   ├───(AND)─ Inject Malicious Shader Code **[CRITICAL NODE]** [HIGH RISK PATH]
    │   │   │   └─── If application allows loading or using custom shaders, inject code to leak data or cause crashes (OpenGL/GLSL specific) [HIGH RISK PATH]
    │   ├───(OR)─ Dependency Vulnerabilities in Raylib's Dependencies [HIGH RISK PATH]
    │   │   ├───(AND)─ Vulnerabilities in `stb_image` (Image Loading) **[CRITICAL NODE]** [HIGH RISK PATH]
    │   │   │   └─── Exploit known or zero-day vulnerabilities in the version of `stb_image` used by Raylib [HIGH RISK PATH]
    │   │   ├───(AND)─ Vulnerabilities in `stb_vorbis` (OGG Audio Decoding) **[CRITICAL NODE]** [HIGH RISK PATH]
    │   │   │   └─── Exploit known or zero-day vulnerabilities in the version of `stb_vorbis` used by Raylib [HIGH RISK PATH]
    ├───(OR)─ Exploit Application's Incorrect Usage of Raylib API [HIGH RISK PATH]
    │   ├───(AND)─ Lack of Input Validation Before Raylib Functions [HIGH RISK PATH]
    │   │   ├─── Pass Unvalidated File Paths to Raylib Resource Loading Functions **[CRITICAL NODE]** [HIGH RISK PATH]
    │   │   │   └─── Path traversal vulnerabilities if application doesn't sanitize file paths before using `LoadTexture`, `LoadSound`, etc. [HIGH RISK PATH]
    │   ├───(AND)─ Incorrect Memory Management Around Raylib Objects [HIGH RISK PATH]
    │   │   ├─── Use-After-Free in Application Code Interacting with Raylib **[CRITICAL NODE]** [HIGH RISK PATH]
    │   │   │   └─── Application code improperly manages Raylib objects, leading to use-after-free scenarios when accessing freed Raylib resources [HIGH RISK PATH]

Attack Tree Path: Exploit vulnerabilities in image decoding libraries used by Raylib (stb_image) [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Attack Step: Provide a maliciously crafted image file (PNG, JPG, etc.) to the application, designed to exploit a vulnerability within the stb_image library used by Raylib for image loading.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High (Code execution, arbitrary code execution, data access, potential system compromise)
  • Effort: Medium (Requires finding or developing an exploit for a known or zero-day vulnerability in stb_image. Public exploits might be available for known vulnerabilities.)
  • Skill Level: High (Exploit development or adaptation skills are needed. Understanding of memory corruption vulnerabilities and image file formats is required.)
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Exploit execution might be subtle and not immediately obvious. Detection depends on robust logging, intrusion detection systems, and potentially memory monitoring.)

Attack Tree Path: Exploit vulnerabilities in audio decoding libraries used by Raylib (stb_vorbis) [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Attack Step: Provide a maliciously crafted audio file (OGG, etc.) to the application, designed to exploit a vulnerability within the stb_vorbis library used by Raylib for OGG audio decoding.
  • Likelihood: Low-Medium
  • Impact: High (Code execution, arbitrary code execution, data access, potential system compromise)
  • Effort: Medium-High (Requires finding or developing an exploit for a known or zero-day vulnerability in stb_vorbis. Exploits might be less readily available compared to image libraries.)
  • Skill Level: High (Exploit development or adaptation skills are needed. Understanding of memory corruption vulnerabilities and audio file formats is required.)
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Similar to image exploits, detection depends on logging, intrusion detection, and potentially memory monitoring. Audio processing vulnerabilities might be less scrutinized than image ones.)

Attack Tree Path: Use-After-Free Vulnerabilities in Raylib Library [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Attack Step: Trigger a sequence of actions in the application that exploits a use-after-free vulnerability within Raylib's internal resource management or object handling. This involves causing a resource to be deallocated and then accessed again while still considered valid by the application or Raylib.
  • Likelihood: Low
  • Impact: High (Code execution, arbitrary code execution, memory corruption, potential system compromise)
  • Effort: High (Requires deep understanding of Raylib's internal workings, potentially reverse engineering, and precise timing or conditions to trigger the UAF.)
  • Skill Level: Expert (Requires expert-level knowledge of memory management, race conditions, and debugging complex software.)
  • Detection Difficulty: High (Use-after-free vulnerabilities are notoriously difficult to detect and debug. They often manifest as subtle crashes or unpredictable behavior, and can be hard to reproduce reliably.)

Attack Tree Path: Inject Malicious Shader Code [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Attack Step: If the application allows loading or using custom shaders (GLSL code), inject malicious shader code designed to perform actions beyond intended rendering, such as data exfiltration, denial of service (GPU overload), or potentially even more advanced exploits depending on the shader execution environment.
  • Likelihood: Medium (If custom shaders are a feature, injection is a plausible attack vector.)
  • Impact: High (Data leakage, information disclosure, application compromise, GPU denial of service, potential for more advanced exploits depending on shader capabilities.)
  • Effort: Medium (Requires knowledge of GLSL shader language and injection techniques. Basic shader injection techniques are relatively well-known.)
  • Skill Level: Medium-High (Requires shader programming skills and security knowledge related to shader vulnerabilities.)
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium-High (Detecting malicious shader behavior can be challenging. Shader code execution is often opaque, and monitoring shader behavior requires specialized tools and techniques.)

Attack Tree Path: Vulnerabilities in stb_image (Image Loading) [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Attack Step: Similar to point 1, but focusing on exploiting known vulnerabilities in the specific version of stb_image bundled with Raylib. This involves identifying the stb_image version and searching for publicly disclosed vulnerabilities and exploits.
  • Likelihood: Medium (Depends on the age and patch status of the stb_image version used by Raylib. Known vulnerabilities are easier to exploit.)
  • Impact: High (Code execution, arbitrary code execution, data access, potential system compromise)
  • Effort: Medium (Exploits for known vulnerabilities might be readily available, reducing the effort required for exploit development.)
  • Skill Level: Medium-High (Exploit usage skills are needed. Understanding of vulnerability reports and exploit adaptation might be required.)
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Detection depends on vulnerability signatures, intrusion detection systems, and logging. Patching and updating dependencies is the primary mitigation.)

Attack Tree Path: Vulnerabilities in stb_vorbis (OGG Audio Decoding) [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Attack Step: Similar to point 2 and 5, but focusing on exploiting known vulnerabilities in the specific version of stb_vorbis bundled with Raylib.
  • Likelihood: Low-Medium (Similar considerations as stb_image, but potentially fewer publicly known exploits for stb_vorbis.)
  • Impact: High (Code execution, arbitrary code execution, data access, potential system compromise)
  • Effort: Medium-High (Exploits for known vulnerabilities might be less readily available compared to image libraries.)
  • Skill Level: Medium-High (Exploit usage skills are needed. Understanding of vulnerability reports and exploit adaptation might be required.)
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Similar to stb_image vulnerabilities, detection relies on vulnerability signatures, intrusion detection, and patching.)

Attack Tree Path: Pass Unvalidated File Paths to Raylib Resource Loading Functions [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Attack Step: Provide crafted file paths (e.g., containing "../" sequences for path traversal) as input to the application, which are then passed to Raylib's resource loading functions (like LoadTexture, LoadSound, etc.) without proper validation or sanitization. This allows accessing files outside of the intended application directories.
  • Likelihood: Medium-High (Path traversal is a common web application vulnerability and can easily extend to applications using file loading functions without proper input validation.)
  • Impact: Medium-High (Data access to sensitive files, potential code execution if executable files outside the intended directory can be accessed and loaded/executed by the application.)
  • Effort: Low (Path traversal techniques are well-known and easy to implement. Simple manipulation of file paths is sufficient.)
  • Skill Level: Low-Medium (Basic understanding of file systems and path traversal is required.)
  • Detection Difficulty: Low-Medium (File access logging can easily detect anomalous file access patterns, especially attempts to access files outside of expected directories.)

Attack Tree Path: Use-After-Free in Application Code Interacting with Raylib [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Attack Step: Exploit memory management errors in the application's code that interacts with Raylib objects. This involves causing the application to free a Raylib resource (texture, sound, model, etc.) and then subsequently attempt to use or access that freed resource.
  • Likelihood: Low-Medium (Depends on the complexity of the application's code and its memory management practices around Raylib objects. Manual memory management in C/C++ is prone to errors.)
  • Impact: High (Crash, arbitrary code execution, memory corruption, potential application or system compromise)
  • Effort: Medium (Requires understanding the application's code, its memory management logic, and how it interacts with Raylib. Debugging and reverse engineering might be necessary.)
  • Skill Level: Medium-High (Requires debugging skills, understanding of memory management concepts, and potentially reverse engineering skills.)
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium-High (Use-after-free vulnerabilities in application code can be subtle and harder to detect than library-level vulnerabilities. They might require dynamic analysis, memory sanitizers, and thorough code reviews.)