Attack Surface: 1. File Parsing and Loading
Description: Exploitation of vulnerabilities in raylib's file parsing routines for various supported formats (images, audio, models, etc.). This is the most direct and likely attack vector.
raylib Contribution: raylib provides the functions (LoadTexture, LoadModel, LoadSound, etc.) and the underlying parsing logic that are directly vulnerable.
Example: A maliciously crafted .obj model file with an invalid vertex count is loaded using LoadModel(), triggering an out-of-bounds write in raylib's model parsing code.
Impact:
* Denial of Service (DoS): Application crash.
* Arbitrary Code Execution (ACE): Possible, especially with complex formats, allowing the attacker to gain control.
* Information Disclosure: Potential leakage of memory contents.
Risk Severity: Critical (for formats with complex parsers like 3D models, compressed audio) to High (for simpler formats).
Mitigation Strategies:
* Developer:
* Input Validation: Before calling raylib functions, rigorously validate file size, magic numbers, and internal structure (as much as feasible without reimplementing the parser).
* Fuzz Testing: Extensive fuzz testing of all file loading functions is absolutely essential. Use a fuzzer to generate a wide variety of malformed inputs.
* Limit Supported Formats: Restrict the application to only load the file formats that are strictly necessary.
* Sandboxing/Isolation: If possible, load and process files in a sandboxed environment or a separate process to contain the impact of a successful exploit.
* Memory Safety: Use memory analysis tools (Valgrind, AddressSanitizer) during development to catch memory errors.
* User:
* Trusted Sources: Only load files from trusted sources. Avoid files from untrusted websites or unknown senders.
Attack Surface: 2. Shader Exploits (If User-Defined Shaders are Allowed)
Description: Exploitation of vulnerabilities in raylib's shader handling, allowing attackers to execute malicious code on the GPU. This is only relevant if the application allows loading external or user-created shaders.
raylib Contribution: raylib provides the functions (LoadShader, LoadShaderFromMemory) to load and use shaders, making it directly responsible for this attack surface if external shaders are permitted.
Example: An attacker provides a custom shader with an infinite loop, causing the GPU to hang and the application to freeze. A more sophisticated attack might attempt to read from unauthorized GPU memory locations.
Impact:
* Denial of Service (DoS): GPU crash, application freeze.
* Arbitrary Code Execution (ACE): Theoretically possible, but extremely difficult on modern systems. More likely to result in data corruption or instability.
* Information Disclosure: Potential for reading sensitive data from GPU memory.
Risk Severity: High (if user-defined or externally loaded shaders are allowed). If the application only uses its own built-in, pre-compiled shaders, this risk is significantly reduced and would not be included in this high/critical list.
Mitigation Strategies:
* Developer:
* Avoid User-Defined Shaders: The best mitigation is to completely disallow loading shaders from external sources or user input. Use only pre-compiled, thoroughly vetted shaders that are part of the application.
* Strict Sandboxing (if unavoidable): If external shaders are absolutely essential, implement extremely strict sandboxing and validation. This is a complex and challenging task, and even with sandboxing, vulnerabilities are possible.
* Input Validation: If external shaders are allowed, attempt to validate the shader source code for obviously dangerous operations (though this is very difficult to do comprehensively).
* Limit Shader Capabilities: Restrict features available to externally loaded shaders.
* User:
* No user-level mitigation if the application allows arbitrary shader loading. This is entirely the developer's responsibility.