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Attack Tree Analysis for raysan5/raylib

Objective: To achieve arbitrary code execution (ACE) on the target system running a raylib application, or to cause a denial-of-service (DoS) condition specifically leveraging raylib's functionality. ACE is the primary goal.

Attack Tree Visualization

                                     +-------------------------------------------------+
                                     |  Attacker Goal: Achieve ACE or DoS on Target    |
                                     |  System Running a Raylib Application            |
                                     +-------------------------------------------------+
                                                      |
          +----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
          |
+-------------------------+                                      +-------------------------------------+
|  1. Exploit Memory       |                                      |  2. Exploit Resource Loading        |
|     Management Issues   |                                      |     Vulnerabilities                 |
|  [HIGH RISK]            |                                      +-------------------------------------+
+-------------------------+                                                      |
          |                                                +-------------------------------------+
+---------------------+                                      |  2.1 Malformed Image                |
| 1.1 Buffer Overflow |                                      |     File [HIGH RISK]                |
|     in Raylib       |                                      +-------------------------------------+
| [HIGH RISK]            |                                                      |
+---------------------+                                      +---------------------+
          |                                                                |
+---------------------+                                      | 2.1.1 Heap Overflow                |
| 1.1.1 Crafted       |                                      |       in Decoder                   |
|       Texture Data  |                                      | [CRITICAL]                         |
| [CRITICAL]            |                                      +---------------------+
+---------------------+
          |
+---------------------+
| 1.1.2 Crafted       |
|       Model Data    |
| [CRITICAL]            |
+---------------------+
          |
+---------------------+
| 1.4 Integer Overflow|
|     Leading to      |
|     Memory          |
|     Corruption      |
|  [HIGH RISK]        |
+---------------------+
          |
+---------------------+
| 1.4.1 Crafted Input |
|       to Trigger    |
|       Overflow      |
|  [CRITICAL]        |
+---------------------+

Attack Tree Path: 1. Exploit Memory Management Issues [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: This category encompasses vulnerabilities arising from improper memory management within the raylib library, a common issue in C codebases.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: Very High
  • Effort: Medium to High
  • Skill Level: Intermediate to Advanced
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard

Attack Tree Path: 1.1 Buffer Overflow in Raylib [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: The attacker crafts malicious input that, when processed by raylib, overwrites a buffer's allocated memory. This can corrupt adjacent data, including function pointers or return addresses, leading to control flow hijacking.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: Very High
  • Effort: Medium to High
  • Skill Level: Intermediate to Advanced
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1 Crafted Texture Data [CRITICAL]

  • Description: The attacker provides a specially crafted image file (e.g., PNG, JPG) with manipulated dimensions, chunk sizes, or other metadata. When raylib attempts to load or process this image, it overflows a buffer allocated for texture data.
  • Vulnerable Functions (Examples): LoadTexture(), LoadImage(), LoadImageRaw(), internal image processing functions.
  • Mitigation:
    • Thorough input validation of image dimensions and metadata.
    • Use of safe memory handling functions (e.g., bounds checking).
    • Fuzz testing with various image formats and corrupted data.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.2 Crafted Model Data [CRITICAL]

  • Description: Similar to texture data, the attacker provides a maliciously crafted 3D model file (e.g., OBJ, glTF) containing oversized data elements or incorrect structural information. This overflows buffers during model parsing or rendering.
  • Vulnerable Functions (Examples): LoadModel(), LoadModelFromMesh(), internal model parsing and rendering functions.
  • Mitigation:
    • Strict validation of model file format and data sizes.
    • Use of safe parsing libraries with built-in security checks.
    • Fuzz testing with various model formats and corrupted data.

Attack Tree Path: 1.4 Integer Overflow Leading to Memory Corruption [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: An integer overflow occurs during calculations related to memory allocation or data indexing. This can result in allocating a buffer that is too small or writing data outside of allocated bounds.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High to Very High
  • Effort: Medium to High
  • Skill Level: Intermediate to Advanced
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard

Attack Tree Path: 1.4.1 Crafted Input to Trigger Overflow [CRITICAL]

  • Description: The attacker provides input values (e.g., dimensions, sizes, counts) that, when used in calculations within raylib, cause an integer overflow. This leads to incorrect memory allocation or out-of-bounds writes.
  • Vulnerable Functions (Examples): Any function that takes integer input and uses it for memory allocation or indexing. This is highly context-dependent.
  • Mitigation:
    • Careful review of all integer calculations, especially those involving user input.
    • Use of checked arithmetic operations (e.g., functions that detect and handle overflows).
    • Input validation to restrict the range of acceptable integer values.
    • Static analysis to identify potential integer overflow vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit Resource Loading Vulnerabilities

  • Description: This category focuses on vulnerabilities in how raylib handles external resources, particularly image files.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High to Very High
  • Effort: Low to Medium
  • Skill Level: Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium

Attack Tree Path: 2.1 Malformed Image File [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: The attacker provides a malformed image file designed to exploit vulnerabilities in the image decoding process.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High to Very High
  • Effort: Low to Medium
  • Skill Level: Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium

Attack Tree Path: 2.1.1 Heap Overflow in Decoder [CRITICAL]

  • Description: The attacker crafts an image file that triggers a heap overflow within the image decoding library used by raylib (e.g., stb_image). This often involves manipulating image metadata or chunk structures to cause the decoder to write beyond allocated buffer boundaries.
  • Vulnerable Functions (Examples): Indirectly, through raylib functions like LoadTexture(), LoadImage(). The vulnerability is within the underlying image decoding library.
  • Mitigation:
    • Keep image decoding libraries (dependencies of raylib) up-to-date with the latest security patches.
    • Use memory-safe image decoding libraries if possible.
    • Fuzz testing of raylib's image loading functions with a wide variety of malformed image files.
    • Consider sandboxing the image decoding process to limit the impact of a successful exploit.