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Threat Model Analysis for raysan5/raylib

Threat: Integer Overflow/Underflow in Image Loading

  • Threat: Integer Overflow/Underflow in Image Loading

    • Description: An attacker provides a maliciously crafted image file (e.g., PNG, JPG, QOI) with dimensions or color data designed to cause integer overflows or underflows during processing by Raylib's image loading functions. This could lead to memory corruption within Raylib or its underlying libraries (like stb_image).
    • Impact: Application crash, arbitrary code execution (potentially), denial of service. The attacker could potentially gain control of the application.
    • Affected Component: Image module, specifically functions like LoadImage, LoadImageRaw, LoadImageAnim, and the bundled stb_image library.
    • Risk Severity: High to Critical (depending on the exploitability of the overflow and the platform).
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developer:
        • Update Raylib regularly to benefit from fixes in stb_image and Raylib's own handling. This is the most important mitigation.
        • Validate image dimensions before passing them to Raylib functions. Implement reasonable maximum size limits, but this is secondary to updating Raylib.
        • Consider using a separate, hardened image loading library only if you can guarantee it's kept more up-to-date than Raylib's bundled version, and understand the integration risks.
        • Use memory safety tools (e.g., AddressSanitizer) during development to detect overflows.
      • User:
        • Only load images from trusted sources.

Threat: Path Traversal in Resource Loading

  • Threat: Path Traversal in Resource Loading

    • Description: An attacker provides a filename containing path traversal sequences (e.g., ../../) to Raylib functions that load resources, attempting to access files outside the intended directory. This exploits Raylib's handling of file paths.
    • Impact: Information disclosure (reading arbitrary files), potentially overwriting critical files (if the application has write permissions, and Raylib doesn't prevent it), denial of service.
    • Affected Component: Various modules, including models (LoadModel, LoadModelFromMesh), textures (LoadTexture, LoadTextureFromImage), audio (LoadSound, LoadMusicStream), and text (LoadFont, LoadFontEx). The vulnerability lies in how Raylib handles the file paths before passing them to the OS.
    • Risk Severity: High.
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developer:
        • Sanitize all filenames before passing them to Raylib loading functions. Remove or reject any path traversal sequences. This is crucial and the primary mitigation.
        • Use a whitelist of allowed characters for filenames.
        • Load resources from a dedicated, sandboxed directory, and ensure Raylib respects this directory.
        • Avoid constructing file paths based on user input without thorough sanitization.
        • Use platform-specific APIs for secure file access where available, and ensure Raylib utilizes them correctly.
      • User:
        • If the application allows loading resources from arbitrary locations, be extremely cautious about the files you select.

Threat: Shader Injection

  • Threat: Shader Injection

    • Description: If the application allows loading custom shaders, an attacker could provide a malicious shader containing code that exploits vulnerabilities in the GPU driver or Raylib's shader handling. This directly impacts Raylib's shader loading and execution.
    • Impact: Arbitrary code execution (potentially on the GPU), denial of service, system instability. This is a high-impact threat.
    • Affected Component: shaders module, functions like LoadShader, LoadShaderFromMemory.
    • Risk Severity: High to Critical.
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developer:
        • Strongly discourage or disable loading custom shaders from untrusted sources. This is the best mitigation.
        • If custom shaders are absolutely necessary, implement a strict whitelist of allowed shader features and functions. This is very difficult to do securely.
        • Use a shader validator to check for potentially dangerous code (again, difficult to do comprehensively).
        • Run shaders in a sandboxed environment if possible (complex and platform-dependent).
        • Regularly update GPU drivers and Raylib.
      • User:
        • Do not load custom shaders from untrusted sources.

Threat: Unvalidated data in custom rlgl calls

  • Threat: Unvalidated data in custom rlgl calls.

    • Description: If the application uses rlgl (Raylib's immediate mode OpenGL abstraction) directly, an attacker might be able to influence the data passed to rlgl functions, leading to undefined behavior or potential vulnerabilities in the OpenGL driver. This is a direct threat to applications using rlgl improperly.
    • Impact: Application crash, denial of service, potential arbitrary code execution (depending on the OpenGL driver vulnerability and how rlgl is used).
    • Affected Component: rlgl module, all functions within this module.
    • Risk Severity: High.
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developer:
        • Thoroughly validate all data passed to any rlgl function. Ensure that vertex data, indices, and other parameters are within expected bounds and of the correct type. This is absolutely critical.
        • Avoid constructing rlgl calls directly from user input without rigorous sanitization.
        • Use higher-level Raylib functions whenever possible, as they often provide more safety checks (but don't assume they are perfectly safe).
        • Regularly update OpenGL drivers.
      • User: N/A (primarily a developer responsibility).