Mitigation Strategy: Parameterized Commands (Using redisCommandArgv
)
-
Description:
- Identify
redisCommand
andredisvCommand
calls: Locate all instances in your code where you're usingredisCommand
orredisvCommand
to send commands to Redis. These functions are vulnerable when used with string concatenation and user input. - Replace with
redisCommandArgv
: Replace every instance ofredisCommand
andredisvCommand
withredisCommandArgv
. This is the core of the mitigation. - Restructure Arguments: Instead of a single formatted command string, prepare two arrays:
const char* argv[]
: An array of C-style strings, where each element is a separate part of the Redis command (e.g., command name, key, value).size_t argvlen[]
: An array ofsize_t
values, where each element corresponds to the length (in bytes) of the string at the same index inargv
.
- Call
redisCommandArgv
: Use the following function signature:redisReply *redisCommandArgv(redisContext *c, int argc, const char **argv, const size_t *argvlen);
c
: YourredisContext
pointer.argc
: The number of elements in theargv
andargvlen
arrays.argv
: The array of command argument strings.argvlen
: The array of argument string lengths.
- Example:
// Vulnerable: char command[256]; snprintf(command, sizeof(command), "SET %s %s", key, value); // DANGEROUS! redisReply *reply = redisCommand(context, command); // Secure (using redisCommandArgv): const char *argv[] = {"SET", key, value}; size_t argvlen[] = {3, strlen(key), strlen(value)}; redisReply *reply = redisCommandArgv(context, 3, argv, argvlen);
- Thorough Testing: Rigorously test all code paths that use
redisCommandArgv
to ensure correct functionality and that no regressions have been introduced.
- Identify
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Redis Command Injection (Critical): This is the primary threat mitigated.
redisCommandArgv
ensures that arguments are properly escaped byhiredis
before being sent to the Redis server, preventing attackers from injecting arbitrary commands. - Data Modification/Deletion (High): By preventing command injection, you prevent unauthorized modification or deletion of data.
- Data Exfiltration (High): Prevents attackers from using injected commands to read sensitive data.
- Server Compromise (Critical): If
CONFIG
commands are enabled, injection could lead to server compromise. Parameterization prevents this.
- Redis Command Injection (Critical): This is the primary threat mitigated.
-
Impact:
- Redis Command Injection: Risk reduced to near zero. This is the core purpose of using parameterized commands.
- Data Modification/Deletion: Risk significantly reduced.
- Data Exfiltration: Risk significantly reduced.
- Server Compromise: Risk significantly reduced.
-
Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. Used in
user_data.c
for user profile management. -
Missing Implementation: Missing in
session_management.c
(session token handling) andcache.c
(cache management).
Mitigation Strategy: Robust hiredis
Error Handling
-
Description:
redisContext
Check: Immediately after callingredisConnect
orredisConnectWithTimeout
, check if the returnedredisContext*
isNULL
. If it is, an error occurred during connection.- Access
context->err
(integer error code) andcontext->errstr
(error description string) to diagnose the problem. - Handle the error appropriately (log, retry, inform the user, etc.).
- Access
redisReply
Check: After every call to a command execution function (e.g.,redisCommand
,redisCommandArgv
,redisAppendCommand
,redisGetReply
), check if the returnedredisReply*
isNULL
. ANULL
reply indicates a communication error with the Redis server.- Again, check
context->err
andcontext->errstr
for details. - Handle the error appropriately.
- Again, check
reply->type
Check: If theredisReply*
is notNULL
, check thereply->type
field. This tells you the type of reply received from Redis. Pay special attention to:REDIS_REPLY_ERROR
: Indicates that the Redis server returned an error. The error message is inreply->str
. Handle this explicitly (log, retry, return an error, etc.).- Other reply types (
REDIS_REPLY_STRING
,REDIS_REPLY_INTEGER
, etc.) should be handled according to your application's logic.
redisSetTimeout
: Use theredisSetTimeout
function to set a timeout for Redis operations:This prevents your application from blocking indefinitely if the Redis server becomes unresponsive.struct timeval timeout = { 1, 500000 }; // 1.5 seconds redisSetTimeout(context, timeout);
- Resource Management (
freeReplyObject
,redisFree
):freeReplyObject(reply)
: Always callfreeReplyObject(reply)
after you are finished processing aredisReply*
. Failure to do so results in memory leaks.redisFree(context)
: Always callredisFree(context)
when you are finished with aredisContext*
(i.e., when you're done with the connection). This frees all resources associated with the connection.
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Application Crashes (Medium): Prevents crashes caused by unhandled
hiredis
errors (e.g., dereferencing aNULL
redisReply*
). - Data Inconsistency (High): Prevents the application from continuing in an inconsistent state after a Redis error.
- Denial of Service (Medium): Timeouts (via
redisSetTimeout
) prevent the application from hanging indefinitely. - Information Leakage (Low): Proper error handling can prevent sensitive information from being exposed in error messages (though this is more about how you handle the errors).
- Application Crashes (Medium): Prevents crashes caused by unhandled
-
Impact:
- Application Crashes: High impact; significantly reduces crashes.
- Data Inconsistency: High impact; helps maintain data integrity.
- Denial of Service: Moderate impact; improves resilience.
- Information Leakage: Low impact; minor contribution to preventing information leaks.
-
Currently Implemented: Basic
NULL
checks forredisReply
in some functions, but inconsistent and incomplete.freeReplyObject
andredisFree
are generally used, but potential edge cases exist. -
Missing Implementation: Comprehensive checks of
reply->type
, consistent use ofcontext->err
andcontext->errstr
, implementation ofredisSetTimeout
, and thorough auditing for correct resource management are missing in many parts of the application.
Mitigation Strategy: Library Updates (of hiredis
itself)
-
Description:
- Dependency Management: Ideally, use a C/C++ dependency manager (e.g., vcpkg, Conan, or your system's package manager) to manage the
hiredis
library. This simplifies updates. - Version Monitoring: Regularly check for new releases of
hiredis
. The best way to do this is to monitor the officialhiredis
GitHub repository: https://github.com/redis/hiredis. Look for new tags and releases. - Security Advisories: While
hiredis
doesn't have a dedicated security advisory system, closely examine the release notes and commit history for any mentions of security fixes or vulnerability patches. - Update Process: When a new version is available (especially if it addresses security concerns):
- Review the release notes and changelog carefully.
- Update the
hiredis
library in your development environment using your dependency manager (or manually, if necessary). - Rebuild your application.
- Thoroughly test your application with the updated library to ensure no regressions were introduced.
- Deploy the updated application to your production environment.
- Dependency Management: Ideally, use a C/C++ dependency manager (e.g., vcpkg, Conan, or your system's package manager) to manage the
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Known Vulnerabilities in
hiredis
(Variable Severity): This directly addresses vulnerabilities that have been discovered and patched in newer versions of thehiredis
library itself. The severity depends on the specific vulnerability.
- Known Vulnerabilities in
-
Impact:
- Known Vulnerabilities: Variable impact, depending on the nature of the vulnerability. Regular updates are crucial for minimizing the window of exposure to known exploits.
-
Currently Implemented: Not implemented. The project uses a static, outdated version of
hiredis
(v1.0.0) that was manually included. -
Missing Implementation: A dependency management system is not in place. There's no process for checking for or applying
hiredis
updates. The library is likely vulnerable to known issues.