Objective: To cause a Denial of Service (DoS) or achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the application using liblognorm by exploiting vulnerabilities in its parsing or rule processing logic.
+-------------------------------------------------+
| Compromise Application using liblognorm (DoS/RCE) | [CRITICAL]
+-------------------------------------------------+
|
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| |
+-------------------------+
| Denial of Service (DoS) |
+-------------------------+
|
+---------------------+---------------------+---------------------+
| Resource Exhaustion | Parsing Logic Flaws | Rulebase Corruption |
+---------------------+---------------------+---------------------+
| [HIGH RISK] | [HIGH RISK] | [HIGH RISK]
+-------+-------+ +-------+-------+ +-------+-------+
| CPU | Memory| | Stack | Heap | | Rule | |
| Exh. | Exh. | | Ovfl. | Ovfl. | | Inject| |
+-------+-------+ +-------+-------+ +-------+-------+
| | | [CRITICAL]
+-------v-------+ +-------v-------+ +-------v-------+
|Crafted Log | |Crafted Log | |Malicious Rule |
|Input (Large | |Input (Complex | |File/Input |
|Fields/Repeats)| |Nested Struct.)| |(if writable) |
+---------------+ +---------------+ +---------------+
| | |
| | +---------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| | | IF liblognorm allows external loading/modification of rulebases AND lacks proper |
| | | validation/sandboxing, THEN attacker could inject malicious rules. |
| | +---------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| |
| +-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| | IF liblognorm has flaws in its parsing logic (e.g., handling of nested structures, |
| | regular expressions, or custom parsing functions), THEN attacker could craft input to trigger them.|
| +-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| IF liblognorm has insufficient resource limits (e.g., maximum log size, maximum field count, recursion depth), |
| THEN attacker could craft input to exhaust resources. |
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Attack Tree Path: Resource Exhaustion (CPU and Memory)
Description: The attacker crafts specially designed log messages to consume excessive CPU or memory resources, leading to a Denial of Service.
* Attack Vectors:
* CPU Exhaustion: Sending logs with:
* Extremely long fields.
* Numerous fields.
* Deeply nested structures (if applicable).
* Complex regular expressions or custom parsing functions within the rulebase that are triggered by the input.
* Memory Exhaustion: Sending logs with:
* Repeating fields.
* Very large fields.
* Input designed to exploit memory allocation patterns within liblognorm.
* Likelihood: Medium to High
* Impact: High (DoS)
* Effort: Low to Medium
* Skill Level: Novice to Intermediate
* Detection Difficulty: Medium
Attack Tree Path: Parsing Logic Flaws (Stack/Heap Overflow - Leading to DoS)
Description: The attacker exploits vulnerabilities in liblognorm's parsing logic to cause a stack or heap overflow, leading to a crash (DoS). While RCE is possible from these overflows, it's much harder; the DoS outcome is the more likely and therefore high-risk scenario.
* Attack Vectors:
* Stack Overflow: Sending logs with excessively nested structures if liblognorm uses recursive parsing without proper bounds checking.
* Heap Overflow: Sending logs crafted to trigger vulnerabilities in how liblognorm allocates and manages memory for parsed data. This could involve specific field types, structures, or sequences of data.
* Likelihood: Low to Medium
* Impact: High (DoS)
* Effort: Medium to High (for triggering the crash; much higher for RCE)
* Skill Level: Intermediate to Advanced (for triggering the crash; Expert for RCE)
* Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard
Attack Tree Path: Rulebase Corruption (Rule Injection)
Description: The attacker injects malicious rules into the liblognorm rulebase, if external loading is allowed and poorly secured. These rules can then be used to cause DoS or potentially RCE.
* Attack Vectors:
* If liblognorm loads rulebases from external files or network locations without proper validation (e.g., digital signatures, checksums), the attacker could:
* Replace a legitimate rulebase with a malicious one.
* Modify an existing rulebase to include malicious rules.
* Create a new rulebase file in a location that liblognorm is configured to read from.
* Malicious rules could be designed to:
* Cause infinite loops or excessive recursion.
* Consume excessive CPU or memory resources.
* Potentially execute arbitrary code (if the rule engine allows for this, which is highly undesirable).
* Likelihood: Low to Medium (heavily dependent on configuration)
* Impact: Very High (DoS, potential RCE, data corruption)
* Effort: Low to High (dependent on security measures)
* Skill Level: Intermediate to Expert
* Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard