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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for taosdata/tdengine

Attack Surface: Unauthorized Data Access via Network (TDengine Ports/Protocol)

  • Description: Attackers gain unauthorized access to TDengine data by directly exploiting vulnerabilities in TDengine's network services or its proprietary communication protocol.
    • How TDengine Contributes: TDengine exposes network ports for client connections and inter-node communication. The proprietary protocol, while optimized, is a potential target for attackers.
    • Example: An attacker discovers an open, unauthenticated TDengine port (due to firewall misconfiguration or a vulnerability in TDengine's authentication) and uses a custom client to send commands directly to the TDengine server, bypassing application-level security.
    • Impact: Data breach, data exfiltration, potential for data manipulation or deletion.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Strict Firewall Rules: Implement very strict firewall rules (host-based and network-based) to allow only necessary connections to TDengine ports from explicitly authorized sources. Deny all other traffic.
      • Change Default Ports: Change TDengine's default ports to non-standard values.
      • Strong Authentication: Enforce strong, unique passwords for all TDengine users. Disable the default root user after creating a new administrative user.
      • TLS Encryption: Require TLS encryption for all client-server and inter-node communication. Use strong TLS ciphers and regularly update certificates. Verify client certificates where possible.
      • VPN/Tunneling: Mandate that all remote access to the TDengine cluster occurs through a VPN or secure tunnel.
      • Network Intrusion Detection/Prevention: Deploy an IDS/IPS system configured to monitor for suspicious activity related to the TDengine protocol (if possible, with custom rules).

Attack Surface: Exploitation of Vulnerabilities in TDengine Code

  • Description: Attackers exploit vulnerabilities in TDengine's core code (dnode, mnode), its proprietary protocol implementation, or its connectors (taosAdapter, JDBC, etc.) to gain control or access data.
    • How TDengine Contributes: This is inherent to any software. TDengine's specific codebase and components are the attack surface.
    • Example: A zero-day vulnerability is discovered in TDengine's handling of a specific data type, allowing an attacker to craft a malicious query that triggers a buffer overflow and executes arbitrary code on the TDengine server.
    • Impact: Remote code execution (RCE), data corruption, data exfiltration, complete system compromise.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Immediate Patching: Implement a rapid patching process for TDengine. Monitor security advisories very closely and apply updates immediately upon release. Have a rollback plan in case of issues.
      • Vulnerability Scanning: Regularly scan for outdated or vulnerable versions of TDengine and its components.
      • Least Privilege: Run TDengine processes with the absolute minimum necessary privileges. Never run as root.
      • Security Hardening: Harden the underlying operating system and network environment according to best practices.

Attack Surface: Denial-of-Service (DoS) via Resource Exhaustion (Targeting TDengine)

  • Description: Attackers overwhelm TDengine's internal resources (CPU, memory, disk I/O, connections) with specifically crafted requests or queries, causing service disruption.
    • How TDengine Contributes: TDengine's performance and stability are directly tied to its resource management. Vulnerabilities or limitations in its resource handling can be exploited.
    • Example: An attacker sends a flood of specially crafted queries designed to exploit a weakness in TDengine's query optimizer, causing excessive CPU consumption and making the server unresponsive.
    • Impact: Service disruption, data unavailability.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • TDengine-Specific Resource Limits: Configure strict resource limits within TDengine (using taos.cfg parameters like max_connections, max_cpu_cores, query timeouts, etc.) to prevent any single user or query from monopolizing resources.
      • Query Analysis and Optimization: Actively monitor query performance and identify slow or resource-intensive queries. Work with developers to optimize queries and prevent inefficient operations. Use TDengine's built-in query analysis tools.
      • Rate Limiting (Network Level): Implement rate limiting at the network level (firewall or reverse proxy) to control the number of connections and requests specifically to TDengine ports.

Attack Surface: Misconfiguration of TDengine's Access Control (RBAC)

  • Description: Incorrectly configured user roles and permissions within TDengine itself grant excessive access.
    • How TDengine Contributes: TDengine's built-in RBAC system is the direct source of this risk.
    • Example: A TDengine user is accidentally granted the SUPER privilege, allowing them to modify system settings or access data they shouldn't.
    • Impact: Unauthorized data access, data modification, data deletion, potential for denial-of-service.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Strict Least Privilege: Enforce the principle of least privilege meticulously within TDengine's RBAC. Grant only the absolute minimum necessary permissions. Avoid using the SUPER privilege except for initial setup and essential administrative tasks.
      • Regular RBAC Audits: Conduct regular, thorough audits of TDengine user roles and permissions. Automate this process if possible.
      • Role-Based Templates: Use predefined role templates to standardize permissions and reduce configuration errors.