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Threat Model Analysis for timescale/timescaledb

  • Threat: Forged Timestamp Data Insertion

    • Description: An attacker crafts malicious data payloads with manipulated timestamps. They might insert data points far in the future or past to disrupt time-series analysis, trigger false alerts based on time windows, or bypass time-based access controls (e.g., inserting data that should be outside a retention period).
    • Impact: Data corruption, inaccurate analysis, incorrect alerts, potential bypass of security controls, and compromised data integrity.
    • Affected Component: Hypertables (specifically, the time column and any indexes based on it).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Server-Side Timestamping: Use server-side timestamp generation (e.g., NOW()) whenever possible.
      • Strict Input Validation: Implement rigorous validation of client-provided timestamps.
      • Trusted Data Sources: Establish trust mechanisms (e.g., digital signatures) for external data sources.
      • Row-Level Security (RLS): Use RLS to restrict timestamp ranges for insertions.
  • Threat: Unauthorized Hypertable Schema Modification

    • Description: An attacker gains sufficient database privileges to execute ALTER TABLE commands on a hypertable. They could change data types, add/remove columns, or modify chunking parameters (chunk_time_interval).
    • Impact: Data loss, data corruption, application errors, performance degradation, potential denial of service.
    • Affected Component: Hypertables, chunk_time_interval setting, TimescaleDB internal metadata.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Principle of Least Privilege: Grant only necessary permissions to the application's database user. Do not grant ALTER privileges on hypertables.
      • Database User Segmentation: Use separate database users for different application components.
      • Change Management: Implement strict change management procedures for schema modifications.
      • Auditing: Enable PostgreSQL auditing (e.g., pgAudit) to track schema changes.
  • Threat: Continuous Aggregate Manipulation

    • Description: An attacker with sufficient privileges alters the definition of a continuous aggregate (using ALTER MATERIALIZED VIEW) or directly manipulates the materialized data.
    • Impact: Inaccurate pre-calculated results, leading to incorrect reports or decisions. Potentially exposes sensitive data.
    • Affected Component: Continuous Aggregates (materialized views), timescaledb.continuous_aggregate catalog table.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Restrict Access: Limit access to CREATE CONTINUOUS AGGREGATE and ALTER MATERIALIZED VIEW commands.
      • Regular Validation: Periodically compare continuous aggregate results with raw data calculations.
      • Auditing: Monitor logs for unauthorized changes to continuous aggregate definitions.
      • Row-Level Security (RLS): Apply RLS to control access based on user roles.
  • Threat: Direct Chunk Data Tampering

    • Description: An attacker gains direct access to the underlying PostgreSQL data files and modifies the data within individual chunks, bypassing TimescaleDB's access controls.
    • Impact: Data corruption, data loss, circumvention of database-level security.
    • Affected Component: Underlying PostgreSQL data files representing TimescaleDB chunks.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Operating System Security: Harden the OS and file system.
      • Encryption at Rest: Implement encryption for database data files.
      • File Integrity Monitoring (FIM): Use FIM tools to detect unauthorized changes.
      • Regular Backups and Verification: Perform and verify regular backups.
  • Threat: Information Disclosure via Continuous Aggregates

    • Description: A continuous aggregate is misconfigured or lacks appropriate access controls, exposing sensitive data.
    • Impact: Exposure of sensitive data, violation of privacy regulations.
    • Affected Component: Continuous Aggregates (materialized views).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Data Minimization: Include only the minimum necessary information in aggregates.
      • Row-Level Security (RLS): Implement RLS to restrict access.
      • Views with Security Barriers: Use views to control access and enforce security checks.
  • Threat: Denial of Service via Resource Exhaustion (Queries)

    • Description: An attacker submits poorly optimized queries against large hypertables, consuming excessive resources.
    • Impact: Denial of service, database performance degradation, system instability.
    • Affected Component: Hypertables, TimescaleDB query planner, PostgreSQL resource management.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Query Optimization: Use indexes, time-based filters, and continuous aggregates.
      • EXPLAIN Analysis: Analyze query plans with EXPLAIN.
      • Query Timeouts: Implement query timeouts.
      • Resource Limits: Configure PostgreSQL resource limits.
      • Connection Pooling: Use connection pooling.
  • Threat: Disk Space Exhaustion (Uncontrolled Data Growth)

    • Description: Hypertables grow without bounds due to a lack of data retention policies, filling up disk space.
    • Impact: Denial of service, database unavailability, potential data loss.
    • Affected Component: Hypertables, TimescaleDB chunk management.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Data Retention Policies: Use drop_chunks to remove old data.
      • Disk Space Monitoring: Monitor disk usage and set up alerts.
      • Compression: Enable TimescaleDB's native compression.
  • Threat: Privilege Escalation via SECURITY DEFINER Functions

    • Description: A TimescaleDB function with SECURITY DEFINER executes with the creator's privileges. An attacker exploits this to gain elevated privileges.
    • Impact: Attacker gains the privileges of the function's creator.
    • Affected Component: TimescaleDB functions created with the SECURITY DEFINER attribute.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Avoid SECURITY DEFINER: Use SECURITY INVOKER whenever possible.
      • Code Review: Rigorously review code if SECURITY DEFINER is necessary.
      • Restrict Creation: Limit who can create SECURITY DEFINER functions.
      • Input Validation: Validate all inputs to SECURITY DEFINER functions.
  • Threat: TimescaleDB Extension Vulnerability

    • Description: A vulnerability exists within the TimescaleDB extension itself.
    • Impact: Varies, but could include information disclosure, privilege escalation, or denial of service.
    • Affected Component: The TimescaleDB extension itself.
    • Risk Severity: Critical (if a vulnerability exists)
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Stay Updated: Keep TimescaleDB and PostgreSQL up to date.
      • Vulnerability Scanning: Use a database vulnerability scanner.
      • Monitor Advisories: Subscribe to TimescaleDB security advisories.