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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for valkey-io/valkey

Attack Surface: Unauthenticated Network Access

  • Description: Valkey instance is accessible over the network without requiring any authentication.
  • Valkey Contribution: By default, Valkey might bind to network interfaces and listen for connections without enforced authentication. This is a configuration setting that needs to be explicitly secured.
  • Example: An attacker on the same network or with network access to the Valkey instance can connect using valkey-cli or a similar client and execute arbitrary Valkey commands without providing credentials.
  • Impact: Full compromise of data stored in Valkey, data manipulation, data deletion, denial of service by crashing the server or consuming resources, potential lateral movement if Valkey server is running with elevated privileges.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Enable Authentication: Configure requirepass in valkey.conf with a strong, randomly generated password.
    • Use ACLs (if implemented in Valkey): Implement Access Control Lists to restrict command access based on user roles and permissions.
    • Network Segmentation: Isolate Valkey instances on private networks or subnets, limiting network access to only authorized applications and services.
    • Firewall Rules: Implement firewall rules to restrict access to the Valkey port (default 6379) to only trusted IP addresses or networks.

Attack Surface: Command Injection via Application Logic

  • Description: Application code improperly constructs Valkey commands using user-controlled input without proper sanitization or validation.
  • Valkey Contribution: Valkey's command-based interface allows for powerful operations. If application logic blindly incorporates user input into commands, it can become vulnerable to injection attacks.
  • Example: An application takes user input for a key name and uses it directly in a GET command. An attacker could input a specially crafted string like ; FLUSHALL; GET malicious_key which, if not properly handled, could lead to unintended command execution (like FLUSHALL in this example) alongside the intended GET command.
  • Impact: Data deletion (FLUSHALL), data manipulation, denial of service by executing resource-intensive commands, potential information disclosure depending on the commands executed.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Input Sanitization and Validation: Thoroughly sanitize and validate all user inputs before incorporating them into Valkey commands. Use allow-lists and escape special characters.
    • Parameterization/Abstraction Libraries: Utilize Valkey client libraries that offer parameterized queries or abstraction layers to prevent direct command construction from user input.
    • Principle of Least Privilege: Grant application users only the necessary permissions within Valkey using ACLs (if available) to limit the impact of potential command injection.
    • Code Review: Conduct regular code reviews to identify potential command injection vulnerabilities in application logic interacting with Valkey.

Attack Surface: Denial of Service (DoS) via Resource Exhaustion

  • Description: Attackers exploit resource-intensive Valkey commands or connection floods to overwhelm the Valkey server, making it unresponsive and causing application downtime.
  • Valkey Contribution: Valkey, like Redis, can be susceptible to DoS attacks if not properly configured and protected. Certain commands and high connection rates can consume significant server resources.
  • Example: An attacker repeatedly sends resource-intensive commands like KEYS * (on a large database), SORT on large lists, or floods the server with connection requests, exhausting CPU, memory, or network bandwidth and causing Valkey to become slow or crash.
  • Impact: Application downtime, service disruption, data unavailability, potential data loss if persistence mechanisms are affected by the DoS.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Resource Limits: Configure Valkey's resource limits (e.g., maxmemory, maxclients) to prevent excessive resource consumption.
    • Command Renaming/Disabling: Rename or disable potentially dangerous commands like KEYS, FLUSHALL, FLUSHDB using rename-command in valkey.conf to limit their availability.
    • Connection Limits: Implement connection limits at the application level or using network firewalls to restrict the number of connections from a single source.
    • Rate Limiting: Implement rate limiting on application requests to Valkey to prevent excessive command execution from a single source.
    • Monitoring and Alerting: Monitor Valkey server resource usage (CPU, memory, network) and set up alerts to detect and respond to potential DoS attacks.

Attack Surface: Data Exposure via Unencrypted Network Traffic

  • Description: Communication between the application and Valkey is not encrypted, allowing attackers to eavesdrop on network traffic and intercept sensitive data.
  • Valkey Contribution: Valkey, by default, does not enforce encryption for network communication. It's the responsibility of the user to configure TLS/SSL encryption.
  • Example: An attacker on the same network as the application and Valkey server can use network sniffing tools to capture network packets and read sensitive data being transmitted between the application and Valkey, including keys and values.
  • Impact: Confidentiality breach, exposure of sensitive data (passwords, user data, application secrets) stored in Valkey, potential for further attacks based on exposed information.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Enable TLS/SSL Encryption: Configure Valkey to use TLS/SSL encryption for client connections. This encrypts all communication between the application and Valkey.
    • Secure Network Infrastructure: Ensure the network infrastructure between the application and Valkey is secure and trusted. Use VPNs or private networks where appropriate.
    • Avoid Storing Highly Sensitive Data in Valkey (if possible): If extremely sensitive data must be stored, consider additional encryption at the application level before storing it in Valkey.

Attack Surface: Weak Authentication Passwords

  • Description: Using weak or default passwords for Valkey authentication (requirepass) makes it easy for attackers to gain unauthorized access.
  • Valkey Contribution: Valkey relies on the configured password for authentication. If this password is weak, the authentication mechanism is easily bypassed.
  • Example: Using a common password like "password" or "123456" for requirepass. Attackers can easily brute-force or dictionary attack these weak passwords and gain full access to the Valkey instance.
  • Impact: Full compromise of data stored in Valkey, data manipulation, data deletion, denial of service, potential lateral movement.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Strong Passwords: Generate and use strong, randomly generated passwords for requirepass. Store passwords securely (e.g., using a password manager or secrets management system).
    • Regular Password Rotation: Implement a policy for regular password rotation for requirepass.
    • Avoid Default Passwords: Never use default passwords or easily guessable passwords.
    • Consider Key-Based Authentication (if supported in future Valkey versions): Explore and implement stronger authentication mechanisms like key-based authentication if Valkey supports them in the future.