Attack Surface: Network Exposure and Unauthenticated Access
-
1. Network Exposure and Unauthenticated Access
- Description: Direct, unauthenticated access to the Valkey instance from untrusted networks.
- How Valkey Contributes: Valkey, by default, listens on a TCP port (6379) and may not have authentication enabled initially.
- Example: An attacker scans for open port 6379 on public IP addresses and finds a Valkey instance without a password set.
- Impact: Complete data compromise (read, write, delete), potential for remote code execution (if certain modules are loaded and exploitable).
- Risk Severity: Critical
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Network Segmentation: Place Valkey within a private network (VPC) accessible only to trusted application servers. Never expose it directly to the public internet.
- Firewall Rules: Configure strict firewall rules to allow inbound connections to port 6379 only from the specific IP addresses of authorized application servers.
- Authentication: Always enable authentication in Valkey using a strong, randomly generated password (
requirepass
directive invalkey.conf
). - VPN/Bastion Host: If remote administrative access is required, use a secure VPN or a bastion host with strong authentication and auditing.
Attack Surface: Unencrypted Communication (Lack of TLS)
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2. Unencrypted Communication (Lack of TLS)
- Description: Data transmitted between the application and Valkey is not encrypted, allowing for interception.
- How Valkey Contributes: Valkey supports TLS, but it's not enabled by default. The application must be configured to use it.
- Example: An attacker performs a Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack on the network between the application server and the Valkey instance, capturing sensitive data in transit.
- Impact: Data leakage (credentials, cached data, application data), potential for data modification.
- Risk Severity: High
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Enable TLS: Configure both Valkey and the application's client library to use TLS encryption for all communication.
- Certificate Validation: Ensure the client library properly validates the Valkey server's TLS certificate to prevent MitM attacks using forged certificates.
- Strong Cipher Suites: Use strong, modern cipher suites for TLS encryption.
Attack Surface: Command Injection
-
3. Command Injection
- Description: Attackers inject malicious Valkey commands through unsanitized application input.
- How Valkey Contributes: Valkey executes commands sent by clients. If the application constructs commands using untrusted input without proper escaping, injection is possible.
- Example: An application uses user input directly in a
SET
command:valkey.set(userInput, "value")
. An attacker provides input like"; FLUSHALL; "
to delete all data. - Impact: Data loss, data modification, potential denial of service, potential for remote code execution (via
EVAL
or modules). - Risk Severity: High
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Parameterized Commands: Use client libraries that support parameterized commands (like prepared statements in SQL). This treats all input as data, preventing command injection.
- Input Validation/Sanitization: Strictly validate and sanitize all input used in constructing Valkey commands, even when using parameterized commands (defense-in-depth).
- Disable Dangerous Commands: Use the
rename-command
directive invalkey.conf
to disable or rename dangerous commands likeFLUSHALL
,FLUSHDB
,CONFIG
, andEVAL
if they are not absolutely necessary.
Attack Surface: Denial of Service (DoS)
-
4. Denial of Service (DoS)
- Description: Attackers overwhelm the Valkey instance, making it unavailable to legitimate users.
- How Valkey Contributes: Valkey is susceptible to resource exhaustion (memory, CPU, network) if not properly configured and protected.
- Example: An attacker sends a flood of
SET
commands with very large values, consuming all available memory in the Valkey instance. Or, an attacker repeatedly executesKEYS *
on a large dataset. - Impact: Application unavailability, potential data loss (if persistence is not configured or is overwhelmed).
- Risk Severity: High
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Rate Limiting: Implement rate limiting on the application side or using a proxy to limit the number of requests per client/IP address.
- Resource Limits: Configure
maxmemory
invalkey.conf
to limit the maximum memory Valkey can use. Usemaxclients
to limit concurrent connections. - Avoid
KEYS *
: UseSCAN
instead ofKEYS *
for iterating over keys in production. - Network Monitoring: Monitor network traffic and server resource usage to detect and respond to DoS attacks.
- Timeouts: Configure appropriate timeouts on both the client and server sides.
Attack Surface: Outdated Valkey Version or Client Library
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5. Outdated Valkey Version or Client Library
- Description: Running an outdated version of Valkey or a vulnerable client library exposes the application to known vulnerabilities.
- How Valkey Contributes: Like any software, Valkey and its client libraries can have security vulnerabilities that are patched in newer releases.
- Example: An older version of Valkey has a known remote code execution vulnerability. An attacker exploits this vulnerability to gain control of the server.
- Impact: Varies depending on the vulnerability, but can range from data leakage to complete system compromise.
- Risk Severity: High (depending on the vulnerability)
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Regular Updates: Keep Valkey and all client libraries up-to-date with the latest stable releases.
- Vulnerability Scanning: Regularly scan the Valkey instance and application dependencies for known vulnerabilities.
- Software Composition Analysis (SCA): Use SCA tools to track dependencies and receive alerts about vulnerabilities.