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Attack Tree Analysis for vurtun/nuklear

Objective: Gain Unauthorized Control via Nuklear Exploitation (CRITICAL NODE)

Attack Tree Visualization

                                     +-----------------------------------------------------+
                                     |  Gain Unauthorized Control via Nuklear Exploitation  |
                                     +-----------------------------------------------------+
                                                  /
                                                 /
          +-------------------------+                        
          | Arbitrary Code Execution|                        
          +-------------------------+                        
           **CRITICAL NODE**                                
               /         \                              
              /           \                             
+-------------+     +-------------+                       
| **Buffer**  |     |  (Implicit) |                       
| **Overflow**|     |  Format     |                       
|             |     |  String Vuln|                       
+-------------+     +-------------+                       
 **HIGH-RISK**       **HIGH-RISK**                          
     |                     |                                
     |                     |                                
+----+----+          +-------------+                       
| **Crafted**|          | **Crafted**  |                       
| **Input**  |          | **Input**    |                       
| **to**     |          | **(Format** |                       
| **Widgets**|          |  **String)**|                       
+---------+          +-------------+                       
**HIGH-RISK PATH**    **HIGH-RISK PATH**

Attack Tree Path: Arbitrary Code Execution (ACE) - CRITICAL NODE

  • Description: The attacker achieves the ability to execute arbitrary code of their choosing on the system running the application. This is the most severe outcome, granting the attacker complete control.
  • Impact: Very High. Complete system compromise.
  • Why it's Critical: This is the ultimate goal for many attackers, allowing them to steal data, install malware, pivot to other systems, or cause significant damage.

Attack Tree Path: Buffer Overflow - HIGH-RISK

  • Description: A vulnerability where data written to a buffer exceeds its allocated size, overwriting adjacent memory. In the context of Nuklear, this would likely occur due to insufficient input validation on data passed to Nuklear widgets.
  • Impact: High to Very High. Can lead to ACE.
  • Mechanism:
    • Nuklear widgets (text fields, etc.) have internal buffers to store data.
    • If the application doesn't validate the length of user-provided input before passing it to Nuklear, an attacker can provide input that's larger than the buffer.
    • This overwrites adjacent memory, potentially corrupting data structures, function pointers, or return addresses.
    • By carefully crafting the overflowing data, the attacker can redirect program execution to their own malicious code.
  • Example: A text field widget in Nuklear might have a buffer of 64 bytes. If the application doesn't check the input length, an attacker could provide a string of 128 bytes. The extra 64 bytes would overwrite adjacent memory.
  • Mitigation: Rigorous input validation (length checks, type checks, sanitization) before passing data to Nuklear functions.

Attack Tree Path: Crafted Input to Widgets (Buffer Overflow) - HIGH-RISK PATH

  • Description: The attacker provides specially crafted input to Nuklear widgets (e.g., text fields, sliders) designed to trigger a buffer overflow.
  • Impact: High to Very High (leads to Buffer Overflow, then ACE).
  • Effort: Medium. Requires understanding of Nuklear's data structures and the application's input handling. Fuzzing can reduce effort.
  • Skill Level: Medium to High. Requires knowledge of buffer overflow vulnerabilities and C.
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium to High. Might be silent initially. Requires IDS, application logging, or crash analysis.
  • Mitigation: Same as for Buffer Overflow: rigorous input validation.

Attack Tree Path: Crafted Input (Format String) - HIGH-RISK PATH

  • Description: The attacker provides a specially crafted string that is used as a format string in a function like nk_textf (or a similar function if the application wraps Nuklear calls). This allows the attacker to read from or write to arbitrary memory locations.
  • Impact: High to Very High (can lead to ACE).
  • Effort: Medium. Requires understanding of format string vulnerabilities and how the application uses string formatting.
  • Skill Level: Medium to High. Requires knowledge of format string vulnerabilities and C.
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium to High. Similar to buffer overflows.
  • Mechanism:
    • Format string functions (like printf in standard C, or nk_textf in Nuklear) use format specifiers (e.g., %x, %s, %n) to interpret arguments.
    • If an attacker can control the format string itself (e.g., by providing it as input to a text field that's then used in nk_textf), they can use these specifiers to:
      • %x: Read data from the stack (potentially leaking sensitive information).
      • %s: Read data from an arbitrary memory address (potentially crashing the application or leaking data).
      • %n: Write to an arbitrary memory address (this is the most dangerous, allowing for code execution).
    • The attacker crafts a format string with a specific sequence of specifiers to achieve their desired outcome (reading or writing to specific memory locations).
  • Example: If an application has code like nk_textf(ctx, NK_TEXT_LEFT, user_input); where user_input is directly taken from a text field without sanitization, an attacker could enter a string like "%x %x %x %x %n" to potentially write to memory and gain control.
  • Mitigation:
    • Never use user-supplied input directly as a format string.
    • If you need to display user-supplied text, use functions that don't interpret format specifiers (e.g., nk_label for simple text).
    • If you must use a format string function with user input, always provide a fixed format string and pass the user input as arguments to the function, not as part of the format string itself. For example: nk_textf(ctx, NK_TEXT_LEFT, "%s", user_input); (This is safe because user_input is treated as a string to be displayed, not as a format string).