Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
50 lines (36 loc) · 4.21 KB

attack-tree.md

File metadata and controls

50 lines (36 loc) · 4.21 KB

Attack Tree Analysis for woltapp/blurhash

Objective: Compromise application that use given project by exploiting weaknesses or vulnerabilities within the project itself.

Attack Tree Visualization

└── [CRITICAL] Compromise Application using BlurHash Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL] └── OR: [CRITICAL] Exploit Server-Side Vulnerabilities (via BlurHash Generation) [CRITICAL] └── AND: [CRITICAL] Trigger Server-Side Denial of Service (DoS) [CRITICAL] ├── [HIGH RISK] 3. Craft Malicious Input Image for Resource Exhaustion during BlurHash Generation [HIGH RISK] [CRITICAL] │ ├── [HIGH RISK] 3.1. Extremely Large Image Files [HIGH RISK] [CRITICAL] │ └── [HIGH RISK] 3.3. Repeated Requests for BlurHash Generation [HIGH RISK] **[CRITICAL]

Attack Tree Path: 1. [CRITICAL] Compromise Application using BlurHash Vulnerabilities:

  • This is the root goal of the attacker. Success means the attacker has achieved some level of compromise in the application by exploiting vulnerabilities related to BlurHash processing.

Attack Tree Path: 2. [CRITICAL] Exploit Server-Side Vulnerabilities (via BlurHash Generation):

  • This critical node represents the attacker's chosen path to compromise the application: targeting the server-side BlurHash generation process.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • Exploiting vulnerabilities in the BlurHash generation library itself (though considered lower likelihood in our full analysis, server-side vulnerabilities are generally higher impact).
    • Overwhelming the server resources during BlurHash generation, leading to Denial of Service.

Attack Tree Path: 3. [CRITICAL] Trigger Server-Side Denial of Service (DoS):

  • This is the immediate objective within the server-side exploitation path. A successful DoS disrupts the application's availability and can be a stepping stone for further attacks or simply the goal itself.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • Crafting malicious input images that consume excessive server resources during BlurHash generation.
    • Flooding the server with a large number of BlurHash generation requests.

Attack Tree Path: 4. [HIGH RISK] 3. Craft Malicious Input Image for Resource Exhaustion during BlurHash Generation:

  • This High-Risk Path focuses on using malicious images to cause server-side DoS.

  • Likelihood: Medium to High - It is relatively easy for an attacker to provide large or potentially complex images.

  • Impact: Low to Medium - Can lead to server DoS, impacting application availability.

  • Effort: Low - Requires minimal effort to send malicious images.

  • Skill Level: Low - No specialized skills are needed.

  • Detection Difficulty: Easy - Server monitoring can detect increased resource usage.

    • 4.1. [HIGH RISK] 3.1. Extremely Large Image Files:

      • Attack Vector: Submitting or linking to extremely large image files for BlurHash generation.
      • Mechanism: Processing very large images consumes significant server resources (CPU, memory, bandwidth, disk I/O), potentially leading to resource exhaustion and DoS.
      • Mitigation: Implement strict image size limits (file size and dimensions) on the server-side. Implement resource quotas for image processing tasks.

    • 4.2. [HIGH RISK] 3.3. Repeated Requests for BlurHash Generation:

      • Attack Vector: Sending a flood of requests to the BlurHash generation endpoint.
      • Mechanism: Overwhelming the server with a high volume of requests, even with normal-sized images, can exhaust server resources and cause DoS.
      • Mitigation: Implement rate limiting on the BlurHash generation endpoint to restrict the number of requests from a single source within a given time frame.