Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
73 lines (60 loc) · 7.39 KB

attack-surface.md

File metadata and controls

73 lines (60 loc) · 7.39 KB

Attack Surface Analysis for apache/incubator-brpc

Attack Surface: Protocol Parsing Vulnerabilities

  • Description: Flaws in the code within brpc that parses network protocols (Baidu RPC, HTTP/1.1, HTTP/2, H2C, Thrift, gRPC).
  • How incubator-brpc contributes to the attack surface: brpc's implementation of protocol parsing logic is the direct source of these vulnerabilities.
  • Example: A buffer overflow in brpc's HTTP/2 header parsing allows an attacker to send a crafted request leading to remote code execution.
  • Impact: Remote Code Execution (RCE), Denial of Service (DoS).
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Regularly update brpc: Apply security patches and bug fixes by updating to the latest brpc version.
    • Fuzzing and Security Audits: Conduct focused fuzzing and security audits on brpc's protocol parsing implementations.

Attack Surface: Serialization/Deserialization Vulnerabilities

  • Description: Weaknesses in how brpc handles data serialization and deserialization, especially in its integration with libraries like Protobuf or Thrift.
  • How incubator-brpc contributes to the attack surface: brpc's use of serialization libraries and its own serialization/deserialization logic can introduce vulnerabilities if not handled securely.
  • Example: Insecure deserialization vulnerability in brpc's Protobuf handling. An attacker sends a malicious serialized Protobuf message that, when deserialized by brpc, leads to arbitrary code execution.
  • Impact: Remote Code Execution (RCE), Denial of Service (DoS).
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Use secure and updated serialization libraries: Ensure that brpc's dependencies, especially serialization libraries, are up-to-date and known to be secure.
    • Input validation (at application level): While brpc handles deserialization, application-level validation of deserialized data can provide an additional layer of defense.
    • Principle of Least Privilege: Run brpc services with minimal necessary privileges to limit the impact of potential RCE.

Attack Surface: HTTP/2 Specific Vulnerabilities

  • Description: Security vulnerabilities specific to the HTTP/2 protocol implementation within brpc.
  • How incubator-brpc contributes to the attack surface: If HTTP/2 is enabled, brpc's HTTP/2 implementation becomes a direct part of the attack surface, inheriting the complexities and potential vulnerabilities of HTTP/2.
  • Example: HTTP/2 request smuggling vulnerability in brpc. An attacker exploits ambiguities in brpc's HTTP/2 stream handling to smuggle malicious requests, potentially bypassing security controls.
  • Impact: Request Smuggling, Denial of Service (DoS), potentially Remote Code Execution.
  • Risk Severity: High to Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Keep brpc updated: Ensure brpc's HTTP/2 implementation is patched against known HTTP/2 vulnerabilities by updating brpc regularly.
    • Disable HTTP/2 if not required: If HTTP/2 is not a necessary protocol for the application, consider disabling it to reduce the attack surface.
    • Web Application Firewall (WAF): Deploy a WAF capable of inspecting and filtering HTTP/2 traffic for known attack patterns.

Attack Surface: Service Discovery Vulnerabilities (Naming Service Interaction)

  • Description: Weaknesses in how brpc interacts with external naming services (like Zookeeper, Consul, etcd) for service registration and discovery.
  • How incubator-brpc contributes to the attack surface: brpc's integration logic with naming services can be vulnerable if not implemented securely, or if the naming service itself is compromised.
  • Example: Service registration manipulation due to insecure brpc naming service integration. An attacker exploits a flaw in brpc's naming service interaction to register a malicious service, leading to clients being redirected to a compromised endpoint.
  • Impact: Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks, Denial of Service (DoS), Service Disruption.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Secure Naming Service Access: Implement strong authentication and authorization for access to the naming service itself.
    • Mutual TLS (mTLS) for Service Communication: Use mTLS to authenticate and encrypt communication between brpc clients and servers, mitigating MitM risks even if service discovery is compromised.
    • Service Registration Validation: Implement validation mechanisms to ensure only authorized and legitimate services are registered through brpc's integration.

Attack Surface: Insecure Default Configurations

  • Description: brpc's default configurations might include settings that are insecure for production deployments.
  • How incubator-brpc contributes to the attack surface: Out-of-the-box, brpc might have configurations that prioritize ease of use over security, potentially enabling insecure features or disabling security measures by default.
  • Example: Disabled authentication by default in brpc. If deployed with default settings and authentication is not explicitly enabled, brpc services become vulnerable to unauthorized access.
  • Impact: Unauthorized Access, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service (DoS).
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Review and Harden Configurations: Thoroughly review brpc's configuration options and harden them for production environments, specifically focusing on security-related settings.
    • Enable Authentication and Authorization: Explicitly enable and configure strong authentication and authorization mechanisms provided by brpc.
    • Minimize Enabled Features: Disable any brpc features that are not strictly necessary to reduce the attack surface.

Attack Surface: Dependency Vulnerabilities

  • Description: Security vulnerabilities present in third-party libraries that brpc depends upon.
  • How incubator-brpc contributes to the attack surface: By depending on external libraries, brpc indirectly inherits the attack surface of those dependencies. Vulnerabilities in these libraries can be exploited through brpc.
  • Example: A critical vulnerability is discovered in a specific version of the Protobuf library used by brpc. Applications using brpc with this vulnerable Protobuf version become susceptible to exploits targeting this dependency vulnerability.
  • Impact: Remote Code Execution (RCE), Denial of Service (DoS), Information Disclosure.
  • Risk Severity: High to Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Dependency Scanning and Management: Regularly scan brpc's dependencies for known vulnerabilities using vulnerability scanning tools.
    • Keep Dependencies Updated: Update brpc and its dependencies to the latest versions to patch known vulnerabilities.
    • Dependency Pinning: Use dependency pinning to manage and control dependency versions, facilitating consistent vulnerability management.