attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for apache/mxnet

Objective: Execute Arbitrary Code on Server (CRITICAL GOAL)

Attack Tree Visualization

[Execute Arbitrary Code on Server] | ------------------------------------(CR)------------------------------------------------- | | [Exploit Deserialization] (CRITICAL) [Exploit MXNet Runtime/Dependencies] |---(CR)-------------------------- |---(HR)---

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| |---(CR)--- | | [Custom Op] [Pickle/JSON] [Buffer Overflow] [Known CVE] | | (CRITICAL) (CRITICAL) | | [Crafted Code] [Untrusted Source] (CRITICAL)

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Deserialization (CRITICAL)

• Description: This is the most critical attack vector due to the inherent dangers of deserializing untrusted data. MXNet, like many ML frameworks, uses serialization for saving and loading models and data.
• High-Risk Paths:
  • (CR) Exploit Deserialization -> Pickle/JSON Deserialization -> Untrusted Source: This is the most critical path.
    • Attack Vector: An attacker provides a maliciously crafted serialized object (using pickle or a vulnerable JSON format) from an untrusted source (e.g., a file upload, an external API). When the application deserializes this object using pickle.load() or an insecure JSON parser, arbitrary code embedded within the object is executed.
    • Likelihood: High
    • Impact: High (Complete system compromise)
    • Effort: Low (Readily available exploits for pickle)
    • Skill Level: Low-Medium
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • (HR) Exploit Deserialization -> Custom Operator Deserialization -> Crafted Code:
    • Attack Vector: If a custom MXNet operator has flawed serialization/deserialization logic, an attacker can craft a malicious serialized object. When deserialized, this object executes arbitrary code. This is particularly dangerous if the custom operator is loaded from an untrusted source or if its load/save methods don't perform proper input validation.
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: High (Complete system compromise)
    • Effort: Medium
    • Skill Level: Medium-High
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium-High

Attack Tree Path: Exploit MXNet Runtime/Dependencies

• Description: Vulnerabilities in MXNet's core C++ code or its dependencies (BLAS, CUDA libraries, etc.) can be exploited.
• High-Risk Paths:
  • (HR) Exploit MXNet Runtime/Dependencies -> Buffer Overflow:
    • Attack Vector: A buffer overflow vulnerability in MXNet's C++ code or a dependency allows an attacker to overwrite memory, potentially leading to arbitrary code execution. This can be triggered by carefully crafted input data or model definitions.
    • Likelihood: Low-Medium
    • Impact: High (Complete system compromise)
    • Effort: High
    • Skill Level: High
    • Detection Difficulty: High
  • (CR) Exploit MXNet Runtime/Dependencies -> Dependency Vulnerability (Known CVE):
    • Attack Vector: A known vulnerability (CVE) exists in one of MXNet's dependencies (e.g., a BLAS library). An attacker leverages this vulnerability, potentially using a publicly available exploit, to compromise the system.
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: High (Can range from DoS to arbitrary code execution)
    • Effort: Low-Medium
    • Skill Level: Low-Medium
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium

Attack Tree Path: Critical Nodes Summary

• Exploit Deserialization: The overarching category of deserialization attacks.
• Pickle/JSON Deserialization (Untrusted Source): The most dangerous specific instance of deserialization vulnerability.
• Dependency Vulnerability (Known CVE): Exploiting known vulnerabilities in dependencies.
• Untrusted Source: Source of malicious input.