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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for apache/thrift

Attack Surface: Deserialization Vulnerabilities in Thrift Protocols

  • Description: Flaws in the deserialization logic of Thrift protocols (like TBinaryProtocol, TCompactProtocol, TJSONProtocol) can be exploited by sending malicious or malformed data to the server or client. This can lead to buffer overflows, type confusion, or potentially arbitrary code execution.

    • Thrift Contribution: Thrift protocols define the data serialization format. Vulnerabilities in the implementation of these protocols within Thrift libraries or generated code directly contribute to this attack surface. The complexity of handling various data types and nested structures in protocols increases the potential for vulnerabilities.

    • Example: A server using TBinaryProtocol receives a crafted Thrift message with an excessively large string length field. Due to a missing bounds check in the deserialization code, this leads to a buffer overflow when allocating memory for the string, potentially allowing an attacker to overwrite adjacent memory regions and gain control of the server process.

    • Impact:

      • Denial of Service (DoS) due to crashes or resource exhaustion.
      • Information Disclosure by leaking memory contents.
      • Potentially Arbitrary Code Execution, allowing full system compromise.

    • Risk Severity: High to Critical

    • Mitigation Strategies:

      • Use the latest stable version of Thrift compiler and libraries.
      • Implement input validation and sanitization before deserialization, checking for expected data types, sizes, and ranges.
      • Review generated code and custom handlers for memory safety issues, especially in languages like C++.
      • Consider using safer protocols if applicable, based on security needs.
      • Conduct regular security audits and penetration testing, focusing on deserialization processes.
      • Utilize Web Application Firewalls (WAFs) or similar network security tools to detect malicious Thrift traffic patterns.

Attack Surface: Transport Layer Security (TLS/SSL) Misconfiguration (TSLSocket, THttpServer with HTTPS)

  • Description: Improper configuration of TLS/SSL when using secure transports in Thrift can weaken or negate the security benefits of encryption, leading to eavesdropping, man-in-the-middle attacks, or data manipulation.

    • Thrift Contribution: Thrift provides transports like TSLSocket and THttpServer that can utilize TLS/SSL. However, the configuration of TLS/SSL is often left to the developer. Misconfiguration during setup directly creates this attack surface within the Thrift context.

    • Example: A Thrift server using TSLSocket is configured with a weak cipher suite, allowing an attacker to downgrade the connection or break the encryption, intercepting sensitive data. Disabling certificate validation on the client side allows a MitM attacker to present a fraudulent certificate without detection.

    • Impact:

      • Confidentiality Breach: Sensitive data transmitted over Thrift is exposed to eavesdropping.
      • Integrity Breach: Data in transit can be modified by an attacker.
      • Authentication Bypass: Improper certificate validation can bypass mutual authentication.

    • Risk Severity: High

    • Mitigation Strategies:

      • Configure TLS/SSL to use strong and modern cipher suites. Disable weak or outdated ciphers.
      • Enable and enforce certificate validation on both client and server sides. Verify server certificates against trusted CAs.
      • Use the latest TLS protocol versions (TLS 1.2 or TLS 1.3) and disable older versions.
      • Regularly review and update TLS/SSL configurations to align with security best practices.
      • Securely manage private keys used for TLS/SSL, protecting them from unauthorized access.

Attack Surface: Denial of Service (DoS) via Transport Layer (Connection Exhaustion, Resource Consumption)

  • Description: Attackers can exploit weaknesses in the transport layer to overwhelm the Thrift server with requests, consuming resources (connections, CPU, memory, bandwidth) and preventing legitimate clients from accessing the service.

    • Thrift Contribution: Thrift servers, by default, listen for and accept connections. If not properly configured and protected, they are susceptible to transport-layer DoS attacks. The choice of transport and server implementation details within Thrift influence vulnerability to DoS.

    • Example: An attacker floods a Thrift server using TSocket with a large number of connection requests, exhausting server resources and making it unresponsive. Sending very large messages can also consume excessive server memory, leading to DoS.

    • Impact:

      • Service Unavailability: Legitimate users are unable to access the Thrift service.
      • Business Disruption: Impact on business operations relying on the service.
      • Resource Exhaustion: Server resources are depleted, potentially affecting other services.

    • Risk Severity: High

    • Mitigation Strategies:

      • Implement connection limits and rate limiting on the Thrift server.
      • Properly configure server-side resource limits (threads, memory). Use non-blocking I/O where appropriate.
      • Utilize firewalls and network security devices to filter malicious traffic.
      • Employ load balancing and redundancy to distribute traffic and improve resilience.
      • Implement monitoring and alerting to detect DoS attacks and unusual traffic patterns.