threat-modeling.md

Threat Model Analysis for apache/thrift

Threat: Backdoor/Trojaned Compiler (Supply Chain)

Description: An attacker compromises the Thrift compiler distribution channel or substitutes the official compiler with a malicious version. This trojaned compiler injects backdoors or malicious code into the generated code during the build process. Impact: Application compromise, data breaches, unauthorized access, and potential widespread impact if the compromised application is distributed widely. This is a severe supply chain attack. Affected Thrift Component: Thrift Compiler, Generated Code Risk Severity: Critical Mitigation Strategies: Download the Thrift compiler only from official and trusted sources (Apache Thrift website, official repositories). Verify the integrity of the downloaded compiler using checksums or digital signatures provided by the official source. Use dependency scanning tools to detect potentially compromised dependencies in the build environment. Consider using a hardened build environment.

Threat: Insecure Default Configurations in Generated Code

Description: The generated code uses insecure default configurations, particularly regarding transport and protocol. For example, defaulting to unencrypted TSocket or not enforcing authentication. An attacker exploits these defaults by eavesdropping on unencrypted communication or gaining unauthorized access due to lack of authentication. Impact: Data breaches due to eavesdropping, unauthorized access to services, and potential compromise of sensitive information. Affected Thrift Component: Generated Code, Transport Layer, Protocol Layer Risk Severity: High Mitigation Strategies: Explicitly configure secure transports (e.g., TSSLSocket) and protocols. Enforce TLS/SSL encryption for all network communication involving Thrift services. Implement proper authentication and authorization mechanisms in the application logic using the generated code. Review and override default configurations in the generated code to ensure security.

Threat: Unencrypted Transports (TSocket)

Description: Using unencrypted transports like TSocket for communication between Thrift clients and servers. An attacker performs network sniffing or man-in-the-middle attacks to intercept and read sensitive data transmitted over the network. Impact: Data breaches, loss of confidentiality, compromise of sensitive information transmitted via Thrift services. Affected Thrift Component: Thrift Transport Layer (TSocket) Risk Severity: Critical (if sensitive data is transmitted) Mitigation Strategies: Always use encrypted transports like TSSLSocket for sensitive data. Enforce TLS/SSL encryption for all network communication involving Thrift services. Disable or restrict the use of unencrypted transports in production environments. Properly configure TLS/SSL with strong ciphers and up-to-date certificates.

Threat: Transport Layer Denial of Service (DoS)

Description: Exploiting vulnerabilities in specific transport implementations (e.g., buffer overflows, resource exhaustion in TSocket, THttpClient). An attacker sends malformed or excessively large messages to the server or client, overwhelming resources and causing a denial of service. Impact: Service unavailability, application downtime, disruption of business operations. Affected Thrift Component: Thrift Transport Layer (specific transport implementations like TSocket, THttpClient) Risk Severity: High Mitigation Strategies: Keep Thrift library and transport implementations updated. Implement rate limiting and request size limits at the transport layer. Use robust and well-tested transport implementations. Implement resource monitoring and alerting to detect DoS attacks. Consider using network firewalls and intrusion detection/prevention systems.

Threat: Deserialization Vulnerabilities

Description: Exploiting vulnerabilities in the deserialization logic of Thrift protocols (especially binary and compact protocols). An attacker crafts malicious data that, when deserialized by the server or client, triggers vulnerabilities like buffer overflows, memory corruption, or even remote code execution. Impact: Application crashes, memory corruption, denial of service, remote code execution, and potential complete system compromise. Affected Thrift Component: Thrift Protocol Layer (deserialization logic in specific protocols) Risk Severity: Critical (especially for remote code execution) Mitigation Strategies: Keep Thrift library and protocol implementations updated. Be aware of potential deserialization vulnerabilities in the chosen protocol and target language. Implement input validation and sanitization on data received via Thrift services, even after deserialization. Consider using safer serialization formats if deserialization vulnerabilities are a major concern (though Thrift protocols are generally designed to be efficient and secure).

Threat: Denial of Service (DoS) at the Server Level

Description: An attacker floods the Thrift server with a large number of requests, overwhelming its resources (CPU, memory, network bandwidth). This leads to legitimate users being unable to access the service, causing a denial of service. Impact: Service unavailability, application downtime, disruption of business operations, and potential financial losses. Affected Thrift Component: Thrift Server, Network Infrastructure Risk Severity: High Mitigation Strategies: Implement rate limiting and request throttling at the server level or using a reverse proxy/load balancer. Use appropriate server types designed for concurrency (e.g., TThreadPoolServer, TNonblockingServer). Implement resource monitoring and alerting to detect and respond to DoS attacks. Use network firewalls and intrusion detection/prevention systems. Consider using a Content Delivery Network (CDN) or DDoS mitigation services.