Description: Attackers exploit known, unpatched security vulnerabilities inherent in PhantomJS and its outdated components (WebKit, Qt). Due to lack of maintenance, no patches are available. Exploitation is achieved by sending crafted web pages or network requests that trigger these vulnerabilities within the PhantomJS rendering engine or core. Impact: Critical - Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the server hosting PhantomJS, allowing complete system compromise. High - Denial of Service (DoS) rendering the application unavailable, significant Information Disclosure exposing sensitive data, and complete compromise of the application's PhantomJS-dependent functionality. Affected PhantomJS Component: PhantomJS core, WebKit rendering engine, Qt framework. Risk Severity: Critical to High Mitigation Strategies: * Strongly Recommended and Primary Mitigation: Migrate away from PhantomJS to actively maintained alternatives like Puppeteer or Playwright. This is the only effective long-term mitigation. * If immediate migration is impossible: * Implement extremely strict sandboxing and process isolation for PhantomJS processes to limit the impact of potential exploits. * Continuously monitor security advisories for WebKit and Qt to understand potential vulnerabilities, even though direct patches for PhantomJS are unavailable. * Harden the server environment where PhantomJS is running with strong security configurations.
Description: Attackers exploit a vulnerability within PhantomJS to escape the intended process sandbox. Due to weak or misconfigured process isolation, they can gain elevated privileges or access resources beyond the PhantomJS process, leading to compromise of the underlying host system. This leverages weaknesses in how PhantomJS processes are contained by the operating system. Impact: Critical - Complete compromise of the host system where PhantomJS is running. This allows attackers to control the server, access all data, and potentially pivot to other systems within the network. Affected PhantomJS Component: Process execution environment, interaction between PhantomJS and the operating system's process isolation mechanisms. Risk Severity: High Mitigation Strategies: * Run PhantomJS processes with the absolute minimum necessary privileges (principle of least privilege). * Mandatory: Utilize containerization technologies like Docker or Kubernetes to enforce strong process isolation for PhantomJS. * Implement and rigorously configure operating system-level process isolation mechanisms (e.g., namespaces, cgroups, SELinux/AppArmor). * Regularly audit and harden the server operating system and container configurations to ensure robust isolation.
Description: Attackers craft or inject malicious JavaScript code that, when executed by PhantomJS, intentionally consumes excessive server resources (CPU, memory, network). This can overwhelm the server, leading to a Denial of Service (DoS) specifically targeting the application's PhantomJS functionality and potentially impacting other services on the same server. Impact: High - Application unavailability due to resource exhaustion, leading to significant disruption of service. Performance degradation for all users, and potential instability of the entire server. Affected PhantomJS Component: JavaScript engine within PhantomJS, resource management and limitations within PhantomJS. Risk Severity: High Mitigation Strategies: * Mandatory: Implement strict resource limits (CPU, memory) for PhantomJS processes at the operating system or container level to prevent resource monopolization. * Implement robust monitoring of resource usage for PhantomJS processes and set up alerts for unusual spikes or sustained high consumption. * Enforce aggressive timeouts for PhantomJS script execution to prevent runaway scripts from consuming resources indefinitely. * Thoroughly sanitize and validate all user-provided input that could influence PhantomJS scripts or the URLs it renders to prevent injection of malicious code.
Description: Attackers exploit the webpage.evaluate() function (or similar JavaScript execution features in PhantomJS) by injecting malicious JavaScript code. This is achieved by manipulating user-controlled input or untrusted data that is used to construct the script passed to evaluate(). This allows execution of attacker-controlled JavaScript within the security context of the rendered page and the PhantomJS process itself.
Impact: High - Execution of arbitrary JavaScript code within the PhantomJS environment. This can lead to sensitive data exfiltration from the rendered page or the server, manipulation of page content, and potentially further exploitation to achieve Remote Code Execution on the server if combined with other vulnerabilities.
Affected PhantomJS Component: webpage.evaluate() function and similar JavaScript execution APIs within PhantomJS.
Risk Severity: High
Mitigation Strategies:
* Critical Mitigation: Completely avoid using webpage.evaluate() or any similar functions that execute arbitrary JavaScript code based on user-controlled input. Re-design application logic to eliminate the need for these functions.
* If evaluate() is absolutely unavoidable:
* Implement extremely rigorous sanitization and validation of all input used to construct the JavaScript code passed to evaluate(). Use parameterized queries or prepared statements for script construction to prevent injection.
* Consider implementing Content Security Policy (CSP) for pages rendered by PhantomJS to restrict the capabilities of any potentially injected scripts, although CSP effectiveness within PhantomJS might be limited.
Description: Attackers manipulate URLs or network-related input that PhantomJS processes. By providing malicious URLs, they can force PhantomJS to make requests to unintended internal destinations (intranet services, internal IPs) or external malicious sites. This bypasses firewall rules and access controls, allowing attackers to probe and potentially exploit internal systems. Impact: High - Exposure of internal services and resources not intended for public access. Data exfiltration from internal networks by accessing internal services. Port scanning and reconnaissance of internal network infrastructure. Potential exploitation of vulnerabilities in internal services if they are reachable via SSRF. Affected PhantomJS Component: Network request handling within PhantomJS, URL parsing and processing logic. Risk Severity: High Mitigation Strategies: * Implement extremely strict validation and sanitization of all URLs and network-related input provided to PhantomJS. Use a robust URL parsing library and validate against a strict whitelist. * Mandatory: Implement a strict whitelist of allowed domains or IP ranges that PhantomJS is permitted to access. Deny all other outbound network requests by default. * If network access is not absolutely essential for PhantomJS's functionality, completely disable or restrict outbound network access for PhantomJS processes at the firewall or network level. * Employ network segmentation to isolate the PhantomJS environment from sensitive internal networks, limiting the potential impact of SSRF. * Consider using a forward proxy with strict filtering and logging capabilities to control and monitor all outbound requests from PhantomJS.