Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
57 lines (48 loc) · 5.5 KB

attack-surface.md

File metadata and controls

57 lines (48 loc) · 5.5 KB

Attack Surface Analysis for boostorg/boost

Attack Surface: Deserialization of Untrusted Data (boost::serialization)

  • Description: Deserializing data from untrusted sources (e.g., network input, user-supplied files) without proper validation can lead to arbitrary code execution.
  • Boost Contribution: boost::serialization provides powerful serialization/deserialization capabilities, but it's designed for trusted data exchange and doesn't inherently protect against malicious input. Its flexibility can be abused.
  • Example: An attacker sends a crafted serialized object that, upon deserialization using boost::serialization, instantiates a class with a manipulated virtual function table pointer (vtable), redirecting execution to attacker-controlled code.
  • Impact: Complete system compromise, arbitrary code execution, data theft, denial of service.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Strict Input Validation: Never deserialize data from untrusted sources without rigorous validation. Implement a whitelist of allowed types and verify the structure and content of the data before deserialization.
    • Alternative Serialization Formats: For external data, prefer safer formats like JSON or Protocol Buffers. Reserve boost::serialization for internal, trusted communication.
    • Sandboxing: If boost::serialization must be used with potentially untrusted data, perform deserialization in a sandboxed environment.
    • Type Whitelisting: Explicitly define which types are allowed to be deserialized using Boost.Serialization's features.
    • Version Control: Ensure consistent Boost versions and class definitions.

Attack Surface: Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) (boost::regex)

  • Description: Specially crafted regular expressions or input strings can cause the regex engine to consume excessive CPU and memory, leading to a denial-of-service.
  • Boost Contribution: boost::regex is a powerful regex engine, but like many, it's susceptible to ReDoS due to "catastrophic backtracking."
  • Example: An attacker provides a regex like (a+)+$ and a long input string of "a" characters, causing exponential backtracking.
  • Impact: Denial of service, application unresponsiveness, resource exhaustion.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Regex Auditing: Carefully review and test all regular expressions for potential ReDoS vulnerabilities. Use specialized tools.
    • Input Length Limits: Restrict the length of input strings processed by regular expressions.
    • Timeouts: Set timeouts for regex operations.
    • Alternative Regex Engines: Consider engines with built-in ReDoS protection (though Boost.Regex has limited protection).
    • Avoid Nested Quantifiers: Minimize or avoid nested quantifiers (e.g., (a*)*).
    • Atomic Grouping: Use atomic grouping (?>...) to prevent backtracking.

Attack Surface: Buffer Management Errors (Networking) (boost::asio)

  • Description: Incorrect handling of buffer sizes and data lengths in network operations can lead to buffer overflows or underflows.
  • Boost Contribution: boost::asio provides asynchronous networking, but incorrect usage can still lead to buffer-related vulnerabilities. It relies on the developer to correctly manage buffers.
  • Example: An asynchronous read handler in boost::asio doesn't correctly check the number of bytes read and attempts to write past the end of a buffer.
  • Impact: Memory corruption, arbitrary code execution, denial of service.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Careful Buffer Management: Always verify the number of bytes read or written. Use boost::asio::buffer correctly.
    • Input Validation: Validate all data received from the network within the asynchronous handlers.
    • Static Analysis: Use static analysis tools to detect potential buffer overflows/underflows.
    • Code Reviews: Thoroughly review code that handles network buffers.

Attack Surface: Path Traversal (Filesystem) (boost::filesystem)

  • Description: Allowing user-controlled input to directly influence file paths can enable attackers to access files outside the intended directory.
  • Boost Contribution: boost::filesystem provides file/directory manipulation, but doesn't inherently prevent path traversal if used insecurely. It provides the tools, but the developer is responsible for using them safely.
  • Example: An application uses boost::filesystem::path to construct a file path based on unsanitized user input like "../../etc/passwd".
  • Impact: Unauthorized file access, data leakage, potential system compromise.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Input Sanitization: Strictly sanitize and validate all user-provided file paths before using them.
    • Whitelist Approach: Use a whitelist of allowed characters and paths.
    • Avoid Direct Construction: Avoid constructing file paths directly from user input.
    • Canonicalization: Use boost::filesystem::canonical to resolve paths to their absolute form before security checks.