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threat-modeling.md

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Threat Model Analysis for boostorg/boost

Threat: Threat 1: Arbitrary Code Execution via Deserialization

  • Description: An attacker crafts a malicious serialized data stream and sends it to the application. The application, using boost::serialization, deserializes this data without proper validation. The crafted data includes instructions to execute arbitrary code on the server. The attacker might use publicly available exploits or create custom payloads targeting specific versions of Boost or the application's custom serialization logic.
  • Impact: Complete system compromise. The attacker gains full control over the application and potentially the underlying server. They can steal data, install malware, or use the server for further attacks.
  • Affected Boost Component: boost::serialization (specifically, the deserialization functions).
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Never deserialize data from untrusted sources. This is the primary and most effective mitigation.
    • If deserialization of untrusted data is unavoidable, implement a strict whitelist of allowed types. Only deserialize objects of known, safe classes.
    • Use a safer serialization format (e.g., JSON, Protocol Buffers) with well-vetted libraries that have built-in security features.
    • Digitally sign serialized data and verify the signature before deserialization (if the data source should be trusted, but transport is not).
    • Consider sandboxing the deserialization process to limit the impact of a successful exploit.

Threat: Threat 2: Denial of Service via Regular Expression Backtracking (ReDoS)

  • Description: An attacker provides a specially crafted regular expression or input string to a component using boost::regex. This input triggers catastrophic backtracking in the regular expression engine, causing the application to consume excessive CPU resources and become unresponsive. The attacker might use known ReDoS patterns or analyze the application's regular expressions to find vulnerabilities.
  • Impact: Denial of Service (DoS). The application becomes unavailable to legitimate users.
  • Affected Boost Component: boost::regex (the regular expression matching functions).
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Avoid complex, nested quantifiers (e.g., (a+)+$) in regular expressions.
    • Use regular expression analysis tools to identify potential ReDoS vulnerabilities.
    • Set strict timeouts for regular expression matching operations.
    • Limit the length of input strings that are processed by regular expressions.
    • Consider using alternative regular expression engines that are less susceptible to ReDoS (e.g., RE2).
    • Sanitize user input to remove potentially dangerous characters before passing it to the regex engine.

Threat: Threat 3: Path Traversal via Filesystem Operations

  • Description: An attacker provides a malicious file path containing ".." sequences or other path manipulation characters to a component using boost::filesystem. The application uses this input without proper sanitization to access files. The attacker aims to read or write files outside the intended directory, potentially accessing sensitive configuration files, source code, or system files.
  • Impact: Information Disclosure, potentially leading to further attacks. In some cases, it could allow writing to arbitrary files, leading to code execution.
  • Affected Boost Component: boost::filesystem (functions that handle file paths, such as boost::filesystem::path, boost::filesystem::ifstream, boost::filesystem::ofstream).
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Never construct file paths directly from untrusted input.
    • Sanitize and validate all file paths received from users or external sources. Remove ".." sequences and other potentially dangerous characters.
    • Use a whitelist approach to restrict access to specific directories and files.
    • Normalize file paths before using them (e.g., using boost::filesystem::canonical).
    • Run the application with the least necessary privileges to limit the impact of a successful path traversal attack.

Threat: Threat 4: Denial of Service via Resource Exhaustion (Asio)

  • Description: An attacker sends a large number of connection requests or specially crafted network packets to an application using boost::asio for network communication. The application, due to improper configuration or resource management, exhausts available resources (e.g., file descriptors, memory, threads), leading to a denial of service.
  • Impact: Denial of Service (DoS). The application becomes unavailable to legitimate users.
  • Affected Boost Component: boost::asio (specifically, the asynchronous I/O functions and network-related components).
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Implement connection limits and rate limiting.
    • Use timeouts for network operations.
    • Carefully manage resources (e.g., close sockets promptly, limit the number of outstanding asynchronous operations).
    • Use a thread pool with a limited number of threads to handle network requests.
    • Monitor resource usage and set alerts for unusual activity.
    • Implement robust error handling to gracefully handle unexpected network conditions.

Threat: Threat 5: Memory Corruption due to Incorrect Use of Smart Pointers

  • Description: A developer incorrectly uses Boost smart pointers (e.g., boost::shared_ptr, boost::weak_ptr, boost::scoped_ptr) leading to use-after-free, double-free, or other memory corruption vulnerabilities. This might involve creating circular dependencies with shared_ptr, incorrectly managing object lifetimes, or using raw pointers alongside smart pointers. While the incorrect use is the root cause, the complexity of Boost's smart pointer system makes these errors more likely than with simpler memory management.
  • Impact: Remote Code Execution (RCE), Denial of Service (DoS), Information Disclosure.
  • Affected Boost Component: Boost smart pointer libraries (e.g., boost::shared_ptr, boost::weak_ptr, boost::intrusive_ptr).
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Thorough code reviews focusing on smart pointer usage.
    • Use static analysis tools to detect potential memory management issues.
    • Use dynamic analysis tools (e.g., Valgrind, AddressSanitizer) to detect memory errors at runtime.
    • Prefer std::shared_ptr and std::unique_ptr if C++11 or later is available.
    • Avoid mixing raw pointers and smart pointers.
    • Understand the ownership semantics of each smart pointer type and use them appropriately.