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Threat Model Analysis for ceph/ceph

Threat: Monitor Compromise

  • Description: An attacker gains unauthorized access to a Ceph Monitor node. They might exploit vulnerabilities in the monitor service or operating system, use stolen credentials, or leverage social engineering. Once compromised, the attacker can manipulate the cluster map, disrupt quorum by causing monitors to fail, inject false information into the cluster state, or potentially gain further access to other Ceph components.
  • Impact:
    • Loss of cluster control and stability.
    • Potential data unavailability due to quorum loss.
    • Risk of data corruption or manipulation if the attacker can alter the cluster map or metadata.
    • Possible escalation of privileges to other Ceph components.
  • Affected Ceph Component: ceph-mon daemon, Monitor Quorum, Cluster Map
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Strong Access Control: Implement strict access control lists (ACLs) and firewall rules to limit access to monitor nodes.
    • Regular Security Patching: Keep monitor OS and Ceph packages up-to-date with security patches.
    • Network Segmentation: Isolate the monitor network from public networks.
    • Mutual Authentication: Enforce mutual authentication between monitors and other Ceph components.
    • Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS): Deploy IDPS to monitor for malicious activity.
    • Regular Security Audits: Conduct periodic security audits of monitor configurations.
    • Principle of Least Privilege: Grant only necessary privileges to users and services accessing monitors.

Threat: OSD Compromise

  • Description: An attacker compromises a Ceph OSD node. This could be achieved through exploiting vulnerabilities, physical access, or supply chain attacks. A compromised OSD allows direct access and manipulation of data stored on it. They could exfiltrate data, modify data, or destroy data leading to data loss.
  • Impact:
    • Data breach and confidentiality loss of data on the compromised OSD.
    • Data integrity compromise through data modification or deletion.
    • Potential data loss if the attacker destroys data.
    • Possible pivot point for further attacks.
  • Affected Ceph Component: ceph-osd daemon, underlying storage devices, data replication/erasure coding (indirectly)
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Strong Access Control: Implement strict access control to OSD nodes.
    • Data-at-Rest Encryption: Enable encryption for data stored on OSDs.
    • Regular Security Patching: Keep OSD OS and Ceph packages updated with security patches.
    • Network Segmentation: Isolate OSD traffic to a dedicated network segment.
    • Physical Security: Secure physical access to OSD servers.
    • Disk Encryption Keys Management: Securely manage disk encryption keys.
    • Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS): Monitor OSD nodes for suspicious activity.
    • Regular Security Audits: Conduct periodic security audits of OSD configurations.

Threat: MDS Compromise (CephFS)

  • Description: An attacker gains unauthorized access to a Ceph Metadata Server (MDS) node. Similar to monitor compromise, this could be through exploiting vulnerabilities, stolen credentials, or social engineering. A compromised MDS allows manipulation of file system metadata, leading to unauthorized file access, data corruption, or denial of service.
  • Impact:
    • File system corruption and data loss due to metadata manipulation.
    • Unauthorized access to files and directories within CephFS.
    • Denial of service for CephFS operations.
    • Potential compromise of applications relying on CephFS.
  • Affected Ceph Component: ceph-mds daemon, CephFS metadata, file system namespace
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Strong Access Control: Implement strict access control to MDS nodes.
    • Regular Security Patching: Keep MDS OS and Ceph packages updated with security patches.
    • Network Segmentation: Isolate MDS traffic to a dedicated network segment.
    • Mutual Authentication: Enforce mutual authentication between MDS and other Ceph components.
    • Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS): Monitor MDS nodes for suspicious activity.
    • Regular Security Audits: Conduct periodic security audits of MDS configurations.
    • Principle of Least Privilege: Grant only necessary privileges to users and services accessing MDS nodes.

Threat: RGW Vulnerabilities

  • Description: Attackers exploit vulnerabilities in the RADOS Gateway (RGW) service itself, its dependencies, or the underlying web server. Exploitation can lead to unauthorized access to object storage, data breaches, denial of service, or remote code execution on the RGW server.
  • Impact:
    • Data breach and unauthorized access to object storage data.
    • Data manipulation or deletion within object storage.
    • Denial of service for RGW and applications relying on it.
    • Potential compromise of the RGW server.
  • Affected Ceph Component: ceph-rgw daemon, RGW S3/Swift API, underlying web server, RGW configuration
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Regular Security Patching: Keep RGW and its dependencies up-to-date with security patches.
    • Web Application Firewall (WAF): Deploy a WAF in front of RGW.
    • Input Validation and Output Encoding: Implement robust input validation and output encoding in RGW configurations.
    • Security Hardening: Follow security hardening guidelines for RGW deployments.
    • Regular Vulnerability Scanning: Perform regular vulnerability scans of RGW.
    • Penetration Testing: Conduct periodic penetration testing of RGW deployments.
    • Principle of Least Privilege: Configure RGW access policies and bucket permissions to enforce least privilege.

Threat: RGW Authentication and Authorization Bypass

  • Description: Attackers bypass RGW's authentication or authorization mechanisms due to weaknesses, misconfigurations, or vulnerabilities. Successful bypass allows unauthorized users to access and manipulate object storage resources without proper credentials or permissions.
  • Impact:
    • Data breach and unauthorized access to sensitive data in object storage.
    • Data manipulation or deletion by unauthorized users.
    • Potential reputational damage and legal liabilities.
  • Affected Ceph Component: ceph-rgw daemon, RGW authentication modules, RGW access policies, bucket policies
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Strong Authentication Mechanisms: Utilize robust authentication methods for RGW access (e.g., IAM integration, cephx).
    • Proper Access Policy Configuration: Carefully configure RGW access policies and bucket permissions.
    • Regular Security Audits: Conduct periodic security audits of RGW authentication and authorization configurations.
    • Least Privilege for Service Accounts: Grant service accounts only necessary permissions.
    • Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA): Consider implementing MFA for RGW administrative access.

Threat: RGW Misconfiguration

  • Description: RGW is misconfigured, leading to security vulnerabilities such as overly permissive bucket policies or insecure default settings. Misconfigurations can unintentionally expose data or grant excessive privileges to unauthorized users.
  • Impact:
    • Data breach and unauthorized access to object storage due to overly permissive access.
    • Data manipulation or deletion by unintended users.
    • Compliance violations and potential legal repercussions.
  • Affected Ceph Component: ceph-rgw daemon, RGW configuration files, bucket policies, access policies
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Secure Configuration Guidelines: Develop and adhere to secure configuration guidelines for RGW.
    • Infrastructure-as-Code (IaC): Use IaC to automate secure RGW deployments and configurations.
    • Regular Configuration Audits: Conduct regular security audits of RGW configurations.
    • Principle of Least Privilege by Default: Implement configurations that default to least privilege.
    • Automated Configuration Checks: Implement automated checks to validate RGW configurations.
    • Security Training: Provide security training to RGW administrators.

Threat: Stored Credentials in Clients (Ceph Clients)

  • Description: Ceph credentials are stored insecurely within client applications or on client systems (e.g., hardcoded, easily accessible configuration files). If a client system is compromised, attackers can obtain these credentials and gain unauthorized access to Ceph storage.
  • Impact:
    • Data breach and unauthorized access to Ceph storage due to compromised credentials.
    • Potential for data manipulation or deletion by attackers.
    • Compromise of the application and potentially other systems.
  • Affected Ceph Component: Ceph client applications, client systems, credential storage mechanisms
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Secure Credential Management: Implement secure credential management practices (secrets management systems, environment variables).
    • Avoid Hardcoding Credentials: Never hardcode credentials in application code or configuration files.
    • Principle of Least Privilege for Credentials: Grant credentials only necessary permissions and scope.
    • Credential Rotation: Implement regular rotation of Ceph credentials.
    • Client System Security: Secure client systems to reduce the risk of credential theft.

Threat: Client-Side Vulnerabilities (Ceph Clients)

  • Description: Vulnerabilities exist in Ceph client libraries or applications using them. Attackers can exploit these to gain unauthorized access to Ceph storage from the client side, potentially bypassing server-side controls, leading to data breaches, client system compromise, or denial of service.
  • Impact:
    • Data breach and unauthorized access to Ceph storage from compromised clients.
    • Compromise of client systems, potentially leading to lateral movement.
    • Denial of service if client vulnerabilities are exploited to overload Ceph services.
  • Affected Ceph Component: Ceph client libraries, applications using Ceph client libraries, client systems
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Up-to-Date Client Libraries: Use the latest stable and patched versions of Ceph client libraries.
    • Secure Coding Practices: Implement secure coding practices in applications interacting with Ceph.
    • Regular Vulnerability Scanning: Regularly scan client applications and systems for vulnerabilities.
    • Principle of Least Privilege for Clients: Grant Ceph clients only necessary permissions.
    • Client-Side Security Hardening: Harden client systems by applying security patches and disabling unnecessary services.