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threat-modeling.md

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Threat Model Analysis for clickhouse/clickhouse

Threat: Weak or Default User Credentials

  • Threat: Weak or Default User Credentials
  • Description: An attacker could attempt to log in to ClickHouse using default usernames and passwords that were not changed after installation, or easily guessable weak passwords. This could be done via the HTTP interface or native TCP protocol.
  • Impact: Unauthorized access to the ClickHouse server, leading to data breaches, data manipulation, or denial of service.
  • Affected Component: User Authentication Module
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Enforce strong password policies requiring complex and unique passwords.
    • Disable or remove default user accounts if not necessary.
    • Implement multi-factor authentication (MFA) for administrative accounts where possible via external authentication proxies.
    • Regularly audit user accounts and password strength.

Threat: Insufficient Access Control

  • Threat: Insufficient Access Control
  • Description: An attacker, either an insider or someone who gained initial access, could exploit overly permissive user or role configurations in ClickHouse. This allows them to access databases, tables, or functions beyond their intended authorization, potentially reading, modifying, or deleting sensitive data.
  • Impact: Data breaches, data manipulation, privilege escalation allowing further unauthorized actions, and potential compliance violations.
  • Affected Component: Access Control and RBAC (Role-Based Access Control) Module
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Implement granular Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) using ClickHouse's built-in features.
    • Adhere to the principle of least privilege, granting users only the necessary permissions.
    • Define roles with specific permissions for databases, tables, and dictionaries.
    • Regularly review and audit access control configurations and user permissions.

Threat: Unencrypted Communication

  • Threat: Unencrypted Communication
  • Description: An attacker could eavesdrop on network traffic between the application and ClickHouse, or between ClickHouse servers in a cluster, if communication is not encrypted. This could be done by intercepting network packets, exposing sensitive data transmitted in queries and responses.
  • Impact: Data breaches through interception of sensitive data in transit, loss of confidentiality.
  • Affected Component: Network Communication Modules (HTTP and TCP)
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • For HTTP interface: Always enforce HTTPS for communication. Configure ClickHouse to only accept HTTPS connections.
    • For Native TCP protocol: Enable TLS encryption for native client-server and inter-server communication. Configure tcp_port_secure and related TLS settings.
    • Ensure proper certificate management for TLS, using valid and trusted certificates.

Threat: Unauthorized Access to ClickHouse Ports

  • Threat: Unauthorized Access to ClickHouse Ports
  • Description: An attacker from an untrusted network could attempt to directly connect to exposed ClickHouse ports (e.g., HTTP 8123, TCP 9000) if they are not properly protected by firewalls or network segmentation. This direct access could allow them to attempt to exploit vulnerabilities or brute-force authentication.
  • Impact: Data breaches, denial of service, unauthorized access to the ClickHouse server and its data.
  • Affected Component: Network Listener Modules (HTTP and TCP)
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Implement network segmentation and firewalls to restrict access to ClickHouse ports only from trusted networks.
    • Use Access Control Lists (ACLs) in ClickHouse configuration to limit client IP addresses that can connect.
    • Avoid exposing ClickHouse ports directly to the public internet. Use a reverse proxy or VPN for external access if necessary.

Threat: Denial of Service (DoS) via Query Flooding or Resource Exhaustion

  • Threat: Denial of Service (DoS) via Query Flooding or Resource Exhaustion
  • Description: An attacker could send a large volume of resource-intensive queries to ClickHouse, overwhelming the server's resources (CPU, memory, disk I/O). This can lead to service disruption and application unavailability.
  • Impact: Service disruption, application unavailability, potential financial losses due to downtime.
  • Affected Component: Query Processing and Resource Management Modules
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Implement query limits in ClickHouse configuration (e.g., max_memory_usage, max_execution_time, max_concurrent_queries).
    • Configure connection limits to prevent excessive connections from a single source.
    • Implement rate limiting on the application side to control request frequency.
    • Monitor ClickHouse resource usage and set up alerts for unusual activity.

Threat: Misconfiguration of ClickHouse Settings

  • Threat: Misconfiguration of ClickHouse Settings
  • Description: Incorrect or insecure configuration settings in ClickHouse can create vulnerabilities. This includes using default settings, enabling unnecessary features, or misconfiguring security parameters. Attackers could exploit these misconfigurations to gain unauthorized access or disrupt service.
  • Impact: Various impacts depending on the misconfiguration, including data breaches, unauthorized access, denial of service, and system compromise.
  • Affected Component: Configuration Management Module
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Follow security hardening guidelines and best practices for ClickHouse configuration.
    • Review and customize ClickHouse configuration files, avoiding default settings and disabling unnecessary features.
    • Regularly audit and review ClickHouse configuration for security vulnerabilities.
    • Use configuration management tools to ensure consistent and secure configurations.

Threat: File Function Misuse (file(), url(), hdfs())

  • Threat: File Function Misuse (file(), url(), hdfs())
  • Description: Attackers could exploit ClickHouse's file functions (file(), url(), hdfs()) if they are enabled and accessible without proper controls. By crafting malicious queries using these functions with manipulated paths or URLs, they could potentially read sensitive files from the ClickHouse server's filesystem or access internal network resources (SSRF).
  • Impact: Data breaches (reading local files), Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), information disclosure, potential server compromise.
  • Affected Component: File Functions (file(), url(), hdfs())
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Restrict or disable these functions if they are not strictly necessary for your application using readonly settings or user-level function restrictions.
    • If required, carefully control access through user permissions and roles.
    • Implement strict input validation and sanitization if user input is used to construct paths or URLs for these functions.
    • Use ClickHouse's path configuration settings to restrict directories accessible by the file() function.