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Attack Tree Analysis for clickhouse/clickhouse

Objective: Gain Unauthorized Access to Data, Exfiltrate Data, and/or Disrupt Service

Attack Tree Visualization

                                 Attacker's Goal:
                                 Gain Unauthorized Access to Data, Exfiltrate Data, and/or Disrupt Service
                                                 |
    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    |                                               |                                                               |
  1. Unauthorized Data Access 2. Denial of Service (DoS) 3. Data Manipulation/Corruption | | |

| | | | | | X X | | X | Configuration Authentication 2.1 Resource Exhaustion 2.2 Logic Flaws X 3.2 Modify Existing Data Vulnerabilities (if write access is obtained) | | | |

| | | | | | | | X Weak/ X X 2.1.1 2.1.2 X 2.2.2 X X Direct X X No Auth X X Memory Disk/CPU X Network X X Modifi- X X (Mis- X X Exhaustion Exhaustion X Flooding X X cation X X config) X X X X (if write X X [CN] X X DoS X X access) X X [HR] [CN] [HR]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Unauthorized Data Access

  • 1.1.2 Weak/No Authentication (Misconfiguration) [CN] [HR]:
    • Description: The ClickHouse server is configured to allow access with weak credentials (easily guessable or default passwords) or without any authentication at all. This is a direct result of improper configuration of the users.xml file (or equivalent) and/or network settings (listen_host).
    • Likelihood: Medium (Misconfigurations are a common source of vulnerabilities)
    • Impact: High (Full, unauthorized access to all data)
    • Effort: Low (Requires finding the misconfigured instance; exploitation is trivial)
    • Skill Level: Intermediate (Requires understanding of ClickHouse configuration, but not advanced exploitation techniques)
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Unusual access patterns or failed login attempts might be logged, but a successful unauthenticated login might not be flagged as suspicious without specific rules)
    • Mitigation:
      • Enforce strong, unique passwords for all ClickHouse users.
      • Never allow unauthenticated access (no_password).
      • Use strong authentication methods (e.g., password_sha256_salted).
      • Restrict network access using listen_host and firewall rules. Only allow connections from trusted sources.
      • Regularly audit users.xml and network configurations.
      • Implement configuration management to ensure consistency and prevent drift.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Denial of Service (DoS)

  • 2.1.1 Memory Exhaustion:

    • Description: An attacker crafts queries designed to consume excessive amounts of server memory, leading to ClickHouse crashing or becoming unresponsive. This often involves large JOIN operations, GROUP BY on high-cardinality columns, or other memory-intensive operations without proper limits.
    • Likelihood: Medium (Depends on application query patterns and resource limits)
    • Impact: Medium (Service disruption, impacting application availability)
    • Effort: Medium (Requires understanding of ClickHouse query performance and crafting specific queries)
    • Skill Level: Intermediate (Requires knowledge of SQL and ClickHouse's query processing)
    • Detection Difficulty: Easy (Resource monitoring will show high memory usage; ClickHouse logs may show out-of-memory errors)
    • Mitigation:
      • Implement strict query resource limits (e.g., max_memory_usage, max_memory_usage_for_user, max_memory_usage_for_all_queries).
      • Monitor memory usage and set alerts for high consumption.
      • Use query profiling to identify and optimize potentially problematic queries.
      • Consider using ClickHouse's query queueing features to manage resource contention.

  • 2.1.2 Disk/CPU Exhaustion:

    • Description: Similar to memory exhaustion, but the attacker targets disk I/O or CPU cycles. This can involve queries that force full table scans, complex calculations, or inefficient data access patterns.
    • Likelihood: Medium (Depends on application query patterns, data volume, and resource limits)
    • Impact: Medium (Service disruption, impacting application availability)
    • Effort: Medium (Requires understanding of ClickHouse query performance and crafting specific queries)
    • Skill Level: Intermediate (Requires knowledge of SQL and ClickHouse's query processing)
    • Detection Difficulty: Easy (Resource monitoring will show high disk I/O or CPU usage; ClickHouse logs may show slow queries)
    • Mitigation:
      • Implement query resource limits (e.g., max_execution_time, max_threads).
      • Monitor disk I/O and CPU usage and set alerts.
      • Optimize table schemas and indexes to minimize full table scans.
      • Use materialized views to pre-compute expensive calculations.
      • Regularly review and optimize query performance.

  • 2.2.2 Network Flooding:

    • Description: An attacker overwhelms the ClickHouse server with a large volume of network traffic (connection requests, data packets), preventing legitimate users from accessing the service.
    • Likelihood: Medium (A common and relatively easy attack to launch)
    • Impact: Medium (Service disruption, impacting application availability)
    • Effort: Low (Many readily available tools can be used for network flooding)
    • Skill Level: Novice (Basic understanding of network attacks)
    • Detection Difficulty: Easy (Network monitoring will show a significant spike in traffic; ClickHouse logs may show connection errors)
    • Mitigation:
      • Use a firewall to limit the number of connections from a single IP address.
      • Implement rate limiting at the network or application level.
      • Use a load balancer to distribute traffic across multiple ClickHouse instances.
      • Employ intrusion detection/prevention systems (IDS/IPS) to identify and block malicious traffic.
      • Consider using a DDoS mitigation service.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Data Manipulation/Corruption

  • 3.2.1 Direct Modification (if write access is obtained) [CN] [HR]:
    • Description: An attacker who has gained write access to the ClickHouse database can directly modify, delete, or corrupt data within the tables. This could involve altering financial records, deleting user accounts, or inserting malicious data.
    • Likelihood: Low (Requires obtaining write access, which should be tightly controlled)
    • Impact: High (Data loss, corruption, potential compromise of application integrity)
    • Effort: Low (Once write access is obtained, modification is straightforward)
    • Skill Level: Intermediate (Requires understanding of ClickHouse data manipulation commands)
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Auditing can detect changes, but requires proper configuration and monitoring)
    • Mitigation:
      • Implement the principle of least privilege: Grant write access only to the specific users and roles that absolutely require it.
      • Use ClickHouse's access control features (e.g., GRANT, REVOKE) to precisely define permissions.
      • Enable and regularly review audit logs to track data modifications.
      • Implement data integrity checks and backups to detect and recover from unauthorized changes.
      • Consider using data masking or encryption to protect sensitive data even if write access is compromised.