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Attack Tree Analysis for dragonflydb/dragonfly

Objective: Gain unauthorized access to data, disrupt service availability, or execute arbitrary code on the server hosting Dragonfly.

Attack Tree Visualization

                                 Attacker's Goal:
                                 Gain unauthorized access to data, disrupt service availability,
                                 or execute arbitrary code on the server hosting Dragonfly.
                                                 |
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    |                                               |                                               |
  1. Data Exfiltration/Unauthorized Access 2. Denial of Service (DoS) 3. Remote Code Execution (RCE) | | |

| | | | 1.1 1.2 3.1 3.2 Snapshot Bypass Exploit Exploit Exploitation Authentication/ Snapshotting Configuration Authorization Vulnerability Vulnerabilities | | |

| | | | 1.1.1 1.2.1 3.1.1 3.2.1 Predictable Weak/Default Predictable Misconfigured Snapshot Credentials [CRITICAL] Snapshot Security Filenames (e.g., no ACLs) Filenames Rules [CRITICAL] (leading to (e.g., allowing RCE via remote access snapshot without restoration) authentication) [CRITICAL] [CRITICAL] | ----- | 3.2.2 Exposed Management Interface (e.g., no authentication or weak passwords) [CRITICAL]

    -----------------------------------------------------------------
    |
  1. Denial of Service (DoS) |
    |
  2.1
  Resource
  Exhaustion
    |
  -----
    |
  2.1.2
  -> HIGH RISK PATH -> Memory
  Exhaustion

Attack Tree Path: 1. Data Exfiltration/Unauthorized Access

  • 1. Data Exfiltration/Unauthorized Access

Attack Tree Path: 1.1 Snapshot Exploitation

*   **1.1 Snapshot Exploitation**

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1 Predictable Snapshot Filenames [CRITICAL]

    *   **1.1.1 Predictable Snapshot Filenames [CRITICAL]**
        *   **Description:** The attacker guesses the names of snapshot files (e.g., `snapshot.dfly`, `backup1.dfly`) and attempts to download them directly from the server. This is possible if the server exposes the snapshot directory via a web server or if file permissions are misconfigured.
        *   **Likelihood:** Medium
        *   **Impact:** High (Full data compromise)
        *   **Effort:** Very Low
        *   **Skill Level:** Novice
        *   **Detection Difficulty:** Easy (if file access or web server logs are monitored)
        *   **Mitigation:**
            *   Use cryptographically secure random filenames for snapshots.
            *   Implement strict access control on the snapshot directory.
            *   Regularly audit file permissions and web server configurations.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2 Bypass Authentication/Authorization

*   **1.2 Bypass Authentication/Authorization**

Attack Tree Path: 1.2.1 Weak/Default Credentials [CRITICAL]

    *   **1.2.1 Weak/Default Credentials [CRITICAL]**
        *   **Description:** The attacker uses default or easily guessable credentials to access the Dragonfly instance. This is possible if the administrator has not changed the default credentials or has chosen a weak password.
        *   **Likelihood:** High
        *   **Impact:** Very High (Complete control over the data)
        *   **Effort:** Very Low
        *   **Skill Level:** Novice
        *   **Detection Difficulty:** Very Easy (through login logs)
        *   **Mitigation:**
            *   Always change default credentials immediately after installation.
            *   Enforce strong password policies.
            *   Implement multi-factor authentication (if supported).

Attack Tree Path: 2. Denial of Service (DoS)

  • 2. Denial of Service (DoS)

Attack Tree Path: 2.1 Resource Exhaustion

*   **-> HIGH RISK PATH -> 2.1 Resource Exhaustion**

Attack Tree Path: 2.1.2 Memory Exhaustion

    *   **2.1.2 Memory Exhaustion**
        *   **Description:** The attacker sends a large number of requests or requests with large values to consume all available memory on the Dragonfly server, causing it to crash or become unresponsive.
        *   **Likelihood:** High
        *   **Impact:** High (Service disruption, potential data loss if persistence is not configured)
        *   **Effort:** Low
        *   **Skill Level:** Intermediate
        *   **Detection Difficulty:** Medium (through monitoring memory usage)
        *   **Mitigation:**
            *   Configure memory limits for the Dragonfly instance.
            *   Implement rate limiting to prevent attackers from sending too many requests.
            *   Monitor memory usage and set up alerts for high memory consumption.
            *   Use a robust persistence mechanism to prevent data loss on crashes.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Remote Code Execution (RCE)

  • 3. Remote Code Execution (RCE)

Attack Tree Path: 3.1 Exploit Snapshotting Vulnerability

*   **3.1 Exploit Snapshotting Vulnerability**

Attack Tree Path: 3.1.1 Predictable Snapshot Filenames (leading to RCE) [CRITICAL]

    *   **3.1.1 Predictable Snapshot Filenames (leading to RCE) [CRITICAL]**
        *   **Description:** The attacker combines predictable snapshot filenames with a vulnerability in the snapshot restoration process. They craft a malicious snapshot file, upload it to the server (potentially by exploiting another vulnerability), and then trigger a restart or snapshot load. If the restoration process is vulnerable, the malicious code in the snapshot will be executed.
        *   **Likelihood:** Low (requires multiple vulnerabilities)
        *   **Impact:** Very High (Complete server compromise)
        *   **Effort:** High
        *   **Skill Level:** Expert
        *   **Detection Difficulty:** Hard
        *   **Mitigation:**
            *   All mitigations for 1.1.1 (Predictable Snapshot Filenames).
            *   Thoroughly validate and sanitize snapshot data before restoration.
            *   Implement strict input validation and sanitization in the snapshot loading process.
            *   Regularly audit the snapshot restoration code for vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Path: 3.2 Exploit Configuration Vulnerabilities

*   **3.2 Exploit Configuration Vulnerabilities**

Attack Tree Path: 3.2.1 Misconfigured Security Rules [CRITICAL]

    *   **3.2.1 Misconfigured Security Rules [CRITICAL]**
        *   **Description:** The attacker exploits overly permissive security rules (e.g., allowing remote access without authentication) to connect to the Dragonfly instance and execute commands.
        *   **Likelihood:** Medium
        *   **Impact:** Very High (Complete server compromise)
        *   **Effort:** Low (if the misconfiguration is obvious)
        *   **Skill Level:** Intermediate
        *   **Detection Difficulty:** Medium (through auditing security configurations)
        *   **Mitigation:**
            *   Follow the principle of least privilege when configuring security rules.
            *   Require strong authentication for all remote access.
            *   Regularly review and audit security configurations.

Attack Tree Path: 3.2.2 Exposed Management Interface [CRITICAL]

    *   **3.2.2 Exposed Management Interface [CRITICAL]**
        *   **Description:** The attacker gains access to the Dragonfly management interface (if it exists) because it is exposed to the internet without proper authentication or with weak credentials.
        *   **Likelihood:** Low (developers should avoid this)
        *   **Impact:** Very High (Complete server compromise)
        *   **Effort:** Low (if exposed and unprotected)
        *   **Skill Level:** Intermediate
        *   **Detection Difficulty:** Easy (through network scans)
        *   **Mitigation:**
            *   Never expose the management interface to the public internet.
            *   Use a firewall to restrict access to the management interface.
            *   Require strong authentication and authorization for access.
            *   Consider using a VPN or SSH tunnel for remote management.