Threat: Unauthenticated Access
- Description: An attacker connects to the Dragonfly instance without providing any credentials. They can then issue any command, including reading, writing, and deleting all data. This occurs if authentication is disabled or a weak/default password is in use.
- Impact: Complete data compromise (read, write, delete), potential for application disruption, session hijacking, and data corruption. Full control over the data store.
- Affected Component: Core Dragonfly server, authentication mechanism (
AUTH
command handling, password validation logic). - Risk Severity: Critical
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Mandatory: Enable strong password authentication using
--requirepass
with a complex, randomly generated, and frequently rotated password. Never use a default or easily guessable password. - Consider using ACLs (if supported by the Dragonfly version) to further restrict access based on user roles, even after authentication.
- Mandatory: Enable strong password authentication using
- Description: Following successful unauthenticated access, an attacker modifies data stored in Dragonfly. They can use commands like
SET
,HSET
,LPUSH
, etc., to alter existing data or inject malicious data, bypassing any application-level controls.- Impact: Data corruption, application malfunction, incorrect business logic execution, potential for session hijacking if session data is modified. The integrity of the data store is compromised.
- Affected Component: All data storage and manipulation commands (e.g.,
SET
,GET
,HSET
,HGET
,LPUSH
,LPOP
, and all other write commands). - Risk Severity: High
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Crucially: Implement strong authentication and authorization (as described above). This is the primary defense.
- Secondary: Application-level data validation is a good practice but cannot prevent this threat if Dragonfly itself is compromised.
- Description: An attacker sends a large number of requests specifically designed to consume Dragonfly's memory, or stores excessively large values, causing Dragonfly to become unresponsive or crash. This is a direct attack on Dragonfly's in-memory nature.
- Impact: Denial of service specifically targeting Dragonfly, application unavailability, potential data loss if persistence is not configured or fails.
- Affected Component: Dragonfly's memory management, data storage allocation.
- Risk Severity: High
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Essential: Set a memory limit using
--maxmemory
. This is Dragonfly's built-in defense. - Essential: Configure an appropriate eviction policy using
--maxmemory-policy
(e.g.,allkeys-lru
,volatile-lru
,allkeys-random
). Choose a policy that suits your application's data access patterns. - Monitor Dragonfly's memory usage and set up alerts for high memory consumption specifically within Dragonfly.
- Essential: Set a memory limit using
- Description: An attacker gains access to Dragonfly's snapshot files (RDB or AOF). These files contain a direct copy of the data stored in Dragonfly. Exposure leads to a complete data breach of the Dragonfly data store.
- Impact: Data breach, exposure of all sensitive information stored in Dragonfly.
- Affected Component: Snapshotting mechanism (RDB and AOF file generation and storage, file system permissions where these files are stored).
- Risk Severity: High
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Store snapshot files in a secure location with strictly restricted access permissions (file system level).
- Encrypt snapshot files at rest. This is crucial.
- Regularly rotate snapshot files and securely delete old ones.
- Never store snapshots on publicly accessible locations or locations accessible to untrusted users/processes.
- Description: An attacker exploits a vulnerability in the Dragonfly codebase itself (e.g., a buffer overflow, format string vulnerability, or a logic error in a command handler) to gain arbitrary code execution or elevate privileges within the context of the Dragonfly process.
- Impact: Complete system compromise (potentially beyond just Dragonfly), data breach, denial of service. This is the most severe type of threat.
- Affected Component: Potentially any part of the Dragonfly codebase, depending on the specific vulnerability.
- Risk Severity: Critical
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Paramount: Keep Dragonfly absolutely up to date with the latest security patches. Subscribe to security advisories for Dragonfly and apply updates immediately when released.
- Run Dragonfly as a non-root user with strictly limited privileges. This limits the damage if a vulnerability is exploited.
- Use a containerization technology (e.g., Docker) to isolate Dragonfly and further limit the impact of a potential compromise. The container should have minimal privileges.
- Regularly perform security audits and penetration testing, specifically targeting the Dragonfly instance.
- Description: If Dragonfly is configured to load external modules (using
--loadmodule
), an attacker could trick Dragonfly into loading a malicious module that grants them unauthorized access or control over the Dragonfly instance itself.- Impact: System compromise (of the Dragonfly process and potentially the host), data breach, denial of service. This is a direct attack on Dragonfly's extensibility.
- Affected Component: Module loading mechanism (
--loadmodule
, module loading and execution logic). - Risk Severity: High
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Only load modules from trusted sources. This is critical.
- Verify the integrity of modules before loading them (e.g., using checksums or digital signatures, and verifying the source).
- Run Dragonfly with limited privileges (as above) to minimize the impact of a compromised module.
- Avoid using modules unless absolutely necessary. If you don't need modules, don't enable them.
- If using modules, ensure they are kept up-to-date with security patches, just like Dragonfly itself.