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Threat Model Analysis for duckdb/duckdb

Threat: SQL Injection

Description: An attacker injects malicious SQL code into user inputs that are not properly sanitized or parameterized before being used in DuckDB queries. This allows the attacker to execute arbitrary SQL commands within the DuckDB database. For example, an attacker could manipulate input fields to bypass intended query logic and execute commands like DROP TABLE or SELECT * FROM sensitive_data. Impact:

  • Unauthorized data access: Attackers can read sensitive data from the DuckDB database, potentially including user credentials or confidential business information.
  • Data modification or deletion: Attackers can modify or delete data, leading to data integrity issues, data loss, or disruption of application functionality.
  • Potential for privilege escalation: In some scenarios, successful SQL injection could be leveraged to gain further access or control within the application or underlying system. DuckDB Component Affected: SQL Query Execution Engine, Parser Risk Severity: Critical Mitigation Strategies:
  • Use Parameterized Queries/Prepared Statements: Employ parameterized queries or prepared statements for all database interactions to ensure user inputs are treated as data, not executable code.
  • Input Validation and Sanitization: Validate and sanitize all user inputs before incorporating them into SQL queries, even when using parameterized queries, to prevent unexpected data types or formats that could lead to vulnerabilities.
  • Principle of Least Privilege (Database User): Configure the database user used by the application with the minimum necessary permissions required for its intended operations. Avoid using highly privileged database users.

Threat: File Path Injection (Indirect)

Description: An attacker manipulates user inputs that control file paths used in DuckDB functions like read_csv, read_parquet, or COPY FROM. By providing malicious file paths, the attacker can force DuckDB to access or manipulate files outside of the intended application scope on the server's file system. For example, an attacker could attempt to read sensitive system files like /etc/passwd or configuration files by injecting paths into functions that read from files. Impact:

  • Unauthorized file access: Attackers can read sensitive files from the server's file system that the application process has access to.
  • Data exfiltration: Attackers can potentially exfiltrate data from accessed files, including sensitive configuration details, credentials, or system information.
  • Potential for file manipulation (depending on permissions): In certain scenarios, if the application or DuckDB process has write permissions, attackers might be able to write to or modify files on the server. DuckDB Component Affected: File System Access Functions (e.g., read_csv, read_parquet, COPY FROM), Storage Interface Risk Severity: High Mitigation Strategies:
  • Strictly Control and Validate File Paths: Never directly use user-provided input as file paths in DuckDB functions. Implement a whitelist of allowed directories or predefined safe paths. Sanitize and validate any user-provided input that influences file path construction.
  • Sandboxing/Containerization: Run the application and DuckDB in a sandboxed environment or container to restrict file system access and limit the impact of potential file path injection vulnerabilities.
  • Principle of Least Privilege (File System Access): Minimize the file system permissions of the application process running DuckDB, granting access only to the directories and files absolutely necessary for its operation.

Threat: DuckDB Vulnerabilities (Code Execution)

Description: DuckDB, like any software, may contain security vulnerabilities such as buffer overflows, memory corruption issues, or logic flaws. Attackers could exploit these vulnerabilities by crafting specific SQL queries, data inputs, or by triggering specific function calls that expose these weaknesses in DuckDB's core engine. Successful exploitation can lead to arbitrary code execution within the DuckDB process or potentially on the underlying system. Impact:

  • Remote Code Execution (RCE): Attackers can execute arbitrary code on the server running DuckDB, gaining control over the application process and potentially the entire system.
  • Full system compromise: RCE can lead to complete control of the server, allowing attackers to steal data, install malware, disrupt operations, or pivot to other systems on the network.
  • Data breach and data manipulation: Attackers with code execution capabilities can access, modify, or delete any data accessible to the DuckDB process. DuckDB Component Affected: Core DuckDB Engine (Parser, Optimizer, Execution Engine, Storage Layer, all modules) Risk Severity: Critical Mitigation Strategies:
  • Keep DuckDB Updated: Regularly update DuckDB to the latest stable version to benefit from security patches and bug fixes. Subscribe to security advisories and release notes from the DuckDB project to stay informed about known vulnerabilities.
  • Vulnerability Scanning and Penetration Testing: Periodically perform vulnerability scanning and penetration testing on the application and its infrastructure, including DuckDB, to proactively identify and address potential vulnerabilities.
  • Security Monitoring and Intrusion Detection: Implement security monitoring and intrusion detection systems to detect and respond to potential exploitation attempts targeting DuckDB vulnerabilities.

Threat: Malicious DuckDB Extensions (Code Execution)

Description: DuckDB supports extensions to enhance its functionality. If the application uses DuckDB extensions, especially from untrusted or unverified sources, these extensions could contain malicious code or security vulnerabilities. Attackers could exploit vulnerabilities within the extension code or the extension itself could be intentionally designed to be malicious, leading to code execution when the extension is loaded and used by DuckDB. Impact:

  • Remote Code Execution (RCE): Attackers can achieve arbitrary code execution on the server by leveraging malicious or vulnerable DuckDB extensions.
  • System compromise: RCE through extensions can lead to full system control, similar to exploiting vulnerabilities in DuckDB itself.
  • Data theft and manipulation: Malicious extensions could be designed to steal sensitive data processed by DuckDB or manipulate data within the database. DuckDB Component Affected: DuckDB Extension Loading Mechanism, Extension Code (External Component) Risk Severity: High Mitigation Strategies:
  • Only Use Trusted and Well-Vetted Extensions: Exercise extreme caution when using DuckDB extensions. Only use extensions from reputable and trusted sources with a proven track record of security and active maintenance. Avoid using extensions from unknown or unverified developers.
  • Extension Security Audits and Code Reviews: If using custom or less common extensions, conduct thorough security audits and code reviews of the extension code to identify potential vulnerabilities or malicious code.
  • Principle of Least Privilege (Extensions): If possible, configure DuckDB or the application to run extensions with limited privileges or within a restricted environment to minimize the impact of potential vulnerabilities in extensions.

Threat: Compromised DuckDB Distribution (Supply Chain)

Description: The distribution channels for DuckDB (e.g., package repositories, download sites, CDN) could be compromised by attackers. This could lead to the distribution of malicious DuckDB versions that contain backdoors, malware, or vulnerabilities. If an application uses a compromised DuckDB distribution, it could unknowingly install and run a malicious version, leading to system compromise. Impact:

  • Installation of malware and backdoors: Compromised DuckDB distributions could install malware or backdoors on systems where they are deployed, providing attackers with persistent access and control.
  • Data theft and manipulation: Malicious DuckDB versions could be designed to steal sensitive data processed by the application or manipulate data within the DuckDB database.
  • Supply chain compromise: This type of attack represents a supply chain compromise, potentially affecting a wide range of applications and systems that rely on the compromised DuckDB distribution. DuckDB Component Affected: DuckDB Distribution Packages, Installation Process, Dependency Management Risk Severity: High Mitigation Strategies:
  • Verify DuckDB Checksums and Signatures: Always verify the checksums and digital signatures of downloaded DuckDB packages against official sources to ensure the integrity and authenticity of the downloaded files.
  • Use Trusted Package Repositories: Prefer using official and trusted package repositories (e.g., official OS repositories, language-specific package managers) for installing DuckDB. Avoid downloading DuckDB from untrusted or unofficial sources.
  • Dependency Scanning and Software Bill of Materials (SBOM): Implement dependency scanning tools and maintain a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) to track dependencies, including DuckDB, and monitor for known vulnerabilities or compromised components in the supply chain. Regularly update dependencies to mitigate known risks.