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attack-tree.md

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Attack Tree Analysis for ethereum/solidity

Objective: Compromise Solidity Application by Exploiting Solidity Weaknesses

Attack Tree Visualization

  • Root Goal: Compromise Solidity Application [HIGH RISK PATH]
      1. Exploit Smart Contract Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • 1.1. Reentrancy Attacks [HIGH RISK PATH]
        • 1.1.1. Exploit External Call Reentrancy [HIGH RISK PATH]
          • 1.1.1.1. Call vulnerable function with fallback/receive [CRITICAL NODE]
        • 1.1.2. Exploit Cross-Contract Reentrancy [HIGH RISK PATH]
          • 1.1.2.1. Re-enter via another contract call [CRITICAL NODE]
      • 1.3. Access Control Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH]
        • 1.3.3. Unprotected Functions [HIGH RISK PATH]
          • 1.3.3.1. Critical functions without access control [CRITICAL NODE]
      • 1.10. Logic Errors and Business Logic Flaws [HIGH RISK PATH]
        • 1.10.1. Flawed Contract Logic [HIGH RISK PATH]
          • 1.10.1.1. Design flaws in contract functionality [CRITICAL NODE]
        • 1.10.3. Oracle Manipulation (If Oracles are Used) [HIGH RISK PATH]
          • 1.10.3.1. Manipulate external data feeds to influence contract logic [CRITICAL NODE]
      1. Exploit Compiler Vulnerabilities (Less Common, but possible) [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • 2.1. Solidity Compiler Bugs [HIGH RISK PATH]
        • 2.1.1. Trigger compiler bug leading to incorrect bytecode generation [CRITICAL NODE]
      1. Exploit EVM (Ethereum Virtual Machine) Vulnerabilities (Extremely Rare, but theoretically possible) [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • 3.1. EVM Bugs [HIGH RISK PATH]
        • 3.1.1. Trigger EVM bug leading to unexpected execution behavior [CRITICAL NODE]

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1.1. Call vulnerable function with fallback/receive [CRITICAL NODE] - External Call Reentrancy

Attack Vector Name: External Call Reentrancy * How Attack is Performed: * A contract function makes an external call to another contract or address (e.g., using call, send, transfer). * The called contract (or a malicious contract deployed at the target address) has a fallback or receive function. * This fallback/receive function calls back into the original contract before the original function has completed its execution and updated its state (specifically before balances or state variables are updated to reflect the external call). * This re-entrant call can exploit logic flaws, such as repeatedly withdrawing funds before the balance is updated, leading to unauthorized fund drain or state manipulation. * Potential Impact: High - Loss of funds, unauthorized state changes, contract compromise. * Mitigation Strategies: * Implement the Checks-Effects-Interactions pattern: Perform checks and state updates before making external calls. * Use Reentrancy Guards: Employ a mutex pattern (e.g., a boolean flag) to prevent recursive calls within sensitive functions.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.2.1. Re-enter via another contract call [CRITICAL NODE] - Cross-Contract Reentrancy

Attack Vector Name: Cross-Contract Reentrancy * How Attack is Performed: * Contract A calls a function in Contract B. * Contract B, during its execution, makes an external call back to Contract A or to another contract (Contract C) that can then call back into Contract A. * Similar to external call reentrancy, this re-entry occurs before Contract A has completed its state changes, allowing for exploitation of logic flaws through repeated function calls. * Potential Impact: High - Loss of funds, unauthorized state changes, contract compromise. * Mitigation Strategies: * Be aware of state changes in called contracts (Contract B and any contracts it interacts with). * Apply the Checks-Effects-Interactions pattern across contract interactions. * Use Reentrancy Guards in Contract A to protect against re-entrant calls, even if they originate from other contracts.

Attack Tree Path: 1.3.3.1. Critical functions without access control [CRITICAL NODE] - Unprotected Critical Functions

Attack Vector Name: Unprotected Critical Functions * How Attack is Performed: * Developers fail to implement proper access control mechanisms (e.g., using modifiers like onlyOwner, role-based access control, or custom logic) on functions that perform sensitive actions. * Attackers can directly call these unprotected functions without authorization. * This allows attackers to bypass intended security measures and execute privileged operations, such as withdrawing funds, changing critical contract parameters, or manipulating state variables. * Potential Impact: High - Complete contract compromise, loss of all funds, unauthorized control over contract functionality. * Mitigation Strategies: * Apply access control to all sensitive functions. * Use modifiers or role-based access control patterns to restrict access to authorized users or roles. * Conduct thorough code reviews to identify any unintentionally unprotected critical functions.

Attack Tree Path: 1.10.1.1. Design flaws in contract functionality [CRITICAL NODE] - Flawed Contract Logic

Attack Vector Name: Flawed Contract Logic * How Attack is Performed: * The core logic of the smart contract contains design flaws or vulnerabilities due to incorrect implementation of business rules, flawed algorithms, or oversights in handling specific scenarios. * Attackers exploit these logic flaws by interacting with the contract in unexpected or adversarial ways, triggering unintended behavior that benefits the attacker. * This can range from subtle economic exploits to complete breakdown of contract functionality. * Potential Impact: High - Loss of funds, manipulation of contract state, disruption of service, economic exploits. * Mitigation Strategies: * Rigorous code review: Involve multiple developers and security experts in reviewing the contract logic. * Formal verification: Use formal methods to mathematically prove the correctness of critical contract logic. * Thorough testing: Implement comprehensive unit tests, integration tests, and fuzzing to cover various scenarios and edge cases. * Security audits: Engage professional security auditors to perform in-depth analysis of the contract logic and identify potential flaws.

Attack Tree Path: 1.10.3.1. Manipulate external data feeds to influence contract logic [CRITICAL NODE] - Oracle Manipulation

Attack Vector Name: Oracle Manipulation * How Attack is Performed: * Smart contracts rely on external data feeds (oracles) to obtain real-world information for their logic (e.g., price feeds, random numbers, event outcomes). * If the oracle is vulnerable or centralized, attackers can manipulate the data provided by the oracle. * By feeding malicious or incorrect data to the contract through the manipulated oracle, attackers can influence the contract's logic and force it to execute actions that benefit them (e.g., trigger incorrect payouts, manipulate game outcomes). * Potential Impact: High - Loss of funds, manipulation of contract state, unfair advantages in applications relying on external data. * Mitigation Strategies: * Use reputable and decentralized oracles: Choose oracles with strong security reputations and decentralized architectures to reduce the risk of manipulation. * Implement safeguards against oracle manipulation: * Use multiple oracles and compare their data. * Implement outlier detection and sanity checks on oracle data. * Design contracts to be resilient to minor data discrepancies.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1.1. Trigger compiler bug leading to incorrect bytecode generation [CRITICAL NODE] - Solidity Compiler Bugs

Attack Vector Name: Solidity Compiler Bugs * How Attack is Performed: * Attackers discover and exploit bugs in the Solidity compiler itself. * By crafting specific Solidity code that triggers a compiler bug, they can cause the compiler to generate incorrect or vulnerable bytecode. * This incorrect bytecode, when deployed as a smart contract, can behave in unexpected and insecure ways, potentially allowing attackers to exploit vulnerabilities that are not apparent in the original Solidity code. * Potential Impact: High - Unpredictable contract behavior, potential for arbitrary code execution or state manipulation, bypass of intended security measures. * Mitigation Strategies: * Use stable and well-audited compiler versions: Stick to recommended and widely used compiler versions that have undergone security scrutiny. * Stay updated on known compiler bugs: Monitor security advisories and release notes for Solidity compiler updates and known bug fixes. * Perform bytecode analysis: For critical contracts, consider performing bytecode analysis to verify that the compiled bytecode behaves as expected and does not contain unexpected instructions due to compiler bugs.

Attack Tree Path: 3.1.1. Trigger EVM bug leading to unexpected execution behavior [CRITICAL NODE] - EVM Bugs

Attack Vector Name: EVM Bugs * How Attack is Performed: * Attackers discover and exploit bugs in the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) itself. * By crafting specific transactions or contract interactions that trigger an EVM bug, they can cause the EVM to behave in unexpected ways during contract execution. * This can lead to vulnerabilities that are independent of the Solidity code and reside at the fundamental execution level of the blockchain. * Potential Impact: Critical - Unpredictable contract behavior, potential for arbitrary code execution or state manipulation at the EVM level, blockchain-wide impact in severe cases. * Mitigation Strategies: * Rely on well-established EVM implementations: Use widely adopted and rigorously tested EVM implementations (like those in major Ethereum clients). * Stay updated on EVM security research: While less directly actionable for developers, being aware of EVM security research and potential vulnerabilities is important for the broader ecosystem. Platform-level security teams are primarily responsible for addressing EVM bugs.