Mitigation Strategy: Checks-Effects-Interactions Pattern
- Description:
- Checks First (Solidity): Begin your Solidity function by performing all necessary checks using
require()
statements. Validate inputs, user permissions (using modifiers), and preconditions directly within the Solidity code. - Update State (Effects) Next (Solidity): After all checks pass in Solidity, modify the contract's state variables. Execute state-changing operations like updating balances or modifying data structures using Solidity's state variable assignment.
- External Interactions Last (Solidity): Only after completing checks and state updates in Solidity, make external calls to other contracts or send Ether using Solidity's
call()
ortransfer()
functions. This pattern, implemented directly in Solidity, minimizes reentrancy vulnerabilities.
- Checks First (Solidity): Begin your Solidity function by performing all necessary checks using
- List of Threats Mitigated:
- Reentrancy Attacks (Severity: High) - Attackers can recursively call a vulnerable Solidity function before the initial call completes, leading to unintended state changes.
- Impact:
- Reentrancy Attacks: High reduction. Solidity code structured with this pattern significantly reduces reentrancy risk.
- Currently Implemented: Implemented in
transfer
andwithdraw
functions withinToken.sol
andPaymentChannel.sol
contracts using Solidity code structure. - Missing Implementation: Should be consistently applied in all Solidity functions across all contracts that perform external calls, especially in
Exchange.sol
andLendingPool.sol
where Solidity code manages value transfers.
Mitigation Strategy: Reentrancy Guards (Mutex Pattern)
- Description:
- Introduce a State Variable (Solidity): Declare a boolean state variable in your Solidity contract (e.g.,
_locked
) and initialize it tofalse
. - Create a Modifier (Solidity): Define a Solidity
modifier
(e.g.,nonReentrant
) that uses Solidity code to:- Check if
_locked
isfalse
using a Solidityrequire()
statement. Iftrue
, revert the transaction usingrevert()
in Solidity. - Set
_locked
totrue
at the beginning of the function using Solidity assignment. - Reset
_locked
tofalse
at the end of the function, ensuring it's always reset even on errors using Solidity's function execution flow.
- Check if
- Apply the Modifier (Solidity): Apply the
nonReentrant
modifier, written in Solidity, to Solidity functions vulnerable to reentrancy.
- Introduce a State Variable (Solidity): Declare a boolean state variable in your Solidity contract (e.g.,
- List of Threats Mitigated:
- Reentrancy Attacks (Severity: High) - Prevents recursive Solidity function calls within the same transaction context.
- Impact:
- Reentrancy Attacks: High reduction. Solidity-implemented reentrancy guards effectively prevent reentrancy.
- Currently Implemented: Implemented using a
ReentrancyGuard
library (written in Solidity) and applied to critical functions inExchange.sol
andLendingPool.sol
contracts using Solidity modifiers. - Missing Implementation: Review all Solidity contracts, especially new functionalities in
Governance.sol
, and ensure thenonReentrant
modifier is applied in Solidity to relevant functions.
Mitigation Strategy: Use Solidity Version 0.8.0 or Higher
- Description:
- Update Pragma Directive (Solidity): Modify the
pragma solidity
line at the top of each.sol
file to specify a compiler version of 0.8.0 or greater (e.g.,pragma solidity >=0.8.0;
). This is a direct Solidity code change. - Recompile with Updated Compiler (Solidity Tooling): Use the Solidity compiler (solc) version 0.8.0 or higher to compile your Solidity contracts.
- Leverage Built-in Checks (Solidity Feature): Solidity 0.8.0 and above automatically include overflow and underflow checks for arithmetic operations as a core language feature. No additional Solidity code is needed for basic checks.
- Update Pragma Directive (Solidity): Modify the
- List of Threats Mitigated:
- Integer Overflow (Severity: High) - Solidity's built-in checks prevent arithmetic overflows.
- Integer Underflow (Severity: High) - Solidity's built-in checks prevent arithmetic underflows.
- Impact:
- Integer Overflow: High reduction. Solidity language feature eliminates overflow risk.
- Integer Underflow: High reduction. Solidity language feature eliminates underflow risk.
- Currently Implemented: Project is compiled with Solidity version 0.8.12, using the Solidity language feature.
pragma solidity >=0.8.0;
is set in all Solidity files. - Missing Implementation: Not missing. Project leverages the secure Solidity compiler version.
Mitigation Strategy: Avoid Critical Logic Based on block.timestamp
- Description:
- Identify
block.timestamp
Usage (Solidity Code Review): Review your Solidity code to identify any instances whereblock.timestamp
is used in conditional statements or for critical decision-making logic. - Refactor Logic (Solidity Code Modification): If
block.timestamp
is used for security-sensitive operations, refactor your Solidity code to avoid direct reliance on it. Consider alternative approaches within Solidity, or if precise time is crucial, explore using oracles (though oracles are external, the decision to avoidblock.timestamp
is a Solidity coding choice). - Understand Solidity's
block.timestamp
Limitations (Solidity Knowledge): Educate developers about the limitations ofblock.timestamp
in Solidity and the potential for miner manipulation.
- Identify
- List of Threats Mitigated:
- Timestamp Dependence Vulnerabilities (Severity: Medium) - Reduces vulnerabilities arising from relying on a potentially manipulable
block.timestamp
in Solidity.
- Timestamp Dependence Vulnerabilities (Severity: Medium) - Reduces vulnerabilities arising from relying on a potentially manipulable
- Impact:
- Timestamp Dependence Vulnerabilities: Medium reduction. Mitigates risks by avoiding direct reliance on
block.timestamp
in Solidity critical logic.
- Timestamp Dependence Vulnerabilities: Medium reduction. Mitigates risks by avoiding direct reliance on
- Currently Implemented: General awareness among developers to avoid critical timestamp reliance in Solidity code. No specific systematic review for
block.timestamp
usage has been performed. - Missing Implementation: Conduct a code review of all Solidity contracts to identify and refactor any critical logic that depends on
block.timestamp
. Establish coding guidelines to discourage its use for security-sensitive operations in Solidity.
Mitigation Strategy: Use modifier
for Access Control
- Description:
- Define Custom Modifiers (Solidity): Create Solidity
modifier
s to encapsulate access control logic directly within your Solidity contracts. Examples:onlyOwner()
,onlyAdmin()
,onlyRole(bytes32 role)
. Implement the access control checks within the modifier's Solidity code. - Apply Modifiers to Functions (Solidity): Apply these Solidity modifiers to restrict access to functions. In your Solidity function definitions, include the modifier name after the visibility keyword (e.g.,
function adminFunction() public onlyOwner { ... }
). - Centralize Modifier Definitions (Solidity): Define common access control modifiers in a base Solidity contract (like
Ownable.sol
) or a Solidity library to promote code reuse and consistency across your Solidity project.
- Define Custom Modifiers (Solidity): Create Solidity
- List of Threats Mitigated:
- Unauthorized Access to Functions (Severity: High) - Solidity modifiers enforce access control, preventing unauthorized function execution.
- Privilege Escalation (Severity: Medium) - Solidity modifiers make it harder to bypass access controls and escalate privileges.
- Impact:
- Unauthorized Access to Functions: High reduction. Solidity modifiers provide a robust mechanism for access control.
- Privilege Escalation: Medium reduction. Solidity modifier security depends on the correctness of the modifier's implementation.
- Currently Implemented:
onlyOwner
modifier fromOwnable.sol
is used in Solidity code across contracts. BasicisAdmin
checks are sometimes implemented directly within Solidity admin functions instead of using modifiers consistently. - Missing Implementation: Standardize the use of Solidity modifiers for all access control checks. Implement more granular role-based access control modifiers in Solidity, like
onlyRole(bytes32 role)
, and apply them consistently inExchange.sol
,Governance.sol
, andUserRegistry.sol
Solidity code.
Mitigation Strategy: Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) (Solidity Implementation with Modifiers)
- Description:
- Define Roles as Constants (Solidity): Define roles as
bytes32
constants in your Solidity contracts (e.g.,bytes32 public constant ADMIN_ROLE = keccak256("ADMIN_ROLE");
). - Implement Role Management Functions (Solidity): Create Solidity functions to grant and revoke roles. Use Solidity mappings (e.g.,
mapping(address => mapping(bytes32 => bool)) _roles
) to track role assignments within your Solidity contract. - Use
modifier
for Role Checks (Solidity): Create Solidity modifiers likeonlyRole(bytes32 role)
that check within Solidity code ifmsg.sender
has the specified role using the role mapping. - Apply Role-Based Modifiers (Solidity): Apply these Solidity RBAC modifiers to control access to functions based on roles.
- Define Roles as Constants (Solidity): Define roles as
- List of Threats Mitigated:
- Unauthorized Access to Functions (Severity: High) - Solidity RBAC provides fine-grained access control.
- Privilege Escalation (Severity: High) - Solidity RBAC makes privilege escalation significantly harder.
- Accidental Misconfiguration (Severity: Medium) - Solidity RBAC, when well-structured in code, reduces misconfiguration risks.
- Impact:
- Unauthorized Access to Functions: High reduction. Solidity RBAC offers strong and flexible access control.
- Privilege Escalation: High reduction. Solidity RBAC centralizes and secures access management.
- Accidental Misconfiguration: Medium reduction. Solidity RBAC improves manageability but requires careful Solidity code implementation.
- Currently Implemented: Basic
isAdmin
checks exist, but a formal Solidity RBAC system using modifiers and roles is not fully implemented. - Missing Implementation: Implement a comprehensive Solidity RBAC system, potentially using a library like OpenZeppelin's AccessControl (which provides Solidity contracts and modifiers for RBAC), in
Governance.sol
,Exchange.sol
, andUserRegistry.sol
. Define roles and permissions in Solidity code and migrate existing access checks to this Solidity RBAC system.
Mitigation Strategy: Careful Function Visibility (Solidity)
- Description:
- Review Function Visibility (Solidity Code Review): Examine the visibility specifiers (
public
,private
,internal
,external
) of all functions in your Solidity contracts. - Use Most Restrictive Visibility (Solidity Best Practice): For each Solidity function, choose the most restrictive visibility that still allows the intended functionality.
private
: Only callable from within the contract.internal
: Callable from within the contract and derived contracts.external
: Only callable from outside the contract (more gas-efficient for external calls).public
: Callable from anywhere (most permissive, use sparingly).
- Enforce Visibility in Code Reviews (Solidity Code Review Process): Make function visibility a key aspect of Solidity code reviews to ensure developers are using appropriate visibility levels.
- Review Function Visibility (Solidity Code Review): Examine the visibility specifiers (
- List of Threats Mitigated:
- Unauthorized Access to Functions (Severity: Medium) - Restricting function visibility in Solidity limits the attack surface and reduces unintended access.
- Accidental Exposure of Internal Logic (Severity: Low) - Proper Solidity visibility helps prevent accidental exposure of internal contract details.
- Impact:
- Unauthorized Access to Functions: Medium reduction. Reduces unintended access paths by limiting function visibility in Solidity.
- Accidental Exposure of Internal Logic: Low reduction. Improves code encapsulation in Solidity.
- Currently Implemented: General awareness of function visibility in Solidity development. No systematic audit of function visibility has been conducted.
- Missing Implementation: Conduct a dedicated code review of all Solidity contracts to ensure that function visibility is correctly set to the most restrictive level possible for each function. Establish coding guidelines for function visibility in Solidity.
Mitigation Strategy: Storage Layout Compatibility (with delegatecall
)
- Description:
- Design Compatible Storage (Solidity Architecture): When using
delegatecall
in Solidity to call library functions, carefully plan the storage layout of both the calling contract and the library. Ensure that storage variables in the library do not overwrite or interfere with storage variables in the calling contract. - Document Storage Layout (Solidity Documentation): Clearly document the intended storage layout for contracts using
delegatecall
and their associated libraries in Solidity. - Thorough Testing (Solidity Testing): Write comprehensive tests in Solidity that specifically verify the storage integrity when using
delegatecall
with libraries. Test for potential storage collisions and unexpected data overwrites.
- Design Compatible Storage (Solidity Architecture): When using
- List of Threats Mitigated:
- Storage Collisions and Data Corruption (Severity: High) - Incompatible storage layouts with
delegatecall
in Solidity can lead to data corruption and unpredictable contract behavior.
- Storage Collisions and Data Corruption (Severity: High) - Incompatible storage layouts with
- Impact:
- Storage Collisions and Data Corruption: High reduction. Careful storage layout design in Solidity and testing mitigate storage corruption risks with
delegatecall
.
- Storage Collisions and Data Corruption: High reduction. Careful storage layout design in Solidity and testing mitigate storage corruption risks with
- Currently Implemented: Storage layout is considered during library integration with
delegatecall
in Solidity, but no formal documentation or automated checks are in place. - Missing Implementation: Formalize storage layout documentation for all contracts using
delegatecall
in Solidity. Implement automated tests that specifically check for storage layout compatibility and prevent regressions.
Mitigation Strategy: Consider call
Instead of delegatecall
(When Appropriate)
- Description:
- Evaluate Library Usage (Solidity Design Decision): When deciding to use a library in Solidity, carefully consider whether
delegatecall
is truly necessary. - Use
call
for Code Reuse without Storage Context (Solidity Feature): If you only need to reuse code from a library and do not require the library to operate within the storage context of the calling contract, usecall
instead ofdelegatecall
in Solidity.call
executes the library's code in the library's own storage context, providing better isolation and reducing storage layout concerns. - Reserve
delegatecall
for Specific Use Cases (Solidity Best Practice): Limit the use ofdelegatecall
in Solidity to situations where it is explicitly required to modify the calling contract's storage (e.g., for certain proxy patterns or advanced library functionalities).
- Evaluate Library Usage (Solidity Design Decision): When deciding to use a library in Solidity, carefully consider whether
- List of Threats Mitigated:
- Storage Collisions and Data Corruption (Severity: Medium) - Using
call
instead ofdelegatecall
in Solidity reduces the risk of storage-related issues. - Library Vulnerabilities Impacting Calling Contract (Severity: Medium) -
call
provides better isolation, limiting the impact of potential vulnerabilities in the library on the calling contract's storage.
- Storage Collisions and Data Corruption (Severity: Medium) - Using
- Impact:
- Storage Collisions and Data Corruption: Medium reduction. Reduces storage risks by using
call
when appropriate in Solidity. - Library Vulnerabilities Impacting Calling Contract: Medium reduction. Improves isolation and limits vulnerability impact in Solidity.
- Storage Collisions and Data Corruption: Medium reduction. Reduces storage risks by using
- Currently Implemented: Developers are generally aware of the difference between
call
anddelegatecall
in Solidity, but the choice might not always be systematically evaluated. - Missing Implementation: Incorporate a decision-making step in the development process to explicitly evaluate whether
delegatecall
is necessary when integrating libraries in Solidity. Document guidelines for when to usecall
versusdelegatecall
.
Mitigation Strategy: Use require
, revert
, and assert
for Error Handling
- Description:
- Input Validation with
require
(Solidity): Userequire()
statements in Solidity at the beginning of functions to validate inputs and preconditions. If a condition is not met,require()
will revert the transaction and refund gas. - Explicit Error Reversion with
revert
(Solidity): Userevert()
statements in Solidity to explicitly revert transactions when specific error conditions are encountered that are not related to input validation but indicate a failure in business logic. Provide informative error messages withrevert("Reason")
. - Internal Error Checks with
assert
(Solidity - for development/testing): Useassert()
statements in Solidity to check for internal invariants and conditions that should never be false under normal circumstances.assert()
consumes all remaining gas on failure, indicating a critical internal error (primarily for development and testing, less for production error handling). - Test Error Handling Paths (Solidity Testing): Write Solidity tests that specifically trigger error conditions and verify that
require()
,revert()
, andassert()
statements function as expected.
- Input Validation with
- List of Threats Mitigated:
- Unhandled Exceptions and Unexpected Behavior (Severity: Medium) - Robust error handling in Solidity prevents unexpected contract behavior due to unhandled errors.
- Vulnerability due to Incorrect State (Severity: Medium) - Proper error handling in Solidity ensures that transactions are reverted when invalid states are detected, preventing vulnerabilities arising from incorrect state transitions.
- Impact:
- Unhandled Exceptions and Unexpected Behavior: Medium reduction. Solidity error handling improves contract robustness.
- Vulnerability due to Incorrect State: Medium reduction. Solidity error handling helps maintain contract state integrity.
- Currently Implemented:
require()
is used for basic input validation in Solidity contracts.revert()
is used in some cases for explicit error reporting.assert()
usage is less common and primarily for development. - Missing Implementation: Systematically review all Solidity functions and ensure comprehensive error handling using
require()
andrevert()
for all relevant error conditions. Increase the use ofrevert()
with informative error messages. Consider adopting custom error types for more advanced error reporting (see next point).
Mitigation Strategy: Consider Custom Error Types (Solidity 0.8.4+)
- Description:
- Define Custom Errors (Solidity 0.8.4+ Feature): Utilize Solidity's custom error types (introduced in version 0.8.4) to define specific error conditions within your Solidity contracts using the
error
keyword (e.g.,error InsufficientBalance(uint256 requested, uint256 available);
). - Emit Custom Errors with
revert
(Solidity 0.8.4+): Userevert
statements in Solidity to emit these custom errors with specific parameters (e.g.,revert InsufficientBalance({requested: amount, available: balance});
). - Benefits: Gas Efficiency and Clarity (Solidity Advantages): Custom errors in Solidity are more gas-efficient than using string error messages with
revert()
. They also provide better structured error information for off-chain applications and debugging. - Update Solidity Compiler (If Necessary): Ensure you are using Solidity compiler version 0.8.4 or higher to use custom error types.
- Define Custom Errors (Solidity 0.8.4+ Feature): Utilize Solidity's custom error types (introduced in version 0.8.4) to define specific error conditions within your Solidity contracts using the
- List of Threats Mitigated:
- Less Informative Error Messages (Severity: Low) - Custom errors in Solidity provide more structured and informative error details compared to generic string messages.
- Higher Gas Costs for Error Reporting (Severity: Low) - Custom errors in Solidity are more gas-efficient for error reporting than string messages.
- Impact:
- Less Informative Error Messages: Low reduction. Improves error clarity and debugging.
- Higher Gas Costs for Error Reporting: Low reduction. Reduces gas consumption for error reporting in Solidity.
- Currently Implemented: Project is using Solidity 0.8.12, which supports custom errors. Custom error types are not yet systematically used in the codebase.
- Missing Implementation: Gradually adopt custom error types in Solidity contracts, starting with frequently used functions and error conditions in
Exchange.sol
,LendingPool.sol
, andGovernance.sol
. Refactor existingrevert()
statements with string messages to use custom errors for improved gas efficiency and error clarity.