Attack Surface: Denial of Service (DoS) via Complex Layouts
Description: Attackers can craft malicious input (nested layouts, conflicting constraints, extreme values) to cause excessive resource consumption (CPU, memory) during layout calculation, leading to application unavailability.
- Yoga's Contribution: Yoga's core function is layout calculation based on provided style properties. The complexity of this calculation is directly influenced by the input, making it susceptible to DoS if the input is designed to trigger worst-case performance. This is directly related to Yoga's algorithm.
- Example: An attacker submits a layout with 10,000 deeply nested nodes, each with conflicting
flexGrow
,flexShrink
, andaspectRatio
properties. This forces Yoga to perform an extremely large number of calculations. - Impact: Application becomes unresponsive or crashes, preventing legitimate users from accessing it.
- Risk Severity: High
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Input Validation: Limit the depth of nesting, the total number of nodes, and the range of values for dimensions, padding, margins, etc. Reject input exceeding these limits.
- Resource Limits: Impose limits on CPU time and memory allocation for Yoga calculations. Terminate calculations exceeding these limits.
- Timeouts: Implement a timeout for layout calculations. Abort calculations exceeding the timeout.
- Rate Limiting: Limit the frequency of layout calculation requests, especially if triggered by user input.
- Profiling: Regularly profile Yoga's performance to identify and optimize potential bottlenecks.
Attack Surface: Integer Overflow/Underflow Potentially Leading to Exploitable Conditions within Yoga's Core
Description: While Yoga primarily uses floating-point numbers, carefully crafted input could potentially trigger integer overflows/underflows within Yoga's core C code or in highly optimized platform-specific routines called by Yoga. This is less likely than binding-related issues but cannot be entirely ruled out without a deep code audit. We're focusing on the direct Yoga involvement here.
- Yoga's Contribution: Yoga's internal calculations, even if primarily floating-point, might have edge cases or platform-specific optimizations that involve integer arithmetic. The potential for this exists within Yoga itself.
- Example: This is difficult to exemplify without a specific known vulnerability. It would involve a highly specific combination of style properties and potentially platform-specific code paths that trigger an integer overflow during Yoga's layout calculation, leading to a measurable and exploitable side effect (e.g., an incorrect size calculation that could later be used in a buffer overflow in a different part of the system – this is a chain of events, but the root cause is within Yoga).
- Impact: Potentially application crashes, memory corruption (less likely, but the potential exists if the overflow affects size calculations used later), or undefined behavior originating from within Yoga's calculations.
- Risk Severity: High (due to the potential for memory corruption, even if less likely than binding issues). We're being conservative here because we're focusing on direct Yoga involvement.
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Input Validation: Enforce strict bounds on all input values, even those seemingly used only as floats, to prevent them from being used to indirectly influence integer calculations.
- Fuzz Testing (Targeted): Conduct fuzz testing specifically targeting Yoga's core C code with a focus on generating inputs that might trigger integer overflows in edge cases or platform-specific code. This requires a deeper understanding of Yoga's internals.
- Code Audit (Yoga Core): A thorough code audit of Yoga's C code, focusing on integer arithmetic and platform-specific optimizations, is the most reliable way to identify and address this potential risk.