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attack-tree.md

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Attack Tree Analysis for gabime/spdlog

Objective: Compromise Application using spdlog vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Visualization

  • Compromise Application via spdlog [CRITICAL NODE]
    • OR
      • Exploit Log Injection Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
        • OR
          • Format String Vulnerability [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
            • AND
                1. Application logs user-controlled input without proper sanitization into format string [CRITICAL NODE]
                1. Attacker injects format string specifiers in user-controlled input
                1. spdlog processes the malicious format string
              • Outcome: Information Disclosure (Memory Leakage, Stack Data), Application Crash, potentially Code Execution (in some scenarios, architecture dependent) [HIGH IMPACT]
              • Mitigation: Always use positional arguments or structured logging with spdlog to avoid format string interpretation of user input. Sanitize user input before logging. [CRITICAL MITIGATION]
          • Log Injection leading to Command Injection (Indirect) [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
            • AND
                1. Application logs user-controlled input [CRITICAL NODE]
                1. Logs are processed by another system (e.g., log aggregation, monitoring tools) that is vulnerable to command injection via log content. [CRITICAL NODE]
                1. Attacker crafts log messages with malicious commands.
              • Outcome: Command Execution on the log processing system, potentially leading to further compromise of the application environment. [HIGH IMPACT]
              • Mitigation: Sanitize user input before logging. Securely configure and harden log processing systems. Implement input validation and output encoding on log processing tools. [CRITICAL MITIGATION]

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Log Injection Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Description: This is a high-risk category because it directly targets the logging functionality, which is often a core component of applications. If logging is not handled securely, it can open doors to various attacks.
  • Critical Nodes within this path:
    • Compromise Application via spdlog [CRITICAL NODE]: The root goal, highlighting that exploiting log injection is a significant way to compromise the application through spdlog.
    • Exploit Log Injection Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]: This node itself is critical as it represents the broad category of attacks exploiting weaknesses in how logs are handled.

Attack Tree Path: Format String Vulnerability [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Description: This is a specific type of log injection vulnerability that arises when user-controlled input is directly used as a format string in logging functions.
  • Attack Vector Breakdown:
    • 1. Application logs user-controlled input without proper sanitization into format string [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Attack Step: Developers mistakenly use user-provided data directly as the format string argument in spdlog's logging functions (e.g., spdlog::info(user_input)). This is the crucial coding error that enables the vulnerability.
    • 2. Attacker injects format string specifiers in user-controlled input:
      • Attack Step: An attacker crafts malicious input containing format string specifiers like %s, %x, %n, %p, etc.
    • 3. spdlog processes the malicious format string:
      • Attack Step: When the application logs the attacker's input, spdlog interprets the format string specifiers, leading to unintended behavior.
    • Outcome: Information Disclosure (Memory Leakage, Stack Data), Application Crash, potentially Code Execution (in some scenarios, architecture dependent) [HIGH IMPACT]
      • Potential Damage: Reading sensitive data from memory, crashing the application, or in some cases, executing arbitrary code on the server.
    • Mitigation: Always use positional arguments or structured logging with spdlog to avoid format string interpretation of user input. Sanitize user input before logging. [CRITICAL MITIGATION]
      • Recommended Action: The most critical mitigation is to never use user input directly as a format string. Use positional arguments (e.g., spdlog::info("User input: {}", user_input)) or structured logging to treat user input as data. Sanitizing user input is a good defense-in-depth measure.

Attack Tree Path: Log Injection leading to Command Injection (Indirect) [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Description: This is an indirect command injection vulnerability. While spdlog itself doesn't execute commands, it can log data that is later processed by other systems that are vulnerable to command injection.
  • Attack Vector Breakdown:
    • 1. Application logs user-controlled input [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Attack Step: The application logs user-provided data, which might be necessary for debugging, auditing, or monitoring.
    • 2. Logs are processed by another system (e.g., log aggregation, monitoring tools) that is vulnerable to command injection via log content. [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Attack Step: The application's logs are forwarded to a separate system (like a SIEM, log aggregator, or monitoring dashboard). This downstream system has a vulnerability that allows command injection based on the content of the logs it processes. This vulnerability is not in spdlog itself, but in the log processing pipeline.
    • 3. Attacker crafts log messages with malicious commands:
      • Attack Step: The attacker crafts user input that, when logged, contains commands or special characters that will be interpreted as commands by the vulnerable log processing system.
    • Outcome: Command Execution on the log processing system, potentially leading to further compromise of the application environment. [HIGH IMPACT]
      • Potential Damage: Compromise of the log processing infrastructure, which could lead to wider network access, data breaches, or denial of service of logging services.
    • Mitigation: Sanitize user input before logging. Securely configure and harden log processing systems. Implement input validation and output encoding on log processing tools. [CRITICAL MITIGATION]
      • Recommended Actions:
        • Sanitize user input before logging: Remove or escape characters that could be interpreted as commands by downstream systems.
        • Secure log processing systems: Harden the systems that process logs, ensuring they are not vulnerable to command injection. Apply security patches and follow security best practices for these systems.
        • Input validation and output encoding on log processing tools: Configure log processing tools to properly handle log data, validating input and encoding output to prevent command injection vulnerabilities within these tools themselves.