threat-modeling.md

Threat Model Analysis for gabime/spdlog

Threat: Unintentional Logging of Sensitive Data

Description: Developers using spdlog might inadvertently include sensitive information (credentials, PII, tokens) in log messages through format strings or directly logged variables. Attackers gaining access to these spdlog generated logs can extract sensitive data. Impact: Information disclosure, privacy breaches, identity theft, account compromise, compliance violations. Affected spdlog component: Application code using spdlog logging functions (e.g., spdlog::info, format strings). Risk Severity: High to Critical Mitigation Strategies: * Mandatory code reviews specifically for spdlog log statements. * Static analysis tools to detect potential sensitive data in spdlog logging calls. * Structured logging with predefined, non-sensitive fields for spdlog. * Log masking/redaction applied to spdlog output before storage. * Developer training on secure logging practices with spdlog.

Threat: Unauthorized Log File Access

Description: Attackers exploit system misconfigurations or vulnerabilities to access log files generated by spdlog. This allows them to read sensitive information logged by the application via spdlog or monitor application activity. Impact: Information disclosure, unauthorized surveillance, potential for further attacks based on revealed information. Affected spdlog component: Log files generated by spdlog and their storage location. Risk Severity: High Mitigation Strategies: * Restrict file system permissions on directories containing spdlog log files. * Secure access to centralized logging systems receiving spdlog logs with strong authentication. * Regularly audit access controls for spdlog log storage. * Avoid storing spdlog logs in publicly accessible web directories.

Threat: Log File Modification or Deletion

Description: Attackers gaining write access to the system can modify or delete log files generated by spdlog. This can be used to hide malicious activity logged by spdlog or manipulate audit trails. Impact: Loss of auditability, inability to detect security incidents, compromised forensic analysis, regulatory non-compliance. Affected spdlog component: Log files generated by spdlog and their storage location. Risk Severity: High Mitigation Strategies: * Implement write-only access to spdlog log files for application processes. * Utilize centralized logging systems with tamper-evident logging for spdlog logs. * Consider immutable logging solutions for spdlog output. * Regularly back up spdlog log files to secure locations.

Threat: Vulnerabilities in Custom Sinks or Formatters

Description: Developers implementing custom sinks or formatters for spdlog might introduce vulnerabilities (buffer overflows, injection flaws) in this custom code. Exploiting these vulnerabilities in spdlog extensions can lead to code execution or denial of service. Impact: Code execution on the logging system or application server, data corruption, denial of service. Affected spdlog component: Custom sinks and formatters extending spdlog functionality. Risk Severity: High Mitigation Strategies: * Thorough security review and testing of custom spdlog sinks and formatters. * Secure coding practices for custom spdlog extensions (input validation, buffer overflow protection). * Prefer using well-vetted, standard spdlog sinks and formatters. * Principle of least privilege for custom spdlog sink code.