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Attack Tree Analysis for gflags/gflags

Objective: Gain Unauthorized Control/Access

Attack Tree Visualization

                                      Gain Unauthorized Control/Access [CN]
                                                  |
                                  -----------------------------------
                                  |                                 |
                      Exploit gflags Configuration [CN]           (Other Branch Removed)
                                  |
                  -----------------------------------
                  |                 |                 |
      1.  Modify Config Files  2. Env Var  3. Command-Line
          at Runtime [CN]     Manipulation [CN]    Injection [CN]
                  |                 |                 |
      -----------|---------    ------|------    ------|------
      |         |         |    |           |    |     |
 1a.   1b.     1c.     2a.        2c.  3a.  3b.
 File   Symlink  Race   Set         Shell  Arg   Arg
Perm.  Attack  Cond.  Env         Escape Inject.Manip.
[CN]   [HR]           [HR]   [CN]        [HR]   [CN]
[HR]                                         [HR]

Attack Tree Path: Gain Unauthorized Control/Access [CN]

  • Description: The ultimate objective of the attacker. This encompasses gaining the ability to modify the application's behavior in unintended ways or accessing data that should be protected.
  • Why Critical: This is the root of the attack tree and represents the attacker's final goal.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit gflags Configuration [CN]

  • Description: This branch focuses on manipulating the values of flags defined using the gflags library. This is achieved by altering the configuration sources that gflags uses.
  • Why Critical: This is the primary and most direct method for an attacker to control the application's behavior through gflags. It's the gateway to most high-risk paths.

Attack Tree Path: 1. Modify Config Files at Runtime [CN]

  • Description: gflags can read configuration settings from files. If an attacker can modify these files, they can directly change the values of flags, influencing the application's behavior.
  • Why Critical: This is a direct and often easily exploitable path to controlling flag values.

Attack Tree Path: 1a. File Permissions [CN][HR]

  • Description: If the configuration file has overly permissive write permissions (e.g., world-writable), any user on the system, or a process running with lower privileges, can modify the file and change the flag values.
  • Why High-Risk: This is a very common vulnerability due to misconfigured systems or deployments. It's often easy to exploit and provides direct control over flag values.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Novice
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium

Attack Tree Path: 1b. Symlink Attack [HR]

  • Description: If the application opens the configuration file in a predictable location, an attacker might replace the legitimate configuration file with a symbolic link (symlink) pointing to a file controlled by the attacker. When the application reads the configuration, it will unknowingly read the attacker's file.
  • Why High-Risk: This allows the attacker to completely control the configuration file's contents, leading to full control over flag values.
  • Likelihood: Low
  • Impact: High
  • Effort: Medium
  • Skill Level: Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium

Attack Tree Path: 1c. Race Condition [HR]

  • Description: If the application reads the configuration file multiple times or reloads it periodically, there might be a race condition. An attacker could attempt to modify the file between these reads. If the attacker wins the race, they can inject their modified configuration.
  • Why High-Risk: Although less likely than other file-based attacks, a successful race condition attack can give the attacker full control over flag values.
  • Likelihood: Low
  • Impact: High
  • Effort: High
  • Skill Level: Advanced
  • Detection Difficulty: Hard

Attack Tree Path: 2. Environment Variable Manipulation [CN]

  • Description: gflags can also read flag values from environment variables. An attacker who can control the environment variables seen by the application can influence flag values.
  • Why Critical: This is another direct method for controlling flag values, often overlooked.

Attack Tree Path: 2a. Set Environment Variable [CN]

  • Description: The attacker sets an environment variable that corresponds to a gflags flag, overriding any value set in a configuration file or on the command line.
  • Why Critical: This is a direct way to set flag values. The feasibility depends on how the attacker can influence the environment (e.g., compromised parent process, shell access).
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High
  • Effort: Low to Medium
  • Skill Level: Novice to Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium

Attack Tree Path: 2c. Shell Escape [HR]

  • Description: If the application uses environment variables in an unsafe way (e.g., directly embedding them in a shell command without proper escaping), an attacker might be able to inject malicious commands through carefully crafted environment variable values. This is a form of command injection.
  • Why High-Risk: This can lead to arbitrary code execution, giving the attacker complete control over the application and potentially the underlying system.
  • Likelihood: Low
  • Impact: Very High
  • Effort: Medium to High
  • Skill Level: Advanced
  • Detection Difficulty: Hard

Attack Tree Path: 3. Command-Line Injection [CN]

  • Description: gflags is primarily designed to parse command-line arguments. If the application constructs command-line arguments based on user input without proper sanitization or validation, an attacker can inject their own flags or modify existing ones.
  • Why Critical: This is the most direct and intended way to interact with gflags, making it a prime target for attackers.

Attack Tree Path: 3a. Argument Injection [CN][HR]

  • Description: The attacker provides input that is directly incorporated into the command-line arguments passed to gflags. This allows them to specify arbitrary flags and their values.
  • Why High-Risk: This is a very common vulnerability in web applications and other systems that accept user input. It provides direct control over flag values.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High
  • Effort: Low to Medium
  • Skill Level: Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium

Attack Tree Path: 3b. Argument Manipulation [HR]

  • Description: Even without full injection, the attacker might be able to manipulate existing arguments in a way that changes their meaning or how gflags parses them. This could involve adding extra spaces, quotes, or other special characters.
  • Why High-Risk: While less powerful than full injection, this can still allow the attacker to influence flag values and potentially bypass intended restrictions.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: Medium to High
  • Effort: Medium
  • Skill Level: Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium