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Attack Tree Analysis for google/flatbuffers

Objective: To achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) or a significant Denial of Service (DoS) on the application server or client by exploiting vulnerabilities in the FlatBuffers serialization/deserialization process.

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Application via FlatBuffers [CN]
    |
    -----------------------------------------------------------------
    |                                                               |
1.  Remote Code Execution (RCE) [CN]                          2. Denial of Service (DoS)
    |                                                               |
    -------------------------                                   -----------------------------------
    |                       |                                   |
1a. Buffer Overflow [HR] 1b. Type Confusion                      2a. Resource Exhaustion [HR]
    |                       |
    -----                   -----
    |   |                   |   |
1a1 1a2                 1b1 1b2
[HR] [HR]              [HR] [HR]
    |   |
1a3 [CN]                 1b3 [CN]
                                                                    |       |
                                                                  2a1     2a2
                                                                  [HR]    [HR]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Remote Code Execution (RCE) [CN]

  • Critical Node: RCE represents the most severe outcome, granting the attacker complete control over the compromised system.

Attack Tree Path: 1a. Buffer Overflow [HR]

  • High-Risk Path: Exploiting buffer overflows is a common and high-impact attack vector.

Attack Tree Path: 1a1. Oversized Scalar in a Table [HR]

  • Description: An attacker provides a scalar value (integer, float) larger than the allocated buffer space within a FlatBuffer table. If the application doesn't validate the size before writing, this can overwrite adjacent memory.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High (RCE)
  • Effort: Medium
  • Skill Level: Medium to High
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium

Attack Tree Path: 1a2. Oversized String/Vector [HR]

  • Description: Similar to 1a1, but the attacker provides an oversized string or vector. Lack of length validation before writing to the FlatBuffer can lead to a buffer overflow.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High (RCE)
  • Effort: Medium
  • Skill Level: Medium to High
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium

Attack Tree Path: 1a3. Incorrect Offset Manipulation [CN]

  • Description: If the application manually manipulates FlatBuffers offsets (which it generally shouldn't), an error could lead to writing data outside the allocated buffer. This is a low-level error.
  • Likelihood: Low
  • Impact: High (RCE)
  • Effort: High
  • Skill Level: High
  • Detection Difficulty: High

Attack Tree Path: 1b. Type Confusion

Attack Tree Path: 1b1. Schema Mismatch [HR]

  • Description: The server and client use different, incompatible versions of the FlatBuffers schema. This can cause the deserializer to misinterpret data, potentially leading to exploitable behavior.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: Medium to High (Potentially RCE)
  • Effort: Low to Medium
  • Skill Level: Medium
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium

Attack Tree Path: 1b2. Union Misinterpretation [HR]

  • Description: The application doesn't correctly check the _type field of a FlatBuffers union before accessing its value. This can lead to misinterpreting the data type and potentially exploitable behavior.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: Medium to High (Potentially RCE)
  • Effort: Medium
  • Skill Level: Medium
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium

Attack Tree Path: 1b3. Table/Struct Confusion [CN]

  • Description: The deserializer is tricked into treating a table as a struct (or vice-versa), leading to out-of-bounds reads or writes due to different layout and size expectations.
  • Likelihood: Low
  • Impact: High (RCE)
  • Effort: High
  • Skill Level: High
  • Detection Difficulty: High

Attack Tree Path: 2. Denial of Service (DoS)

Attack Tree Path: 2a. Resource Exhaustion [HR]

  • High-Risk Path: Relatively easy to achieve by sending maliciously crafted FlatBuffers.

Attack Tree Path: 2a1. Deeply Nested Objects [HR]

  • Description: An attacker sends a FlatBuffer with excessively deep nesting of tables or vectors, causing the deserializer to consume excessive memory or CPU.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: Medium (DoS)
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Low
  • Detection Difficulty: Low to Medium

Attack Tree Path: 2a2. Large Vectors/Strings [HR]

  • Description: An attacker sends a FlatBuffer containing extremely large vectors or strings, consuming a large amount of memory during deserialization.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: Medium (DoS)
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Low
  • Detection Difficulty: Low to Medium