attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for keepassxreboot/keepassxc

Objective: Gain unauthorized access to sensitive data or functionality of the application by exploiting weaknesses in its integration with or reliance on KeePassXC.

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Application Using KeePassXC [CRITICAL NODE]
├───(OR)─ Exploit KeePassXC Configuration Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   ├───(AND)─ Weak Master Password Policy [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   └─── Brute-force weak master password to unlock database [CRITICAL NODE]
│   ├───(AND)─ Insecure Keyfile Storage [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   └─── Steal keyfile if stored in an easily accessible location [CRITICAL NODE]
├───(OR)─ Exploit Application's Integration with KeePassXC [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   ├───(OR)─ Insecure Storage of KeePassXC Database Credentials [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   ├───(AND)─ Hardcoded Master Password or Keyfile Path in Application Code [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   │   └─── Extract credentials from application source code or binaries [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   ├───(AND)─ Storing Master Password or Keyfile in Application Configuration Files [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   │   └─── Access configuration files to retrieve credentials [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   ├───(AND)─ Insecure Environment Variables for KeePassXC Credentials [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   │   └─── Access environment variables to retrieve credentials [CRITICAL NODE]
│   ├───(OR)─ Insecure KeePassXC Database Handling by Application [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   ├───(AND)─ Leaving KeePassXC Database Unlocked for Extended Periods [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   │   └─── Exploit unlocked database if attacker gains access to the system [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   ├───(AND)─ Lack of Input Validation when Retrieving Passwords from KeePassXC [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   │   └─── Application vulnerable to injection if it uses retrieved passwords without sanitization [CRITICAL NODE]
│   ├───(OR)─ Vulnerabilities in Application's KeePassXC API/CLI Usage [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   ├───(AND)─ Command Injection in Application's KeePassXC CLI Calls [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   │   └─── Inject malicious commands into KeePassXC CLI execution [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   ├───(AND)─ Insecure Parameter Passing to KeePassXC API/CLI [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   │   └─── Manipulate parameters to bypass security checks or retrieve unintended data [CRITICAL NODE]
│   ├───(OR)─ Social Engineering Targeting KeePassXC Users (Application Users) [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   ├───(AND)─ Phishing for KeePassXC Master Password [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   │   └─── Trick user into revealing master password to unlock database [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   ├───(AND)─ Social Engineering to Install Malicious KeePassXC Plugins [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   │   └─── Trick user into installing malicious plugin to compromise KeePassXC [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   ├───(AND)─ Tricking User into Exporting KeePassXC Database [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   │   └─── Trick user into exporting KeePassXC database to attacker-controlled location [CRITICAL NODE]
├───(OR)─ KeePassXC Process Memory Exploitation [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   ├───(AND)─ Memory Dumping KeePassXC Process [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   └─── Extract decrypted passwords and keys from memory dump [CRITICAL NODE]
├───(OR)─ KeePassXC Plugin Vulnerabilities (if plugins are used and enabled) [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   └───(AND)─ Vulnerabilities in Third-Party KeePassXC Plugins [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│       └─── Exploit vulnerabilities in user-installed plugins [CRITICAL NODE]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Exploit KeePassXC Configuration Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

• Attack Vector: Attackers target weaknesses in how KeePassXC is configured, rather than the application code itself. This often relies on user error or misconfiguration.
  • Sub-Paths:
    • Weak Master Password Policy [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
      • Critical Node: Brute-force weak master password to unlock database [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Attack Vector: If the user chooses a weak master password, attackers can use readily available brute-force tools to try common passwords or password lists until they successfully unlock the KeePassXC database.
    • Insecure Keyfile Storage [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
      • Critical Node: Steal keyfile if stored in an easily accessible location [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Attack Vector: If a keyfile is used instead of or in addition to a master password, and it is stored in a location accessible to the attacker (e.g., on a shared network drive, unencrypted USB drive, or easily guessable directory on the local system), the attacker can steal the keyfile and use it to unlock the database, potentially without even needing the master password.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit Application's Integration with KeePassXC [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

• Attack Vector: Attackers exploit vulnerabilities arising from how the application interacts with KeePassXC. This focuses on weaknesses in the application's code and practices related to handling KeePassXC.
  • Sub-Paths:
    • Insecure Storage of KeePassXC Database Credentials [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
      • Attack Vector: The application might need to access the KeePassXC database programmatically. If the credentials (master password or keyfile path) for accessing the database are stored insecurely within the application, attackers can retrieve them.
      • Sub-Paths:
        • Hardcoded Master Password or Keyfile Path in Application Code [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
          • Critical Node: Extract credentials from application source code or binaries [CRITICAL NODE]:
            • Attack Vector: Developers might mistakenly hardcode the master password or keyfile path directly into the application's source code. Attackers can then analyze the source code (if available) or reverse engineer the compiled application binaries to extract these credentials.
        • Storing Master Password or Keyfile in Application Configuration Files [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
          • Critical Node: Access configuration files to retrieve credentials [CRITICAL NODE]:
            • Attack Vector: Credentials might be stored in application configuration files (e.g., INI, XML, JSON). If these files are not properly protected (e.g., world-readable permissions, stored in plaintext), attackers can access them and retrieve the credentials.
        • Insecure Environment Variables for KeePassXC Credentials [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
          • Critical Node: Access environment variables to retrieve credentials [CRITICAL NODE]:
            • Attack Vector: Credentials might be passed to the application via environment variables. If these environment variables are not properly secured (e.g., accessible to other users or processes), attackers can read them and obtain the credentials.
    • Insecure KeePassXC Database Handling by Application [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
      • Attack Vector: Vulnerabilities can arise from how the application manages the KeePassXC database during its operation.
      • Sub-Paths:
        • Leaving KeePassXC Database Unlocked for Extended Periods [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
          • Critical Node: Exploit unlocked database if attacker gains access to the system [CRITICAL NODE]:
            • Attack Vector: If the application unlocks the KeePassXC database and keeps it unlocked for longer than necessary, and an attacker gains access to the system (e.g., through malware, physical access, or other vulnerabilities), they can directly access the unlocked KeePassXC application and its decrypted data.
        • Lack of Input Validation when Retrieving Passwords from KeePassXC [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
          • Critical Node: Application vulnerable to injection if it uses retrieved passwords without sanitization [CRITICAL NODE]:
            • Attack Vector: If the application retrieves passwords from KeePassXC and then uses them in further operations (e.g., constructing database queries, executing system commands) without proper input validation and sanitization, it can become vulnerable to injection attacks (like SQL injection, command injection) if the retrieved password itself contains malicious characters.
    • Vulnerabilities in Application's KeePassXC API/CLI Usage [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
      • Attack Vector: If the application uses KeePassXC's API or command-line interface (CLI) to interact with the password database, vulnerabilities can be introduced in how the application uses these interfaces.
      • Sub-Paths:
        • Command Injection in Application's KeePassXC CLI Calls [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
          • Critical Node: Inject malicious commands into KeePassXC CLI execution [CRITICAL NODE]:
            • Attack Vector: If the application constructs KeePassXC CLI commands by concatenating user-controlled input or other application data without proper sanitization, attackers might be able to inject malicious commands into the CLI string. When the application executes this command, the injected commands will also be executed, potentially leading to system compromise.
        • Insecure Parameter Passing to KeePassXC API/CLI [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
          • Critical Node: Manipulate parameters to bypass security checks or retrieve unintended data [CRITICAL NODE]:
            • Attack Vector: Even if command injection is prevented, attackers might be able to manipulate parameters passed to the KeePassXC API or CLI to bypass intended security checks or retrieve data they are not authorized to access. This could involve manipulating group names, entry titles, or other parameters to access entries outside of the application's intended scope.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Social Engineering Targeting KeePassXC Users (Application Users) [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

• Attack Vector: Attackers manipulate users into performing actions that compromise the security of their KeePassXC database or the application's access to it. This relies on psychological manipulation rather than technical exploits of the application or KeePassXC itself.
  • Sub-Paths:
    • Phishing for KeePassXC Master Password [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
      • Critical Node: Trick user into revealing master password to unlock database [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Attack Vector: Attackers create fake login pages or emails that mimic legitimate KeePassXC prompts or application interfaces. They trick users into entering their KeePassXC master password into these fake interfaces, allowing the attacker to capture the password and subsequently unlock the user's database.
    • Social Engineering to Install Malicious KeePassXC Plugins [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
      • Critical Node: Trick user into installing malicious plugin to compromise KeePassXC [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Attack Vector: Attackers might create malicious KeePassXC plugins disguised as legitimate or useful extensions. They then use social engineering tactics (e.g., forum posts, emails, fake websites) to trick users into downloading and installing these malicious plugins. Once installed, the plugin can perform malicious actions, such as stealing passwords, logging keystrokes, or providing backdoor access.
    • Tricking User into Exporting KeePassXC Database [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
      • Critical Node: Trick user into exporting KeePassXC database to attacker-controlled location [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Attack Vector: Attackers might trick users into exporting their KeePassXC database (e.g., by claiming it's necessary for backup, migration, or support). They then guide the user to export the database to a location controlled by the attacker (e.g., attacker's email, cloud storage, or a compromised server). Once exported, the attacker gains access to the entire password database.

Attack Tree Path: 4. KeePassXC Process Memory Exploitation [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

• Attack Vector: If an attacker gains local access to the system where KeePassXC is running, they can attempt to extract sensitive information directly from the KeePassXC process memory.
  • Sub-Paths:
    • Memory Dumping KeePassXC Process [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
      • Critical Node: Extract decrypted passwords and keys from memory dump [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Attack Vector: When KeePassXC decrypts a database, the decrypted passwords and keys are temporarily stored in the process's memory. If an attacker gains sufficient privileges on the system, they can use memory dumping tools to create a snapshot of the KeePassXC process memory. By analyzing this memory dump, they might be able to locate and extract the decrypted passwords and keys, even if the database itself is encrypted on disk.

Attack Tree Path: 5. KeePassXC Plugin Vulnerabilities (if plugins are used and enabled) [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

• Attack Vector: If the user has installed and enabled third-party KeePassXC plugins, vulnerabilities in these plugins can be exploited to compromise KeePassXC and potentially the application relying on it.
  • Sub-Paths:
    • Vulnerabilities in Third-Party KeePassXC Plugins [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
      • Critical Node: Exploit vulnerabilities in user-installed plugins [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Attack Vector: Third-party plugins are often developed with less rigorous security scrutiny than the core KeePassXC application. They might contain code vulnerabilities (e.g., buffer overflows, injection flaws, logic errors) that attackers can exploit. If a vulnerable plugin is installed, attackers can leverage these vulnerabilities to gain control over KeePassXC, potentially steal passwords, or even execute arbitrary code within the KeePassXC process, which can then be used to compromise the application that relies on it.