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Attack Tree Analysis for keepassxreboot/keepassxc

Objective: Gain Unauthorized Access to Secrets in KeePassXC Database [CRITICAL]

Attack Tree Visualization

Gain Unauthorized Access to Secrets in KeePassXC Database [CRITICAL]
                    |
    ---------------------------------
    |                               |
Compromise Master Key/Key File      Compromise Application Integration
[CRITICAL]                          |
    |                   ----------------------------
    |                   |                           |
Dictionary Attack     Keylogger/          Insecure Storage of
on Master Key         Screen Scraper      KeePassXC Config/
                                          Database File Path [CRITICAL]
                                          |
                                          Improper Key Derivation

Attack Tree Path: Compromise Master Key/Key File [CRITICAL]

  1. Compromise Master Key/Key File [CRITICAL]

    • Description: This attack vector focuses on obtaining the credentials (master password or key file) needed to unlock the KeePassXC database. It's a critical node because successful compromise grants full access to all stored secrets.
    • Attack Vectors:
      • Dictionary Attack on Master Key:
        • Description: The attacker uses a list of common passwords, previously leaked credentials, or other predictable phrases to try and guess the user's master password.
        • Likelihood: Medium. Depends heavily on the user's password choice. Weak, common passwords significantly increase the likelihood.
        • Impact: Very High. Grants full access to the KeePassXC database.
        • Effort: Medium. Readily available tools and wordlists can be used.
        • Skill Level: Intermediate. Requires some knowledge of password cracking tools but is generally accessible.
        • Detection Difficulty: Medium. Repeated failed login attempts might be logged, but distinguishing them from legitimate failures can be challenging.
      • Keylogger/Screen Scraper:
        • Description: The attacker uses malware (keylogger or screen scraper) to capture the master password as the user types it or displays it on the screen. This bypasses any password strength measures.
        • Likelihood: Low. Requires compromising the system where the master key is entered, which is outside KeePassXC's direct control but a critical system-level concern.
        • Impact: Very High. Grants full access to the KeePassXC database.
        • Effort: Medium. Deploying malware requires some effort, but pre-built tools are available.
        • Skill Level: Advanced. Creating and deploying effective, stealthy malware requires significant expertise.
        • Detection Difficulty: Hard. Good keyloggers and screen scrapers are designed to be stealthy and avoid detection.

Attack Tree Path: Compromise Application Integration

  1. Compromise Application Integration

    • Description: This attack vector focuses on vulnerabilities introduced by how the application interacts with KeePassXC, rather than flaws within KeePassXC itself.
    • Attack Vectors:
      • Insecure Storage of KeePassXC Config/Database File Path [CRITICAL]
        • Description: The application stores the path to the KeePassXC database file in an insecure location, such as a world-readable configuration file, hardcoded in a vulnerable part of the application, or in easily accessible logs. This makes it trivial for an attacker to locate the database.
        • Likelihood: Medium. Developers may overlook the security implications of storing this information.
        • Impact: Medium. Facilitates other attacks (brute-force, dictionary attacks, vulnerability exploitation) by making the database easily accessible.
        • Effort: Low. Finding misconfigured files or hardcoded paths is relatively easy.
        • Skill Level: Novice/Intermediate. Requires basic system administration or code review skills.
        • Detection Difficulty: Easy/Medium. Can be detected through file system scans, code analysis, or configuration reviews.
      • Improper Key Derivation:
        • Description: The application uses a weak method to derive a key from user input before passing it to KeePassXC. For example, using a simple hash function instead of a proper Key Derivation Function (KDF) like Argon2. This weakens the overall security, even if KeePassXC's internal KDF is strong.
        • Likelihood: Medium. Developers might not fully understand the importance of strong KDFs or might choose a simpler, less secure method for convenience.
        • Impact: High. Makes the master key significantly easier to compromise through brute-force or dictionary attacks.
        • Effort: Low. Implementing a weak KDF is often easier than implementing a strong one.
        • Skill Level: Intermediate. Requires some understanding of cryptography but not necessarily expert knowledge.
        • Detection Difficulty: Medium. Requires code review and analysis of the key derivation process.